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# GEN. TAYLOR'S

LIFE, BATTLES AND CORRESPONDENCE.



PHILADELPHIA:  
T. C. CLARKE, No. 85 DOCK STREET

For Sale also by King & Baird, Printers, No. 9 George St.  
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1847.









**GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR.**

**The "Rough and Ready" Hero who "Never Surrenders."**

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A BRILLIANT NATIONAL RECORD.

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GENERAL TAYLOR'S  
LIFE, BATTLES, AND DESPATCHES,

WITH THE ONLY CORRECT PORTRAIT YET PUBLISHED;

INCLUDING

HIGHLY IMPORTANT LETTERS,

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE WAR DEPARTMENT, SECRETARY MARCY,  
GENERAL TAYLOR, GENERAL SCOTT, COMMODORE PERRY, AND  
THE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES.

ACCOUNTS OF

THE GLORIOUS BATTLES

OF

Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, and  
San Juan D'Ulloa.

COMPILED FROM AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

ILLUSTRATED

BY PLANS OF THE CITIES, MAPS OF THE BATTLE GROUNDS, AND PORTRAITS OF THE  
PRINCIPAL GENERALS.

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
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# **Battle Grounds of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.**





# A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR.

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THE life of this distinguished hero, who has led the armies of his country to a series of triumphs unparalleled in the annals of warfare, will occupy a place beside that of our immortal Washington, whom, in clear-sighted sagacity, judgment, and decision, in perfect self-possession, unassuming merit, and brilliancy of genius, he so much resembles. In simple dignity and grandeur of character, Washington and Taylor will be associated in the annals of American heroism. They will together challenge the gratitude of their countrymen, and the admiration of the world.

The great claims of the Hero of Buena Vista are founded in his great strength and energy of character, which, in successive emergencies, have enabled him to rise superior to impending ruin. The dangers and obstacles which held the nation in fearful suspense, were successively met and overpowered. At periods of great peril, when the nation held its breath, and when discomfiture and ruin seemed inevitable, the genius of Taylor immersed from the gloom, and relieved the country from apprehensions of disaster and disgrace. From the dark storm cloud the sun of American valour burst forth with a brilliant glory that animates every bosom, and spread a thrill of exultation over the whole land. The brave troops and their gallant leader achieved triumph after triumph, with a rapidity which electrified, and against odds, and under circumstances without a parallel in the annals of warfare.

At Palo Alto, and Resaca de la Palma, with twenty-three hundred Americans, six thousand eight hundred disciplined regular troops of the enemy were attacked in their own chosen position, driven from their fortified entrenchments, and in two successive battles were overwhelmed and scattered like chaff. Marching onward through submissive towns, and in defiance of all opposition, our victorious troops reached Monterey, whose fortresses, deemed impregnable, held the enemy, again in fearful odds and in fancied security. But the genius of Taylor, the valour of Worth, and the spirit of our gallant forces bade defiance to the foe and his armed battlements. In the language of a correspondent from the scene of triumph, "Monterey has fallen! Five thousand men have seen nine thousand file past them with humbled mien and downcast looks; have gazed proudly on two fortified mountain fastnesses they had escalated; upon a castle of enormous strength, bristling with cannon, and upon four formidable forts they had stormed; upon an impregnable citadel, thirty-five pieces of ordnance, countless munitions of war, and the oveliest city in the world, with its stately palaces,

sparkling streams and fountains, its magnificent gardens and fragrant groves of orange and pomegranate, which their gallantry had won. Ensclosed among the dizzy cliffs of the Sierra de la Madre, circled on three sides by a buttressed wall, in many places thirty feet high, the houses built of stone with flat and parapeted roofs for sharpshooters, with barricades of solid masonry twelve feet thick crossing in all directions,—every house a castle and every street a fortress, defended too by ten thousand veteran troops, the pride of the Mexican soldiery,—the city of the Royal Mountain seemed to scoff from her lofty seat at the puny force that lay encamped below. But in three days this despised band had entered the proud city, defeated an army of twice their numbers, one thousand of whom lay stretched on the field of battle, and *without ladders, fascines, siege guns or battering train*, had made themselves masters of more than thirty fortifications on which the heaviest artillery could have produced no impression by a six months' uninterrupted cannonade."

With such glorious results imperishable glory would have encircled the name of Taylor were he to have advanced no further. But a scene of triumph, if possible still more wonderful, awaits him. While deprived of most of his efficient troops, the heroic Worth and other gallant aids detailed upon a distant service, Gen. Taylor is again placed in circumstances of great peril. The Mexican army is led on by its great chieftain, the renowned Santa Anna, in the confident expectation of an easy conquest. That there may be no misconception as to the relative forces of the contending armies, it should be borne in mind that we have the number of Mexican troops clearly established from three different sources. As each of these authorities are Mexican, and therefore disinterested, the number thus shown must be considered conclusive.

In the first place we have the Mexican Journals which after an enumeration of the various forces which left San Luis Potosi with General Santa Anna, sums up the aggregate and makes the entire number exceed twenty-one thousand. In the next place, Mexican prisoners assert the number of the Mexican army to have been twenty-one thousand; six thousand cavalry, and fifteen thousand infantry; and in the last place General Santa Anna, himself boldly proclaims in his note of defiance to Gen. Taylor, that he has with him an army of twenty thousand men. To oppose this force after leaving the necessary troops to garrison Saltillo, Monterey and other points conquered from the enemy, Gen. Taylor had short of five thousand four hundred men. See the

subjoined dispatches both for a more particular account of our own troops and for the demand of Gen. Santa Anna upon Gen. Taylor for an unconditional surrender. It may therefore be considered as fairly established that the American General had about five thousand arrayed against twenty thousand. The Mexican army is reported as having been deplorably destitute of necessary provisions. The stern demands of hunger was an additional incentive to action, and doubtless nerved them for a more desperate and determined contest.

Santa Anna expected an easy victory. His army was told that the Americans had an abundance of provisions and lots of money, and that they must enter Saltillo the day of the battle and take their supper at our expense.

Majors Dix and Coffee, ten days since, says a writer from the seat of war, brought up 200,000 dollars; Majors Colquitt and Weston arrived with some seven wagon loads of gold and silver. Ninety wagons, loaded with provisions from Monterey, and intended for Gen. Taylor's camp, were ordered to be parked in the main plaza, and not to be unloaded. There were on hand 180,000 rations, besides some 60,000 pounds of Mexican flour that had been captured by our forces. Would not all this be a prize for Santa Anna, saying nothing of the officers' baggage, money, &c., six hundred wagons and equipments, four parks of artillery complete, and any quantity of medical supplies, hospital stores, &c., and ammunition in the greatest abundance.

What more imperious motives could have urged men to exertion? to say nothing of the defence of their own homes and the boasted glory of the Mexican nation.

Under such appalling odds, with such disadvantages, in the heart of an enemy's country, surrounded by foes on all sides, and with an overwhelming array actuated by every motive that could nerve men to action, thirsting for revenge against the invaders of their country, impelled with the ferocity of famished wolves, and led on by their greatest champion, what could have been anticipated but an easy and certain triumph. But in circumstances so appalling and of such peril, there was no talk of retreat or of dismay among our small but heroic band. With Gen. Taylor, backed by American troops, there was no such word as fail. He knew the mettle of his men; and they confided in the sagacity, coolness, the military genius and unflinching firmness of their brave old General. An officer of his staff, writing before the battle, says, "In the course of conversation with Gen. Taylor, I asked him if he could realize that Gen. Santa Anna was really approaching with such an army. The old 'war horse' shrugged his shoulders and replied, 'Let them come; they will go back a good deal faster.' He has no fears.

The result, glorious in the extreme, has proved the accuracy of his calculations. Words are inadequate to express the high admiration and the deep felt gratitude which has inspired the country, at the glorious achievements at Buena Vista.

It has been truly said that, in no page of our history do we find recorded four such hard fought battles, fought at such fearful odds as these, which have placed such laurels on the brow of Gen. Taylor, and the brave troops under his command. The country is astonished to find it possesses such a man!

Well may the American citizens feel proud at the glory which has crowned the American arms. Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the necessity or the origin of this war against a neighbouring republic, there can be none as to the immortal glory which crowns the brow of the country's great champion. From the outset, caution marked his steps, and every movement in the approach towards the frontier was pre-eminently distinguished by a steady reluctance to commence hostilities, an unwillingness to give just grounds of offence or to make a single warlike demonstration not sanctioned by the most imperious necessity. His dispatches to the war department clearly establish this. Gen. Taylor was not the man needlessly, rashly to involve his country in an expensive and painful war; before the world he stands acquitted of any such imputation. But having entered upon the contest, he was not the man to shrink from the performance of any duty that could devolve upon an American commander. He has carried the war into the heart of the enemy's country, and under circumstances of difficulty and danger, and accompanied by triumph after triumph, that has electrified every patriot heart, that has challenged the admiration of the world.

Palo Alto! Resaca de la Palma! Monterey! and Buena Vista! what a series of triumphs, each in turn surpassing its predecessor, each rising in grandeur and sublimity, until reaching the crowning glory, the magnificent and stupendous achievement of Buena Vista. Of this, one of the thousand pens which the great event has set in motion, justly states that the battle of Buena Vista is one of the most remarkable of the age, and throws into the shade the recent and much vaunted triumphs of the British arms in India. The Sikhs are, at the best, not superior to the Mexican army, yet, in a two days' battle they were barely repulsed by an English force scarcely inferior in numbers. Over that victory, what exultations abroad! The Tower guns were fired in the dead of night on the receipt of the intelligence: Sir Henry Hardyng and his second in command were raised to the peerage; pensions were voted and honours awarded without stint! At Buena Vista we behold, on one side, twenty thousand men, rendered desperate by hunger, and led by a general whom they regarded as invincible; and on the other scarce five thousand, all told, prepared to resist to death the attack. There is not an instance, during the wars of the whole French revolution, where a victory was achieved against such odds. In all modern history Buena Vista has no parallel.

The details of this great battle will be given in its proper place, together with the brief plain and simple despatches to our government in which the old hero announces his victory. But before passing to those accounts which so brilliantly show forth the prowess of our arms we present a brief sketch of the life of the American commander. Our incidents are necessarily brief, confined as we are to a limited space, but the time is at hand when more ample justice will be done to a subject of such intense interest to the country. The people desire to know more of a man whose unparalleled achievements have excited the admiration both of the old world and the new. That desire will be speedily gratified, and the life of General Taylor will ere long

form one of the most important and brilliant volumes in our national literature.

At present we are mainly dependent upon such information as the journals of the day have furnished.

In the course of conversation with an esteemed friend who has enjoyed rare opportunities for extensive intercourse with public men abroad as well as at home, it was said that Gen. Taylor's conduct of the campaign in Mexico had attracted the highest admiration in Europe. His gallantry and address, and the discipline, order and courage of his army as manifested on the Rio Grande and the taking of Monterey, it was further said, were the frequent theme of eulogy in France and England during the last few weeks of his late visit to Paris and London. The British mind especially, appears to have derived new impressions of American character from these manifestations, which our friend regards as among the few promising effects of this most unpromising war. An eminent American, who now occupies a conspicuous position among our public agents abroad, and who is not pledged to any political party at home, mentioned to him that the name of no contemporary was now more respected among the public men within the circle of his present intercourse than that of the Hero of the Rio Grande. He remarked, moreover, that he was gratified in being able to add from a long and intimate acquaintance with Gen. Taylor in years past, that the personal and private qualities of the man who had thus attracted to himself all attention, were quite as admirable as his prowess in the field—that he is in short not less a civilian than a soldier. And such, we may add, is the uniform testimony of all who know him.

If any other proof of this were needed, we might refer to his remarkable voluminous correspondence with the Government as being conclusive. It would be difficult to find in the whole annals of military history any similar correspondence at all comparable to it in the various attributes that go to declare a sound and cultivated mind,—practical wisdom, clear foresight, and manly vigour. The public mind is apt to infer when a man greatly distinguishes himself in a given course of action, that he is more especially fitted for that than any thing else. This is doubtless sometimes the case. But it is not so with Gen. Taylor, as he has himself demonstrated to his friends, the army, his country, and the world. Though the greater part of his life has been spent in the public service, he has not neglected, as some suppose, to cultivate those milder virtues which give a charm to personal intercourse, and lend attraction and grace to private life.

He comes from an ancient Virginia family, which emigrated from England, with other friends of liberty, and settled in the eastern part of Virginia, near two centuries ago—a family which has since been greatly distinguished in its various branches, and which includes within its connections such names as James Madison, John Taylor of Caroline, Judge Pendleton, Gen. Hunt, &c. &c. Gen. Taylor's father was one of the most daring of those enterprising pioneers who settled "the dark and bloody ground" which defines the Indian word Kentucky, and many anecdotes are told of his prowess in desperate encounters with the savages. He became also a man of eminence in civil life, and was a member

of the Electoral Colleges which voted for Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Clay.—He died on his estate near Lexington in 1826, leaving four sons, of whom "old Zack" is the third, and, we believe, one or two daughters. The eldest son, Gen. James Taylor, who was a Quarter Master General in the Army during the war of 1812, now resides at Newport, Ky. at the advanced age of eighty years.

His more distinguished brother was born in Kentucky two years before its admission into the Union, and is now therefore about 56 years of age. Having a stout, vigorous frame, he was early distinguished for feats of manly character, and many amusing anecdotes are told of his achievements in the sports of boyhood. The same foresight, firmness, and decision which have since so attracted public admiration, are said to have characterized his whole course through all the shifting circumstances of life. Soon after the affair of the Chesapeake and Leopard previous to the war of 1812, he being then 18 years of age, received from Mr. Jefferson (in 1808) the appointment of Lieutenant in the 7th Infantry, and commenced that military career which has now been crowned with imperishable fame.

His strict observance of duty and distinguished merit as a disciplinarian soon commended him for promotion, and at the opening of the war of 1812 we find him a captain in his regiment. Having been entrusted with the command of Fort Harrison on the Wabash with a garrison of fifty men, he greatly distinguished himself in that year by his successful defence of it against a formidable attack by a large body of Indians, and was rewarded by the President with the brevet rank of Major. His well known skill in Indian warfare, acquired in his brilliant career in the N. W. Territory, secured for him the command of the 1st Brigade of the Army of the South, and it was at the head of that Division that he won the Bloody Battle of Lake Okeechobee during the Florida campaign of 1838; and for which achievement he was brevetted Brigadier General.—After four or five years arduous service in the swamps and hammocks of Florida, he was assigned to the command of the first department of the Army at Fort Jesup—where the order to Texas and the Rio Grande found him.

By his marriage with a lady of Maryland, Gen. Taylor has one son and two daughters—one of whom is married to Col. Davis, of the Mississippi regiment, who was severely wounded at Buena Vista. But to pursue his military career further in the midst of the glowing enthusiasm of the country over his brilliant achievements in Mexico, would be idle, and defer a notice of the higher qualities which commend him to the confidence and respect of his countrymen.

Avoiding the mere rumours, and unfounded conjectures, which are only calculated to mislead, we would only present the readers of this brief memoir, with information obtained from reliable sources. Of this character is the letter from the Hon. J. W. Tibbats, a member of Congress, and relative of the distinguished soldier. He says:

"Gen. Z. Taylor is now 50 years of age. He is the son of Capt. Dick Taylor, one of that band of enterprising pioneers of the West, who settled the "dark and bloody ground," to use the Indian



meaning of the word "Kentucky." Of Capt. Dick Taylor, Gov. Scott (who was sometimes a little profane) is reported to have said, that if he had to storm the gates of hell, he would want Dick Taylor to lead the column. Zachary Taylor is a Kentuckian by birth—his father was from Virginia. Z. Taylor entered the service as a Lieutenant of Infantry in 1808, shortly after the attack of the Chesapeake, and has remained in the army ever since. He was sent into Indiana, and early engaged in Indian hostilities. On the 5th December, 1812, he made a gallant defence of Fort Harrison, for which he was *brevetted a Major* by President Madison, which brevet is the *oldest* in the army. In 1832 he led the 1st Infantry in the Black Hawk war—he became the Colonel of the 6th Infantry, I think, in 1832. In 1836 he was ordered to Florida; in that country he was always foremost in danger. With a detachment of about 500 men composed of parts of the 1st, 4th, and 6th regiments of U. S. Infantry, and some Missouri volunteers, he met about 700 Indians, under those famous warriors, Sam Jones, Coa-coo-che, and Alligator, on the O-ke-cho-bee. It is said that he was *challenged* to this battle by Alligator—an invitation which Col. Taylor very readily accepted. This is said to have been the only instance in which the Indians voluntarily gave battle in the Florida war. The Indians were concealed in strong position in a thick swamp, covered in front by a small stream, which was rendered almost impassable by quicksands. Col. Taylor, however, charged his concealed enemy, in the face of a deadly fire, and forced the Indians to yield their ground inch by inch at the point of the bayonet. The battle was hardly contested—it lasted about three hours, when the Indians were routed and pursued until night, with great slaughter. This was a bloody battle, and reflected great credit upon the valiant band engaged in it, both regulars and Missouri volunteers—of whom 139 were killed or wounded, being more than one-fourth of the whole force. Col. Taylor remained on horse-back during the whole engagement, cheering his men and exposing his person to the deadly rifle of the Indians. The victory was complete, for this was the last stand which the Indians made in Florida in any large body. This short sketch would satisfy you that Gen. Taylor will lose nothing of his laurels in Mexico, if his deeds have not already proved that. If I am not greatly mistaken, he will be found to be one of the greatest generals of the age—he is a bold, dashing soldier, who is not disposed to procrastinate, but to make hasty settlements by an appeal to the bayonet, yet always calm, firm and cool in the hour of conflict."

Gen. Taylor's family is believed to be now at New Orleans; though Baton Rouge is their usual place of residence. An unmarried daughter has excited much admiration in that city, the past winter, and, in addition to the interest which the father's achievements have created, the lady is represented as being both beautiful and accomplished. Her distinguished father has been absent from his home for near three years, and besides the deprivations and hardships, which an almost constant exposure in the field has occasioned, we regret to learn that his private affairs have been seriously affected. His fortune has been greatly impaired by his patriotic devotion to the country, but we hope, nay, we have no doubt that his country will see that all is made right.

The kindness and humanity of Gen. Taylor, are prominent features in his character. Of this we have ample testimony in the whole course and conduct of his life, and especially has this been manifested during the campaign in Mexico. From the outset he was averse to hostilities, and, as the despatches we publish amply prove, in his advance upon Mexico, moved solely in strict compliance with his orders and his duty. It is recorded that the females, who followed the Mexican army, remained, like ministering angels, to take care of the wounded. Gen. Taylor treated them with the kindness due their sex, and the humanity expected of an American. And after the disastrous defeat of the Mexican forces at Buena Vista, Gen. Taylor permitted Santa Anna to have all his wounded conveyed into Saltillo, and tendered him surgical aid from his own army.

His intercourse with the inhabitants of Mexico, who in the prosecution of the war, have fallen under his jurisdiction, has been marked with peculiar kindness, conciliation and forbearance. But the most gratifying evidence of his real goodness of heart and nobleness of soul, is furnished in the letter of condolence to the Hon. Henry Clay. This touching and manly expression of feeling, so eminently characteristic of the Hero, we take pride in giving place to here.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Agua Nueva, Mexico, March 1, 1847.

My Dear Sir:—You will no doubt have received, before this can reach you, the deeply distressing intelligence of the death of your son, in the battle of Buena Vista. It is with no wish of intruding upon the sanctuary of parental sorrow, and with no hope of administering any consolation to your wounded heart, that I have taken the liberty of addressing you these few lines: but I have felt it a duty which I owe to the memory of the distinguished dead, to pay a willing tribute to his many excellent qualities, and while my feelings are still fresh, to express the desolation which his untimely loss, and that of other kindred spirits, has occasioned.

I had but a casual acquaintance with your son until he became, for a time, a member of my military family, and I can truly say that no one ever won more rapidly upon my regard, or established a more lasting claim to my respect and esteem. Manly and honourable in every impulse, with no feeling but for the honour of the service and of the country, he gave every assurance that in the hour of need I could lean with confidence upon his support. Nor was I disappointed. Under the guidance of himself and the lamented McKee, gallantly did the sons of Kentucky, in the thickest of the strife, uphold the honour of the State and of the country.

A grateful people will do justice to the memory of those who fell on that eventful day. But I may be permitted to express the bereavement which I feel in the loss of valued friends. To your son I felt bound by the strongest ties of private regard, and when I miss his familiar face, and those of McKee and Hardin, I can say with truth, that I feel no exultation in our success.

With the expression of my deepest and most heartfelt sympathies for your irreparable loss, I remain, dear sir, most faithfully and sincerely,

Your friend,

Z. TAYLOR.

Hon. Henry Clay, New Orleans, La.



It is truly gratifying to perceive the just appreciation of the eminent services, the imperishable glory of the heroic old soldier, which is every where manifested. The government paper, *The Union*, has furnished us with solid columns of encomiums, exhibiting the unequivocal testimony of the leading journals of the country, and the proceedings of the public authorities in most of our towns and cities. In these the illuminations, the roar of artillery and other demonstrations of rejoicing, show the enthusiasm that prevails. In our own city, the exultation has been proud and universal; manifesting itself in a brilliant and general illumination of the city and districts. On issuing his Proclamation, the Mayor briefly but emphatically said:

**"FELLOW CITIZENS:**—In accordance with the spirit of the resolutions passed by Councils on the 8th instant, extending to the gallant Taylor and his brave associates in arms, the expression of our unqualified admiration of their late peerless victory at Buena Vista, as also from the expressed wish of a great portion of my fellow citizens, that some manifestation of the high appreciation we entertain for the valor and patriotism of that Spartan Band, I propose an **ILLUMINATION OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA**, and respectfully suggest **MONDAY EVENING NEXT**, the 19th instant, as a suitable time."

This spirit extends throughout the country, and not only bonfires, processions, and illuminations, show the deep felt joy and gratitude of the people, but newspapers in all parts of the Union, without distinction of party, are placing his name at the head of their columns as the candidate of the nation. Profound admiration of his abilities as a commander, of his qualifications as a civilian, and of the unblemished excellence of his private character, has taken possession of the public mind in every quarter.

Nor is this admiration of the American General confined to his own countrymen. Abroad he is appreciated and admired. Wellington, the "Conqueror of Napoleon," has stamped his military plans with applause, while the London press has bestowed its meed of admiration on the masterly skill and indomitable valour of "Old Rough and Ready." The journals of Paris and other cities of Europe, have also united their praise. When they shall have heard of the last, and crowning glory of our arms, their admiration must be still further heightened. It is a theme upon which the world may boast.

The *Courier des Etats Unis* says, the despatches of General Taylor bear the same impress of modesty and simplicity which have heretofore marked all the acts and words of this General. The answer made by him to Santa Anna's summons to surrender at discretion, is worthy of a place in the military annals of all people, as a model of grandeur and courtesy. These three lines so simple, so polite, should be sufficient to render illustrious the whole life of him who wrote them. After repeating anecdotes of General Taylor's career, his daring self-exposure during the fight, his humanity in seeking to spare the conquered; and finally, his sending back the two foreign deserters from our armies, instead of hanging them up, as by the laws of war he might have done, referring especially to this last incident, this French journal exclaims, "Magnificent contempt! magnificent clemency. These traits," it continues, "and a thousand others, throw such

a charm, and so much poetry, over a character whose goodness is allied to heroic firmness, and where the warrior is cut out of the granite of the man of worth, that the popularity of the Hero of Buena Vista, has become so immense," as to be absolutely overwhelming, flowing onward in a deep, broad current of universal sympathy.

In November, 1812, President Madison conferred upon then Capt. Taylor, the rank of Brevet Major, for his gallant achievements, and from President Polk, he has received the Brevet rank of Major General, the thanks of Congress, and a gold medal commemorative of the events. Thanks were voted him, and swords presented him by Louisiana and other States. He was subsequently appointed a full Major General under the Supplementary War Bill.

Mr. Calhoun, is said to have written a warm commendation of General Taylor for the Presidency, and a favourite statesman of Pennsylvania, closes a brilliant eulogium on the great General of the age, in this brief but beautiful passage.

"Thus—in eleven months, General Taylor has become an historical character; and with an unconscious modesty, he has, with his sword and his pen, written his own history—so that it forms one of the brightest episodes in the annals of the United States since the days of Washington."

## BATTLE OF PALO ALTO.

While Gen. Taylor's forces were engaged in fortifying the camp opposite Matamoras, the communication with Point Isabel—their entrepot whence supplies were received—was cut off by the Mexicans, who were now in force upon either flank, and in rear of the army. Reinforcements for the Mexican army were constantly arriving, and several American scouting parties had either been cut to pieces or taken prisoners. It was a dark hour. The strongest fears were entertained that Point Isabel had fallen into the hands of the enemy, in which case the supplies of our army would have been cut off entirely, and our fortifications, if not the army itself, must inevitably have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Thus, on the first day of May, while darkness and doubt brooded over the fate of his companions at Point Isabel, Gen. Taylor, leaving a small garrison of less than 300 brave hearts, with Col. Brown at their head, in charge of the fort, marched with the main body of his army to the Point to re-open a communication with his stores, and bring back ammunition and guns for the fort. He expected to be obliged to cut his way through Mexican troops; but such was not the case. He met no enemy during the whole march, (twenty-seven miles,) and found all safe when he arrived.

Previous to this, on the 28th day of April, Capt. Samuel Walker, at the head of a small company of Texas Rangers, left Point Isabel with the hope of opening a communication with Fort Brown. But when he had proceeded to about midway between the two posts, he was attacked by a large Mexican force, and his command routed and dispersed.

When Gen. Taylor left Fort Brown, his orders were to defend it to the death; and if the enemy should surround it, to fire signal-guns at certain

intervals to let him know it. As was anticipated, the Mexicans took advantage of the departure of the great bulk of the army, and at daylight on Sunday morning, May 3d, opened their batteries upon the fort. "The holy quiet of that day," says a writer, in describing the attack, "was broken by the thunder of cannon, and before the sun had risen on the scene, that little fort was in a blaze, as gun answered gun; and in twenty minutes' time, one of the Mexican twelve-pounders was seen leaping twenty feet into the air, accompanied by arms, legs and mangled bodies." The cannonading on the part of the enemy was kept up with slight intermission until near midnight, and returned with effect. Major Brown lost one sergeant, and one artillery soldier wounded. The next morning the Mexicans opened their batteries again, sending both shot and shells, but without much effect. The cannonading had not lasted more than half an hour, when Major Brown's artillery silenced the enemy's guns, having greatly damaged three of the embrasures, dismounted several guns, and killed a number of men. The Mexican batteries opened a fire early the next morning, which lasted an hour, and was promptly answered from an eighteen-pounder battery, and a six-pounder howitzer. Both batteries ceased at the same time. The Mexicans now surrounded the fort, and established a battery in its rear. At 5 o'clock the next morning the enemy opened from their several batteries, and continued with slight intervals, to pour a perfect shower of shot and shells among our brave and devoted little band in the fort until 2 o'clock P. M. In the meantime the signal-guns had been fired as directed by Gen. Taylor, and the gallant Brown had received a mortal wound from a falling shell. At half past 4 o'clock a parley was sounded, and the Mexican general sent a summons to the commander of the fort to surrender "for the sake of humanity," offering him one hour to return an answer, and threatening to put the whole garrison to the sword in case his demand should not be complied with. This was a most trying emergency. What should be done? The garrison numbered scarcely 250 men; their enemy several thousands. Their brave chief had been struck down—their ammunition was nearly exhausted. The probabilities were that the Mexican general would be able to carry his infamous threat into execution. Men less resolute, less brave, would have sunk under this accumulation of difficulties, and surrendered. Not so the heroes of Fort Brown. Capt. Hawkins, who succeeded Major Brown after his wound of the 6th, called a council of war, composed of the several company commanders, in the fort, and laid the subject before them. They had neither time nor disposition to deliberate. "*Defend the fort to the death!*" broke forth almost simultaneously from the lips of that devoted band; and within a few minutes they had returned the laconic reply that they *didn't understand Spanish*; and another shower of shot and shells was raining down upon them from the Mexican batteries, while they were constantly anticipating a storm, and nerving their hearts and whetting their blades for a last and death grapple with their powerful enemy. The cannonade was continued for the next and last three days with even more spirit than during the four preceding. During most of the memorable seven days, a number of men were constantly engaged

in completing the works. The American loss was only two killed, (Major Brown and Sergeant Weigart,) and thirteen wounded.

On the afternoon of the 7th, General Taylor took up his line of march from Point Isabel for Fort Brown, and encamped for the night about seven miles from the former post.

On the 8th, General Taylor again commenced his march, and about 11 o'clock came in sight of the enemy drawn up in order of battle, stretching a mile and a half across the plain, along the edge of a chapparal; and a little in advance of it, on the left, were their splendid lancers, a thousand strong, while throughout the rest of the line were masses of infantry and a battery alternately. Our army was immediately formed in column of attack, and, curtained by two squadrons in advance, moved steadily forward to within cannon-range, when one of the enemy's batteries opened. The column was then deployed in line, except the 8th infantry, which still stood in column, and the battle was set. Colonel Twiggs commanded the right, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 5th infantry, and Ringgold's artillery. Lieut. Churchill commanded the two eighteen-pounders in the centre, while Lieut. Col. Belknap was placed over the left wing, composed of Duncan's artillery and 8th infantry—and the **BATTLE OF PALO ALTO** commenced. The gallant Ringgold opened his battery on the right with terrible effect, and our little army for the first time found themselves in the midst of battle. There stood six thousand disciplined men, supported by a powerful artillery, and in position of their own choosing; here were scarce two thousand untried soldiers, marching steadily up to the attack. In a moment the field was in an uproar, and the mid-day sun looked down on as brave a fought battle as ever the stars and stripes floated over.

The deadly precision of Ringgold's guns told with fearful effect on the enemy's cavalry, that were waiting a favourable moment to bear down on our infantry. Platoons went down at every discharge, and wherever his practiced eye directed a cannon, a line opened amid the riders. At length, unable to stand the rapid fire, they wheeled off, and moved away in a trot, when a ball from one of the eighteen-pounders in the centre falling into their midst, hurried them into a gallop. But making a circular sweep, they suddenly threatened our flank, and the train in the rear. Down came the thundering squadrons, making the plain tremble under their horses' feet, when the 5th infantry was thrown into square, and with fixed bayonets waited the shock. A sudden fire from one of the angles of the formation sent twenty horses, emptied of their riders, galloping over the plain; but those behind pressed steadily on, when they, seeing the 3d advancing in column to the attack, wheeled and fled.

While Ringgold was thus making fearful havoc with his light artillery on the right, Duncan, on the left, poured in his destructive volleys in such fierce and rapid succession on the enemy, that their ranks melted away before them like frost-work, and a shout of triumph rolled along our lines that was heard over the roar of battle. Duncan and Ringgold, occupying the two extremes of the lines, sent hope and confidence through the army as it saw with what superiority and address our artillery was managed. To the fierce music that thus rolled over the field

from either wing, the two eighteen-pounders in the centre kept up a steady accompaniment, shaking the field with their steady fire as, slowly advancing, they sent death through the Mexican ranks. But the enemy's batteries were worked with great vigor, and their shot told on our left severely; yet still the regiments destined to support the artillery stood firm while the balls tore through their ranks. At one time, they lay for three-quarters of an hour in the tall grass, while the shot of the enemy kept tearing up the ground amid them, bounding and leaping by, carrying away, here a head and there an arm, and yet not a soldier quailed, but cool and resolute as old veterans, kept their position without a murmur or a look of complaint. In the mean time, Lieut. Duncan set the prairie on fire with some smoke-balls, and the thick smoke rolling along the lines, shut out the two armies from each other, and stayed for a while the work of carnage. It was now four o'clock, and the bloodshot sun was stooping to the western horizon, and silence rested on the field of death, save when the groans of the dying and wounded arose from the plain. Duncan, taking advantage of the smoke, carried the artillery through the lane of fire, with the flames rolling ten feet around him. Suddenly the enemy saw his horses' heads moving in a trot on their flank, and the next moment the pieces were unlimbered, and pouring in a scouring, galling fire on their ranks, rolling them back on each other in inextricable confusion. The Mexicans had changed their line of battle, to escape the murderous effect of the close and well-directed volleys of Ringgold's battery and the eighteen-pounders that had been pushed forward during the short cessation of the cannonading. The gallant Ringgold, while seated on his horse, directing the movement of the guns, received a shot which passed through his horse, cutting in two the pistols in his holsters, tore away the flesh from both his legs, from his knees upward. As he fell on the field some officers gathered around him, but he waved them, saying, "Leave me alone; you are needed forward." The sun went down on the field of blood, and as his departing rays struggled for a moment to pierce the war-cloud that curtained in the two armies, the firing, by mutual consent, ceased, and the battle of Palo Alto was over. Our little army encamped on the field where they fought, amid their dead and dying companions.

This was one of the most singular battles the records of our military history exhibit. It was a pure cannon-fight, in which our infantry, though cool and steady throughout, and ready at any moment to pour themselves in a furious charge on the enemy, took scarcely any active part. Appointed simply to sustain batteries, they stood and saw the artillery contest the field. Gen. Taylor, who evinced the utmost coolness and bravery, evidently feared to engage the enemy mass with mass, with so inferior a force. \* \* \* When night closed over the scene of strife, the Mexican commanders saw that they could do nothing in an open field and fair fight, and so retreated to a still more formidable position. The weary night wore away—the gallant Ringgold lay dying—Page speechless and faint, and scores of our brave men stretched on the field of their fame, wounded or dying, while hundreds of the enemy made the night hideous with their cries and groans. That was an anxious night for the

brave Taylor. He had advanced to within a short distance of the fort, and found the enemy strong, and resolved to dispute his entrance. He had fought one battle, lost one of the most efficient officers in the army, and was far from reinforcements, and without a protecting breast-work, while the enemy were in reach of help from Matamoras, and could choose their position at leisure. With two thousand men he had beat six thousand, and killed and wounded nearly eight hundred; but he knew that loss would be more than made up before morning by reinforcements. In this trying position, he called a council of war, composed of thirteen officers. Four only out of the whole number were in favour of advancing—the remainder advised either to intrench where they were, or retreat to Point Isabel, and wait for reinforcements. When all had spoken, the brave old veteran exclaimed—"I WILL BE AT FORT BROWN BEFORE NIGHT, IF I LIVE!" Noble words that deserve to be written in letters of gold. That feeble garrison, which had for a whole week so firmly withstood the close siege of the enemy, lay on his brave heart, and he resolved to succour it or fall in the attempt. There spoke out the spirit of the true hero. It was a noble resolution to save that garrison or leave his body at the foot of the walls, and right nobly was it carried out.

The next day the army recommenced its march, and found the enemy gone, leaving his dead unburied. The number of bodies lying around the spots where the artillery was posted, showed how terrible the fire of our guns had been, and with what steadiness and bravery the Mexicans had stood to their pieces. In one place, fifty-seven bodies were found in a heap, or about the entire number of killed and wounded together on our side.

## RESACA DE LA PALMA.

General Taylor soon came up with the enemy, occupying a strong position on the farther side of a ravine, and resting his left on a point so as to prevent the possibility of being outflanked on that side. Eight pieces of artillery defended this position, divided into three portions—one on the left side of the road, one on the right, and one in the centre. It was evident from the outset, that the great struggle was to be along the road where the batteries were placed, protected by a ditch and breastwork in front. Reinforcements of 2000 men had arrived during the night, and here, within three miles of the fort, the battle of *Resaca de la Palma* was fought. The victory of the day before, and the recital of the gallant deeds at night, had filled every bosom with a fierce desire to perform some brave act, and the troops defiled past the wagons, and deployed in front of the enemy, with an alacrity and ardor which showed that wild work would be done before night should close over the scene. Scarcely were our troops in order of battle, before the artillery of the enemy opened and rained a perfect shower of balls on our ranks. The road was swept at every discharge with grape-shot and ball, that threatened to carry entirely away the daring squadron which should presume to advance along it. To the left of the road, the conflict at once became fierce and bloody. The 4th, 5th, and 8th infantry, and a



part of the 3d were there, mowing down the enemy with their steady volleys, strewing the road side with the dead, and sternly forcing back the serried ranks, while the artillery kept thundering on with such rapid and ceaseless explosions that, as the Mexican prisoners afterward said, they thought we had fifty instead of eight cannon. Shells and shot drove so like a storm of sleet in their faces, that the officers vainly endeavoured to throw the entire army forward in a desperate charge on our guns, but so certain and biting was the fire, that they could not be induced to move a step, and fell in their tracks. On the right, our men, advancing through the chapparal, had outflanked the enemy, and were pouring in their well directed volleys, while on the left, the incessant flash of musketry, drowned now and then by the roar of cannon and shouts of the men, told how fierce was the conflict. Our troops were steadily gaining ground, but the murderous battery in the centre of the road continued to vomit forth death, and was worked with coolness and held with a tenacity that perfectly maddened our men. Gen. Taylor was within its range, and when expostulated with for exposing himself so, openly refused to move out of danger except by moving forward. The regiments got confused in the chapparal somewhat, but fought just as well; and though the infantry held their firm array, they seemed to fight in groups, each one directing its energies on a single point. The battery of the gallant Ridgely kept steadily advancing like a moving volcano, and hurled such a storm of iron on the guns that swept the road, that the infantry which protected them fell at every discharge like grass before the scythe. At length a body of lancers came charging furiously along the road, and rode up to the very muzzle of his guns. Scattering them like a whirlwind with a discharge from his pieces, he dashed in person among four that still kept hurrying on, and drove them before him.

The infantry fought with unparalleled bravery, led on by as brave officers as ever trod a battlefield. Indeed every officer seemed to think it necessary he should show an example of daring to his men, while every soldier fought as if he would outdo his leader in heroic acts. Sometimes a few men, headed by an officer, would charge a gun and fight around it. In one instance, a soldier leapt astride of a piece he had captured, and boldly defended himself while his companions dragged him away with the prize. From the outset our army steadily advanced on every side, except along the road where the centre battery kept playing. At length, goaded to madness by the galling fire kept up from these few pieces, and seeing that the whole battle rested there, Gen. Taylor ordered Capt. May to charge the battery with his dragoons. His words were, "*You must take it.*" The gallant May wheeled on his steed and said to his followers—"*Men, we must take that battery!*" In a moment those eighty-two stern riders were moving in a dark mass along the road, headed by their fearless commander. The next moment the bugles sounded the charge, and the black and driving mass swept like a thunder-cloud to the shock. A cloud of dust marked their progress as they rode sternly and fiercely on. The attention of nearly the whole army was directed to this desperate charge; and you could hear their muffled tread as they broke into a gallop

and tore forward up to the very muzzles of the guns. Two rods in advance was seen the commanding form of May, as, mounted on his powerful charger, he rode fiercely on, with his long hair streaming in the wind, while behind shook the glittering sabres of his followers. One discharge tore through them, stretching nearly a third of his company and half of his horses on the ground, but when the smoke lifted, there was still seen the war-horse of May leaping the ditch, breastwork and all, pressed closely after by his remaining followers, riding down the artillerymen at their pieces, and passing straight through the Mexican lines. A wild hurrah went up from our entire army as they saw those fierce dragoons clear the breastwork. The 5th and 8th infantry followed close after, charging at a run along the road, and swept over the breastwork just after the dragoons were compelled to leave it, and took possession of the guns. Lieut. Duncan then took command of the advance, and soon cleared the road with his deadly artillery, while the infantry, packed now in the narrow road, with chapparal on each side, went pouring onward with furious shouts, driving the enemy before them. The battle then became a rout, and rolled furiously toward the river, whither the affrighted Mexicans were flying to escape to Matamoras. The cavalry first went galloping like a crowd of fugitives to the ferry, while the infantry, forced from the chapparal at the point of the bayonet, followed after.

That was a joyful meeting, when our wearied but victorious army, amid loud huzzas, marched again into Fort Brown, and into the arms of their brave companions. Three thousand five hundred shots had been fired into that single fort, and yet but two men had been killed.

Gen. Taylor's victory was complete. The Mexicans lost their whole artillery—2000 stand of arms, 600 mules, together with Gen. Arista's private papers, and Gen. Vega himself, whom May made prisoner in his desperate charge on and over the battery. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, in these two battles, was not far from one hundred and seventy; that of the enemy unknown—but it could not be much short of twelve hundred. The battle of the 9th was much the more severe, as is evident from the greater mortality that attended it—our loss being nearly double that of the day before. Gen. Taylor had thrown up hasty intrenchments around his train, which had been left on the first battlefield, guarded by four hundred men; so that he brought but about sixteen hundred men into the fight, while the Mexicans, notwithstanding their severe loss, had received such heavy reinforcements, that they showed a thousand stronger than in the previous engagement. That the Mexicans fought well is evident from their heavy loss—nearly one-third of their entire army disappeared from the ranks before it broke and fled. The great disproportion between the killed and wounded in the two armies was owing entirely to the greater precision of our fire, our soldiers having hit or killed each his man.

The charge of May was one of the most gallant deeds among the hundreds performed in these fierce-fought battles, and decided the victory. Had he not succeeded, we should doubtless have gained the day, for from the outset our troops never once wavered, but steadily gained ground. The conflict, however, would have been pro-

tracted, and our loss much greater, but for this successful charge.

All honour to Gen. Taylor, and May, and Page, and Duncan, and Ridgely, and Churchill, and Inge, and Indon, and McIntosh, and Chadbourn, and Cochrane, and Walker, and Brown, and last, though not least, Ringgold, and a host of others—all honour ought to be paid to our little army, every man of which was a hero. With such soldiers we can never be conquered, nor our arms disgraced. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma will be bright pages in the biography of Gen. Taylor. All honour, we say, then, to our army and its officers.

## OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS FROM GEN. TAYLOR.

### THE TWO BATTLES.

The official accounts are as follows. They are brief and to the point.

#### HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Camp at Palo Alto, Texas, May 9th, 1846.

Sir:—I have the honour to report that I was met near this place yesterday, on my march from Point Isabel, by the Mexican forces, and after an action of about five hours, dislodged them from their position and encamped upon the field. Our artillery, consisting of two 18 pounders and two light batteries, was the arm chiefly engaged, and to the excellent manner in which it was manœuvred and served, is our success mainly due.

The strength of the enemy is believed to have been about six thousand men, with seven pieces of artillery, and eight hundred cavalry. His loss is probably at least one hundred killed. Our strength did not exceed, all told, twenty-three hundred, while our loss was comparatively trifling—four men killed, three officers, and thirty-seven men wounded, several of the latter mortally. I regret to say that Major Ringgold, 2d artillery, and Captain Page, 4th infantry, are severely wounded. Lieut. Luther, 2d artillery, slightly so.

The enemy has fallen back, and it is believed has repassed the river. I have advanced parties now thrown forward in his direction, and shall move the main body immediately.

In the haste of this report, I can only say that the officers and men behaved in the most admirable manner throughout the action. I shall have the pleasure of making a more detailed report when those of the different commanders shall be received.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. A., Com'g.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camp at Resaca de la Palma,

from Matamoras,

10 o'clock, p. m. May 9th, 1846.

Sir: I have the honour to report that I marched with the main body of the army at two o'clock

to-day, having previously thrown forward a body of light infantry into the forest, which covers the Matamoras road. When near the spot where I am now encamped, my advance discovered that a ravine crossing the road had been occupied by the enemy with artillery. I immediately ordered a battery of field artillery to sweep the position, flanking and sustaining it by the 3d, 4th and 5th regiments, deployed as skirmishers to the right and left. A heavy fire of artillery and of musketry was kept up for some time, until finally the enemy's batteries were carried in succession by a squadron of dragoons and the regiments of infantry that were on the ground. He was soon driven from his position, and pursued by a squadron of dragoons, battalion of artillery, 3d infantry, and a light battery, to the river. Our victory has been complete. Eight pieces of artillery, with a great quantity of ammunition, three standards, and some one hundred prisoners have been taken: among the latter, General La Vega, and several other officers. One general is understood to have been killed. The enemy has recrossed the river, and I am sure will not again molest us on this bank.

The loss of the enemy in killed has been most severe. Our own has been very heavy, and I deeply regret to report that Lieut. Inge, 2d dragoons, Lieut. Cochrane, 4th infantry, and Lieut. Chadbourn, 8th infantry, were killed on the field. Lieut. Col. Payne, 4th artillery, Lieut. Col. McIntosh, Lieut. Dobbins, 3d infantry; Capt. Hooe and Lieut. Fowler, 5th infantry, and Capt. Montgomery, Lieuts. Gates, Selden, McClay, Burbank, and Jordan, 8th infantry, were wounded. The extent of our loss in killed and wounded is not yet ascertained, and is reserved for a more detailed report.

The affair of to-day may be regarded as a proper supplement to the cannonade of yesterday; and the two taken together, exhibit the coolness and gallantry of our officers and men in the most favourable light. All have done their duty, and done it nobly. It will be my pride, in a more circumstantial report of both actions, to dwell upon particular instances of individual distinction.

It affords me peculiar pleasure to report that the field work opposite Matamoras has sustained itself handsomely during a cannonade and bombardment of one hundred and sixty hours. But the pleasure is alloyed with profound regret at the loss of its heroic and indomitable commander, Major Brown, who died to-day from the effect of a shell. His loss would be a severe one to the service at any time, but to the army under my orders, it is indeed irreparable. One officer and one non-commissioned officer killed, and ten men wounded, comprise all the casualties incident to this severe bombardment.

I inadvertently omitted to mention the capture of a large number of pack mules left in the Mexican camp.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR.

Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. A., Com'g.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army.

Washington, D. C.

# THE SIEGE OF MONTEREY.

*This great achievement is most eloquently related in the following Despatch, by General Taylor himself.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Camp near Monterey, Oct. 9, 1846.

SIR: I have now the honor to submit a detailed report of the recent operations before Monterey, resulting in the capitulation of that city.

The information received on the route from Cerralvo, and particularly the continual appearance in our front of the Mexican cavalry, which had a slight skirmish with our advance at the village of Ramas, induced the belief as we approached Monterey, that the enemy would defend that place. Upon reaching the neighborhood of the city on the morning of the 19th of September, this belief was fully confirmed. It was ascertained that he occupied the town in force; that a large work had been constructed commanding all the northern approaches; and that the Bishop's Palace and some heights in its vicinity near the Saltillo road, had also been fortified and occupied with troops and artillery. It was known from information previously received, that the eastern approaches were commanded by several small works in the lower edge of the city.

The configuration of the heights and gorges in the direction of the Saltillo road, as visible from the point attained by our advance on the morning of the 19th, led me to suspect that it was practicable to turn all the works in that direction, and thus cut the enemy's line of communication. After establishing my camp at the "Walnut springs," three miles from Monterey, the nearest suitable position, it was, accordingly, my first care to order a close reconnoissance of the ground in question, which was executed on the evening of the 19th by the engineer officers under the direction of Major Mansfield. A reconnoissance of the eastern approaches was at the same time made by Capt. Williams, topographical engineers. The examination made by Major Mansfield proved the entire practicability of throwing forward a column to the Saltillo road, and thus turning the position of the enemy. Deeming this to be an operation of essential importance, orders were given to Brevet Brig. Gen. Worth, commanding the second division, to march with his command on the 20th; to turn the hill of the Bishop's Palace; to occupy a position on the Saltillo road, and to carry the enemy's detached works in that quarter, where practicable.

The first regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, under command of Col. Hays, was associated with the second division on this service. Capt. Sanders, engineers, and Lieut. Meade, topographical engineers, were also ordered to report to Gen. Worth for duty with his column.

At 2 o'clock, p. m., on the 20th, the second division took up its march. It was soon discovered, by officers who were reconnoitering the town, and communicated to Gen. Worth, that its movement had been perceived, and that the enemy was throwing reinforcements towards the Bishop's Palace and the height which commands it. To divert his attention as far as practicable, the first division, under Brigadier General Twiggs, and field division of volunteers, under Major General Butler, were displayed in front of the town until dark. Arrangements were made at the same time to place in battery during the night, at a suitable distance from the enemy's main work, the citadel, two 21 pounder howitzers, and a 10 inch mortar, with a view to open a fire on the following day, when I proposed to make a diversion in favor of General Worth's movement. The 4th infantry covered this battery during the night. Gen. Worth had in the meantime reached and occupied for the night, a defensive position just without range of a battery above the Bishop's Palace, having made a reconnoissance as far as the Saltillo road.

Before proceeding to report the operations of the 21st and following days, I beg leave to state that I shall mention in detail only those which were conducted against the eastern extremity of the city, or elsewhere, under my immediate direction, referring you for the particulars of Gen. Worth's operations, which were entirely detached, to his own full report transmitted herewith.

Early on the morning of the 21st, I received a note from General Worth, written at half-past 9 o'clock the night before, suggesting what I had already intended, a strong diversion against the centre and left of the town to favor his enterprise against the heights in rear. The infantry and artillery of the first division, and the field division of volunteers, were ordered under arms and took the direction of the city, leaving one company of each regiment as a camp guard. The 2d dragoons, under Lieut. Col. May,



and Col. Wood's regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, under the immediate direction of General Henderson, were directed to the right to support Gen. Worth, if necessary, and to make an impression, if practicable, upon the upper quarter of the city. Upon approaching the mortar battery, the 1st and 3d regiments of infantry and battalion of Baltimore and Washington volunteers, with Captain Bragg's field battery—the whole under the command of Lieut. Col. Garland—were directed towards the lower part of the town, with orders to make a strong demonstration, and carry one of the enemy's advanced works, if it could be done without too heavy loss. Major Mansfield, engineers, and Capt. Williams and Lieut. Pope, topographical engineers, accompanied this column, Major Mansfield being charged with its direction, and the designation of points of attack. In the meantime the mortar, served by Capt. Ramsay, of the ordnance, and the howitzer battery under Capt. Webster, 1st artillery, had opened their fire upon the citadel, which was deliberately sustained, and answered from the work. Gen. Butler's division had now taken up a position in rear of this battery, when the discharges of artillery, mingled finally with a rapid fire of small arms, showed that Lieut. Garland's command had become warmly engaged. I now deemed it necessary to support this attack, and accordingly ordered the 4th infantry and three regiments of General Butler's division to march at once by the left flank in the direction of the advanced work at the lower extremity of the town, leaving one regiment (1st Kentucky) to cover the mortar and howitzer battery. By some mistake, two companies of the 4th infantry did not receive this order, and consequently did not join the advance companies until some time afterwards.

Lieut. Col. Garland's command had approached the town in a direction to the right of the advanced work (No. 1.) at the north-eastern angle of the city, and the engineer officer, covered by skirmishers, had succeeded in entering the suburbs and gaining cover. The remainder of this command now advanced and entered the town under a heavy fire of artillery from the citadel and the works on the left, and of musketry from the houses and small works in front. A movement to the right was attempted with a view to gain the rear of No. 1, and carry that work, but the troops were so much exposed to a fire which they could not effectually return, and had already sustained such severe loss, particularly in officers, that it was deemed best to withdraw them to a more secure position. Capt. Backus, 1st infantry,

however, with a portion of his own and other companies, had gained the roof of a tannery, which looked directly into the gorge of No. 1, and from which he poured a most destructive fire into that work and upon the strong building in its rear. This fire happily coincided in point of time with the advance of a portion of the volunteer division upon No. 1, and contributed largely to the fall of that strong and important work.

The three regiments of the volunteer division under the immediate command of Major General Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1. The leading brigade, under Brigadier General Quitman, continued its advance upon that work, preceded by three companies of the 1st Infantry, while General Butler, with the first Ohio regiment, entered the town to the right. The companies of the 4th Infantry had advanced within short range of the work, when they were received by a fire that almost in one moment struck down one third of the officers and men, and rendered it necessary to retire and effect a conjunction with the two other companies then advancing. General Quitman's brigade, though suffering most severely, particularly in the Tennessee regiment, continued its advance, and finally carried the work in handsome style, as well as the strong building in its rear. Five pieces of artillery, a considerable supply of ammunition, and thirty prisoners, including three officers, fell into their hands. Major General Butler, with the 1st Ohio regiment, after entering the edge of the town, discovered that nothing was to be accomplished in his front, and at this point, yielding to the suggestions of several officers, I ordered a retrograde movement; but learning almost immediately from one of my staff that the battery No. 1. was in our possession, the order was countermanded; and I determined to hold the battery and defences already gained. General Butler, with the 1st Ohio regiment, then entered the town at a point farther to the left, and marched in the direction of the battery No. 2. While making an examination with a view to ascertain the possibility of carrying this second work by storm, the general was wounded and soon after compelled to quit the field. As the strength of No. 2, and the heavy musketry fire flanking the approach, rendered it impossible to carry it without great loss, the 1st Ohio regiment was withdrawn from the town.

Fragments of the various regiments engaged were now under cover of the captured battery and some buildings in its front, and on the right. The field batteries of Captains Bragg and Ridgely were also partially cov-

ered by the battery. An incessant fire was kept up on this position from battery No. 2, and other works on its right, and from the citadel on all our approaches. General Twiggs, though quite unwell, joined me at this point, and was instrumental in causing the artillery captured from the enemy to be placed in battery, and served by Capt. Ridgely against No. 2, until the arrival of Capt. Webster's howitzer battery, which took its place. In the mean time, I directed such men as could be collected of the 1st, 3d, and 4th regiments, and Baltimore battalion, to enter the town, penetrating to the right, and carry the 2d battery if possible. This command, under Lieut. Col. Garland, advanced beyond the bridge "Purissima," when, finding it impracticable to gain the rear of the 2d battery, a portion of it sustained themselves for some time in that advanced position; but as no permanent impression could be made at that point, and the main object of the general operation had been effected, the command, including a section of Capt. Ridgely's battery, which had joined it, was withdrawn to battery No. 1. During the absence of this column, a demonstration of cavalry was reported in the direction of the citadel. Capt. Bragg, who was at hand, immediately galloped with his battery to a suitable position, from which a few discharges effectually dispersed the enemy. Capt. Miller, 1st Infantry, was despatched with a mixed command, to support the battery on this service. The enemy's lancers had previously charged upon the Ohio and a part of the Mississippi regiment, near some fields at a distance from the edge of the town, and had been repulsed with a considerable loss. A demonstration of cavalry on the opposite side of the river was also dispersed in the course of the afternoon by Capt. Ridgely's battery, and the squadrons returned to the city. At the approach of evening, all the troops that had been engaged were ordered back to camp, except Capt. Ridgely's battery, and the regular infantry of the first division, who were detailed as a guard for the works during the night, under command of Lt. Col. Garland. One battalion of the 1st Kentucky regiment was ordered to reinforce this command. Intrenching tools were procured, and additional strength was given to the works, and protection to the men, by working parties during the night, under the direction of Lieut. Scarritt, engineers.

The main object proposed in the morning had been effected. A powerful diversion had been made to favor the operations of the 2d division, one of the enemy's advanced works had been carried, and we now had a strong foot-hold in the town. But this had not been

accomplished without a heavy loss, embracing some of our gallant and promising officers. Captain Williams, topographical engineers, Lts. Terrett and Dilworth, 1st infantry, Lt. Woods, 2d infantry, Capts. Morris and Field, Bvt. Major Barbour, Lts. Irwin and Hazlitt, 3d infantry, Lieut. Hoskins, 4th infantry, Lt. Col. Watson, Baltimore battalion, Capt. Allen and Lt. Putnam, Tennessee regiment, and Lt. Hett, Ohio regiment, were killed, or have since died of wounds received in this engagement, while the number and rank of the officers wounded gives additional proof of the obstinacy of the contest, and the good conduct of our troops. The number of killed and wounded incident to the operations in the lower part of the city on the 21st is 394.

Early in the morning of this day, (21st, the advance of the 2d division had encountered the enemy in force, and after a brief but sharp conflict, repulsed him with heavy loss. Gen. Worth, then succeeded in gaining a position on the Saltillo road, thus cutting the enemy's line of communication. From this position the two heights south of the Saltillo road were carried in succession, and the gun taken in one of them turned upon the Bishop's Palace. These important successes were fortunately obtained with comparatively small loss; Captain Mc. Kavett, 8th infantry, being the only officer killed.

The 22d day of September passed without any active operations in the lower part of the city. The citadel and other works continued to fire at parties exposed to their range, and at the work now occupied by our troops. The guard left in it the preceding night, except Capt. Ridgely's company, was relieved at mid-day by Gen. Quitman's brigade, Capt. Bragg's battery was thrown under cover in front of the town to repel any demonstration of cavalry in that quarter. At dawn of day, the height above the Bishop's Palace was carried, and soon after meridian, the Palace itself was taken and its guns turned upon the fugitive garrison. The object for which the 2d division was detached had thus been completely accomplished, and I felt confident that with a strong force occupying the road and heights in his rear, and a good position below the city in our possession, the enemy could not possibly maintain the town.

During the night of the 22d, the enemy evacuated nearly all his defences in the lower part of the city. This was reported to me early in the morning of the 23d by Gen. Quitman, who had already meditated an assault upon those works. I immediately sent instructions to that officer, leaving it to his



discretion to enter the city, covering his men by the houses and walls, and advance carefully as far as he might deem prudent. After ordering the remainder of the troops as a reserve, under the orders of Brigadier General Twiggs, I repaired to the abandoned works, and discovered that a portion of Gen. Quitman's brigade had entered the town, and were successfully forcing their way towards the principal plaza. I then ordered up the 2d regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, who entered the city, dismounted, and, under the immediate orders of Gen. Henderson, co-operated with Gen. Quitman's brigade. Capt. Bragg's battery was also ordered up, supported by the 3d infantry; and after firing for some time at the cathedral, a portion of it was likewise thrown into the city. Our troops advanced from house to house, and from square to square, until they reached a street but one square in rear of the principal plaza, in and near which the enemy's force was mainly concentrated. This advance was conducted vigorously but with due caution, and although destructive to the enemy, was attended with but small loss on our part. Captain Ridgeley, in the meantime, had served a captured piece in battery No. 1, against the city, until the advance of our men rendered it imprudent to fire in the direction of the cathedral. I was now satisfied that we could operate successfully in the city, and that the enemy had retired from the lower portion of it to make a stand behind his barricades. As Gen. Quitman's brigade had been on duty the previous night, I determined to withdraw the troops to the evacuated works, and concert with Gen. Worth a combined attack upon the town. The troops accordingly fell back deliberately, in good order, and resumed their original positions, General Quitman's brigade being relieved after nightfall by that of General Hamer. On my return to camp, I met an officer with the intelligence that General Worth, induced by the firing in the lower part of the city, was about making an attack at the upper extremity, which had also been evacuated by the enemy to a considerable distance. I regretted that this information had not reached me before leaving the city, but still deemed it inexpedient to change my orders, and accordingly returned to the camp. A note from Gen. Worth, written at eleven o'clock, P. M., informed me that he had advanced to within a short distance of the principal plaza, and that the mortar (which had been sent to his division in the morning) was doing good execution within effective range of the enemy's position.

Desiring to make no further attempt upon

the city without complete concert as to the lines and mode of approach, I instructed that officer to suspend his advance until I could have an interview with him on the following morning at his head quarters.

Early on the morning of the 24th, I received, through Colonel Moreno, a communication from General Ampudia, proposing to evacuate the town; which with the answer, were forwarded with my first dispatch. I arranged with Colonel Moreno a cessation of fire until twelve o'clock, at which hour I would receive the answer of the Mexican general at General Worth's headquarters, to which I soon repaired. In the meantime, General Ampudia had signified to General Worth his desire for a personal interview with me, to which I acceded, and which finally resulted in a capitulation, placing the town and the material of war, with certain exceptions, in our possession. A copy of that capitulation was transmitted with my first despatch.

Upon occupying the city, it was discovered to be of great strength in itself, and to have its approaches carefully and strongly fortified. The town and works were armed with forty two pieces of cannon, well supplied with ammunition, and manned with a force of at least 7,000 troops of the line, and from 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars. The force under my orders before Monterey, as exhibited by the accompanying return, was 425 officers, and 6,220 men. Our artillery consisted of one 10 inch mortar, two 24 pounder howitzers, and four light field batteries of four guns each—the mortar being the only piece suitable to the operations of a siege.

Our loss is twelve officers and one hundred and eight men killed; thirty-one officers and three hundred and thirty seven men wounded. That of the enemy is not known, but is believed considerably to exceed our own.

I take pleasure in bringing to the notice of the government the good conduct of the troops, both regulars and volunteers, which has been conspicuous throughout the operations. I am proud to bear testimony to their coolness and constancy in battle, and the cheerfulness with which they have submitted to exposure and privation. To the general officers commanding divisions—Major Generals Butler and Henderson, and Brigadier Generals Twiggs and Worth—I must express my obligations for the efficient aid which they have rendered in their respective commands. I was unfortunately deprived, early on the 21st, of the valuable services of Major General Butler, who was disabled by a wound received in the attack on the city.

Major General Henderson, commanding the Texan volunteers, has given me important aid in the organization of the command, and its subsequent operations. Brigadier General Twiggs, rendered important services with his division, and, as the second in command after Major General Butler was disabled. Brigadier Gen. Worth, was intrusted with an important detachment which rendered his operations independent of my own. These operations were conducted with ability, and crowned with complete success.

I desire also to notice Brigadier Generals Hamer and Quitman, commanding brigades in General Butler's division. Lieutenant Colonels Garland and Wilson, commanding brigades in Gen. Twiggs' division. Colonels Mitchell, Campbell, Davis and Wood, commanding the Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, and 2d Texas regiments, respectively, and Majors Lear, Allen, and Abercrombie, commanding the 3d, 4th, and 1st regiments of infantry; all of whom served under my eye, and conducted their commands with coolness and gallantry against the enemy. Colonel Mitchell, Lieut. Col. McClung, Mississippi regiment, Major Lear, 3d infantry, and Major Alexander, Tennessee regiment, were all severely wounded, as were Captain Lamotte, 1st infantry, Lieut. Graham, 4th infantry, Adjutant Armstrong, Ohio regiment, Lieutenants Seudder and Allen, Tennessee regiment, and Lieut. Howard, Mississippi regiment, while leading their men against the enemy's position, on the 21st and 23d. After the fall of Col. Mitchell, the command of the 1st Ohio regiment, devolved upon Lieut. Col. Weller; that of the 3d infantry, after the fall of Major Lear, devolved in succession upon Capt. Bainbridge and Capt. Henry, the former being also wounded. The following named officers have been favorably noticed by their commanders: Lieut. Col. Anderson, and Adjutant Heiman, Tennessee regiment; Lieut. Col. McClung, Captains Cooper and Downing, Lieutenants Patterson, Calhoun, Moore, Russell, and Cook, Mississippi regiment; also Sergeant Major Hearlan, Mississippi regiment, and Major Price, and Capt. J. Smith, unattached but serving with it. I beg leave also to call attention to the good conduct of Captain Johnston, Ohio regiment, and Lieut. Hooker, 1st artillery, serving on the staff of Gen. Hamer, and of Lieutenant Nichols, 2d artillery, on that of General Quitman. Captains Bragg and Ridgely, served with their batteries during the operations under my own observation, and in part under my immediate orders, and exhibited distinguished skill and gallantry. Captain Webster, 1st artillery, assisted by Lieutenants Donaldson and Bowen, rendered good service with the howitzer battery, which was

much exposed to the enemy's fire on the 21st.

From the nature of the operations, the 2d dragoons were not brought into action, but were usefully employed under the direction of Lieut. Col. May, as escorts, and in keeping open our communications. The 1st Kentucky regiment was also prevented from participating in the action of the 21st, but rendered highly important services under Col. Ormsby, in covering the mortar battery, and holding in check the enemy's cavalry during the day.

I have noticed above, the officers whose conduct either fell under my immediate eye, or is noticed only in minor reports which are not forwarded. For further mention of individuals, I beg leave to refer to the reports of division commanders herewith respectfully transmitted. I fully concur in their recommendations, and desire that they be considered as a part of my own report.

From the officers of my personal staff and of the engineers, topographical engineers, and ordnance associated with me, I have derived valuable and efficient assistance during the operations. Col. Whiting, assistant quartermaster general, Colonels Croghan and Belknap, inspectors general, Major Bliss, assistant adjutant general, Captain Sibley, assistant quartermaster, Captain Waggaman, commissary of subsistence, Captain Eaton and Lieut. Garnett, aids-de-camp, and Major Kirby and Van Buren, pay department, served near my person, and were ever prompt, in all situations, in the communication of my orders and instructions. I must express my particular obligations to Brevet Major Mansfield and Lieut. Scarritt, corps of engineers. They both rendered most important services in reconnoitering the enemy's positions, conducting troops in attack, and strengthening the works captured from the enemy. Major Mansfield, though wounded on the 21st, remained on duty during that and the following day, until confined by his wound to camp. Capt. Williams, topographical engineers, to my great regret and the loss of the service, was mortally wounded while fearlessly exposing himself in the attack of the 21st. Lieut. Pope, of the same corps, was active and zealous throughout the operations. Major Munroe, chief of the artillery, Major Craig and Capt. Ramsay, of the ordnance, were assiduous in the performance of their proper duties. The former superintended their mortar service on the 22d, as particularly mentioned in the report of Gen. Worth, to which I also refer for the services of the engineer and topographical officers detached with the second division.

Surgeon Craig, medical director, was actively employed in the important duties of

his department, and the medical staff generally were unremitting in their attention to the numerous wounded—their duties with the regular regiments being rendered uncommonly arduous by the small number serving in the field.

I respectfully enclose herewith, in addition to the reports of division commanders, a field return of the force before Monterey on the 21st of September—a return of killed, wounded, and missing during the operations—and two topographical sketches—one exhibiting all the movements

around Monterey—the other on a large scale illustrating more particularly the operations in the lower quarter of the city—prepared respectively by Lieut. Meade and Pope, topographical engineers.


I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major General U. S. A. commanding

The ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,


Washington, D. C.





## THE BATTLE FIELD OF BUENA VISTA.

From a drawing, (furnished the Baltimore Sun,) made on the spot by a distinguished officer of the Topographical Engineers, sufficiently large to show the disposition of the opposing forces Gen. Taylor's Despatches confirm its accuracy.



A, Buena Vista, 3 miles from Saltillo. B, Agua Nueva, 18 miles from Saltillo. C, Road from San Luis Potosi. D, Road and mountain pass of Zacatecas. E, The famous battle ground, seven miles wide and ten long. F, San Juan La Vacarea, the camp ground of Gen. Wool from the 21st to 28th December, en route to Saltillo. G G, Route of Gen. Wool from Paras. I, Encantada, the encampment of Santa Anna on the morning of the battle, three miles and a half from Gen. Taylor's encampment.

## BUENA VISTA.

GENERAL TAYLOR'S OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION.  
Camp on the field of battle, Buena Vista,  
Mexico, February 24, 1847.

SIR:—I have the honour to report that, having become assured on the 20th inst., that the enemy

had assembled in very heavy force at Encantacion, thirty miles in front of Agua Nueva, with the evident design of attacking my position, I broke up my camp at the latter place on the 21st, and took up a strong line in front of Buena Vista, seven miles south of Saltillo. A cavalry force left at Agua Nueva for the purpose of covering the removal of supplies was driven in during the night, and on the morning of the 22d the Mexican army appeared immediately in front of our position. At 11 o'clock A. M. a flag was sent, bearing from General Santa Anna a summons of unconditional surrender. To which I immediately returned a negative reply.—The summons and my reply are herewith inclosed.

The action was commenced late in the afternoon between the light troops on the left flank, but was not seriously engaged until the morning of the 23d, when the enemy made an effort to force the left flank of our position. An obstinate and sanguinary conflict was maintained, with short intervals, throughout the day, the result being that the enemy was completely repulsed from our lines. An attack of cavalry upon the rancho of Buena Vista and a demonstration upon the city of Saltillo itself were likewise handsomely repelled. Early in the night the enemy withdrew from his camp and fell back upon Agua Nueva, a distance of twelve miles.

Our own force engaged at all points in this action fell somewhat short of five thousand four hundred men, while that of the enemy, from the statement of General Santa Anna, may be estimated at twenty thousand. Our success against such great odds is a sufficient encomium on the good conduct of our troops. In a more detailed official report, I shall have the satisfaction of bringing to the notice of the government the conspicuous gallantry of particular officers and corps. I may be permitted here, however, to acknowledge my great obligations to Brig Gen. Wool, the second in command, to whom I feel particularly indebted for his valuable services on this occasion.

Our loss has been very severe, and will not probably fall short of 700 men. The Mexican loss has been immense. I shall take the earliest opportunity of forwarding a correct list of the casualties of the day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obed<sup>t</sup>. serv<sup>t</sup>l.

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. General U. S. Army commanding.  
The Adjutant General of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

(Summons of Gen. Santa Anna to Gen. Taylor.)

You are surrounded by twenty thousand men, and cannot to any human probability, avoid suffering a rout, and being cut to pieces with your troops; but as you deserve consideration and particular esteem, I wish to save you from a catastrophe, and for that purpose give you this notice, in order that you may surrender at discretion, under the assurance that you will be treated with the consideration belonging to the Mexican character, to which end you will be granted an hour's time to make up your mind, to commence from the moment when my flag of truce arrives in your camp.

With this view, I assure you of my particular consideration.

God and Liberty. Camp at Encantada, February, 22d, 1847.

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.  
To Gen. Z. Taylor,  
Commanding the forces of the U. States.

*Head-Quarters, Army of Occupation,  
Near Buena Vista, Feb. 22, 1847.*

Sir: In reply to your note of this date, summoning me to surrender my forces at discretion, I beg leave to say that I decline acceding to your request.

With high respect, I am, sir,  
Your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,  
Maj. Gen. U. S. Army, commanding.  
Senor Gen. D. Antonio Lopez De Santa Anna,  
Commander in Chief, La Encantada.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Saltillo, Feb. 25, 1847.

Sir: I have respectfully to report that the main Mexican force is yet at Agua Nueva. Our troops hold the positions which they have so well defended, and are prepared to receive the enemy, should he venture another attack.

An arrangement has been made with Gen. Santa Anna for an exchange of prisoners, by which we shall receive all, or nearly all, of those captured from us at different times, besides the few taken in the action of the 23d. Our wounded, as well as those of the Mexicans, which have fallen into our hands, have been removed to this place, and are rendered comfortable.

Our loss in the recent actions, so far as ascertained, amounts to two hundred and sixty-four, killed, four hundred and fifty wounded, and twenty-six missing. One company of the Kentucky cavalry is not included in this statement, its casualties not being yet reported. I respectfully enclose a list of the commissioned officers killed and wounded, embracing many names of the highest merit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obed't serv't,  
Z. TAYLOR.

Maj. General, U. S. A. comd'g.  
The Adjutant General of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Agua Nueva, March 1, 1847.

Sir: I have the honour to report that the troops of my command occupied their original camp at this place on the 24th of February, the last of the Mexican army leaving the morning of that day in the direction of San Luis. It is ascertained that the enemy is in full retreat, and in a very disorganized condition; the men deserting and dying of starvation in great numbers. I despatch a command this day as far as Encarnacion to harass his rear and secure whatever military supplies may be found there.

From the statements of Mexican officers, particularly of the medical staff left to succor the wounded, there seems no doubt that their loss in the recent action is moderately estimated at one thousand five hundred, and may reach two thousand men, killed and wounded; besides two thousand or three thousand deserters. Many officers of rank were lost. I enclose a list of the names of our own killed and wounded, made as complete as practicable at this time.

One regiment (Kentucky Cavalry) is not included, its return not being rendered.

The enemy had fully reckoned upon our total rout, and had made arrangements to intercept our retreat, and cut off the army, stationing for that purpose, corps of cavalry, not only immediately in our rear, but even below Monterey. I regret to report that they succeeded near the village of Marin in destroying a train of supplies, and killing a considerable number of the escort and teamsters. Colonel Morgan, 2d Ohio regiment, on his march from Cerralvo to Monterey, was infested by the Mexican cavalry, with which he had several rencontres, but finally dispersed them with small loss on his own part. Captain Graham A. Q. M., Volunteer service, was mortally wounded in one of these affairs. I have no doubt that the defeat of the main army at Buena Vista will secure our line of communication from further interruption, but I still propose in a few days to change my headquarters to Monterey, with a view to make such further arrangements as may be necessary in that quarter.

The dispositions made to harass our rear, vindicate the policy and necessity of defending a position in front of Saltillo, where a defeat has thrown the enemy far back into the interior. No result so decisive could have been maintained by holding Monterey, and our communications would have been constantly in jeopardy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

Z. TAYLOR,  
Major General, U. S. Army Commanding.  
The Adjutant General of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

## THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA.

On the morning of the 2d, intelligence reached Gen. Taylor at his camp on the hill overlooking Saltillo from the south, that Santa Anna, whose presence in our vicinity had been reported for several days, was advancing upon our main body, stationed near the Rancho San Juan de Buena Vista, about seven miles from Saltillo. The General immediately moved forward with May's squadron of Dragoons, Sherman's and Bragg's batteries of Artillery, and the Mississippi regiment of Riflemen, under Col. Davis, and arrived at the position which he had selected for awaiting the attack of the enemy about 11 o'clock. The time and place, the hour and the man, seemed to promise a glorious celebration of the day. It was the 22d of February, the anniversary of that day on which the God of Battles gave to freedom its noblest champion.

In the choice of his position, Gen. Taylor had exhibited the same comprehensive sagacity and masterly coup de œil, which characterized his dispositions at Resaca de la Palma, and which crowned triumphantly all his operations amid the blazing lines of Monterey.

During the night, a Mexican prisoner was taken, who reported Santa Anna's force as consisting of fifteen pieces of artillery, including some 21 pounders, six thousand cavalry, and fifteen thousand infantry, thus confirming the statement of his superior.

The firing on our extreme left, which ceased soon after sun set, on the 22d, was renewed on the morning of the 23d, at an early hour. This was also accompanied by quick discharges of artillery from the same quarter, the Mexicans



having established during the night a 12 pounder on a point at the base of the mountain, which commanded any position which could be taken by us. To counteract the effect of this piece, Lieut. O'Brien, 4th artillery, was detached with three pieces of Washington's battery, having with him Lieut. Bryan, of the Topographical Engineers, who, having planted a few shells in the midst of the enemy's gunners, for the time effectually silenced his fire.

From the movements soon perceptible along the left of our line, it became evident that the enemy was attempting to turn that flank, and for this purpose had concentrated a large body of cavalry and infantry on his right. The base of the mountain around which these troops were winding their way, seemed girdled with a belt of steel, as their glittering sabres and polished lances flashed back the beams of the morning's sun. Sherman's and Bragg's batteries were immediately ordered to the left; Col. Bissell's regiment occupied a position between them, while Col. McKee's Kentuckians were transferred from the right of our line, so as to hold a position near the centre. The second Indiana regiment, under Col. Bowles, was placed on our extreme left, nearly perpendicular to the direction of our line, so as to oppose, by a direct fire, the flank movement of the enemy. These dispositions having been promptly effected, the artillery of both armies opened its fires, and simultaneously the Mexican infantry commenced a rapid and extended discharge upon our line, from the left, to McKee's regiment. Our artillery belched forth its thunders with tremendous effect, while the Kentuckians returned the fire of the Mexican infantry, with great steadiness and success; their field officers, McKee, Clay and Fry, passing along their line, animating and encouraging the men, by precept and example. The second Illinois regiment, also received the enemy's fire with great firmness, and returned an ample equivalent. While this fierce conflict was going on, the main body of Col. Hardin's regiment moved to the right of the Kentuckians, and the representatives of each State, seemed to vie with each other in the honourable ambition of doing the best service for their country. Both regiments gallantly sustained their positions, and woo unfading laurels.—The veterans of Austerlitz, could not have exhibited more courage, coolness and devotion.

In the meantime the enemy's cavalry had been stealthily pursuing its way along the mountain, though our artillery had wrought great havoc among its numbers, the leading squadrons had passed the extreme points of danger, and were almost in a position to attack us in rear. The artillery was advanced, its front extended, and different sections and pieces under Sherman, Bragg, O'Brien, Thomas, Reynolds, Kilburn, French and Bryan, were working such carnage in the ranks of the enemy, as to make his columns roll to and fro like ships upon the billows.

Washington's battery on the right, had now opened its fire, and driven back a large party of lancers, advancing in that direction. Along the entire line, the battle raged with great fury.—Twenty-one thousand were arrayed against five thousand. The discharges of the infantry followed each other, and the volleys of artillery reverberated through the mountains like the thunders of an Alpine storm.

The Mexican cavalry still pressed forward on our left, and threatened a charge upon the Mississippi rifles under Col. Davis, who had been ordered to support the Indiana regiment. Col. Davis immediately threw his command into the form of a V., the opening towards the enemy, and awaited his advance. On he came, dashing with all the speed of Mexican horses, but when he arrived at that point from which could be seen the whites of his eyes, both lines poured forth a sheet of lead that scattered him like chaff, felling many a gallant steed to the earth, and sending scores of riders to the sleep that knows no waking.

While the dispersed Mexican cavalry were rallying, the 3d Indiana regiment, under Colonel Lane, was ordered to join Colonel Davis, supported by a considerable body of horse. About this time, from some unknown reason, our wagon train, displayed its length along the Saltillo road, and offered a conspicuous prize for the Mexican lancers, which they seemed not unwilling to appropriate. Fortunately, Lieutenant Rucker, with a squadron of the 1st dragons, (Capt. Steene having been previously wounded and Capt. Enstis confined to his bed by illness,) was present, and by order of Gen. Taylor, dashed among them in a most brilliant style, dispersing them by his charge, as effectually as the previous fire of the Mississippi riflemen. May's dragoons, with a squadron of Arkansas cavalry, under Capt. Pike, and supported by a single piece of artillery, under Lieutenant Reynolds, now claimed their share in the discussion, and when the Mexicans had again assembled, they had to encounter another shock from the two squadrons, besides a fierce fire of grape from Reynolds' 6 pounder. The lancers once more rallied, and directing their course towards the Saltillo road, were met by the remainder of Col. Yell's regiment and Marshall's Kentuckians, who drove them towards the mountains on the opposite side of the valley, where, from their appearance when last visible, it may be presumed, they are still running.

All this time the Mexican force was much divided, and the fortunes of the day were with us. Santa Anna saw the crisis, and by craft and cunning sought to avert it. He sent a white flag to General Taylor, desiring to know "what he wanted?" This was at once believed to be a mere ruse to gain time and recollect his men, but the American General thought fit to notice it, and Gen. Wool was deputed to meet the representatives of Santa Anna, and to say to him that we "wanted" peace. Before the interview could be had, the Mexicans themselves reopened their fires, thus adding treachery of the highest order, to the other barbarian practices which distinguish their mode of warfare. The flag however, had accomplished the ends which its wily originator designed, for though our troops could have effectually prevented the remainder of his cavalry from joining the main body, it could only have been done by a fire, which, while the parley lasted, would have been an undoubted breach of faith. Although a portion of the lancers during this interim had regained their original position, a formidable number still remained behind. Upon these the infantry opened a brisk fire, while Reynolds' Artillery, hailed the grape and canister upon them with terrible effect.

The craft of Santa Anna had restored his courage, and with his reinforcement of cavalry,

he determined to charge our line. Under cover of their artillery, horse and foot advanced upon our batteries. These, from the smallness of our infantry force, were but feebly supported, yet by the most brilliant and daring efforts nobly maintained their positions. Such was the rapidity of their transitions, that officers and pieces seemed empowered with ubiquity, and upon cavalry and infantry alike, wherever they appeared, they poured so destructive a fire, as to silence the enemy's artillery, compel his whole line to fall back, and seem soon to assume a sort of *saute qui peut* movement, indicating any thing but victory. Again, our spirits rose. The Mexicans appeared thoroughly routed, and while their regiments and divisions were flying before us, nearly all our light troops were ordered forward, and followed them with a deadly fire, mingled with shouts which rose above the roar of artillery. In this charge the 1st Illinois Regiment and McKee's Kentuckians were foremost. The pursuit was too hot, and as it evinced too clearly our deficiency in numbers, the Mexicans, with a suddenness which was almost magical, rallied and returned upon us. For a while the carnage was dreadful on both sides. We were but a handful to oppose the frightful masses which were hurled upon us, and could as easily have resisted an avalanche of thunderbolts. We were driven back, and the day seemed lost beyond redemption. Victory, which a moment before appeared within our grasp, was suddenly torn from our standard. There was but one hope, but that proved an anchor sure and steadfast.

While our men were driven through the ravines, at the extremities of which a body of Mexican Lancers was stationed to pounce upon them like tigers,—Brent and Whiting, of Washington's battery, gave them such a torrent of grape as to put them to flight, and thus saved the remnants of those brave regiments, which had long borne the hottest portion of the fight. On the other flank, while the Mexicans came rushing on the artillery was left unsupported, and capture by the enemy seemed inevitable. But Bragg and Thomas rose with the crisis, and eclipsed even the fame they won at Monterey, while Sherman, O'Brien and Bryan, proved themselves worthy of the alliance. Every horse with O'Brien's battery was killed, and the enemy had advanced to within range of grape, sweeping all before him. But here his progress was arrested, and before the showers of iron hail which assailed him, squadrons and battalions fell like leaves in the blasts of autumn. The Mexicans were once more driven back with great loss, though taking with them the three pieces of artillery which were without horses.

The battle had now raged with variable success for near ten hours, and by a sort of mutual consent, after the last carnage wrought among the Mexicans by the artillery, both parties seemed willing to pause upon the result. Night fell, and the American General, with his troops, slept upon the battle ground, prepared, if necessary, to resume operations on the morrow. But ere the sun rose again upon the scene the Mexicans had disappeared, leaving behind them only the hundreds of their dead and dying.

Throughout the action, Gen. Taylor was where the shots fell hottest and thickest, two of which passed through his clothes. He constantly evinced the greatest quickness of conception, fertility of resource, and a cool unerring judg-

ment not to be baffled. Gen. Wool was wherever his presence was required, stimulating the troops to activity and exertion. The operations of Gen. Lane were confined to his own brigade, and his efforts were worthy of better material for their application. Major Bliss bore himself with his usual gallantry; having his horse as at Palo Alto shot in the head. Mr. Crittenden, a son of the Senator from Kentucky, was conspicuous in the field, as volunteer Aid to General Taylor, and the Medical Director's assistant Surgeon, Hitchcock, could be seen, where the balls fell fastest, with true professional zeal.

In this, as in every case of arbitrament by the sword, the laurel is closely entwined with the cypress, and the lustre of a brilliant victory, is darkened by the blood at which it has been purchased.

Other and abler pens will do justice to the character and memory of the illustrious dead, whose devotion to the republic, they have written with their blood and with their lives. Lincoln was a gallant officer and accomplished gentleman, of pure heart and generous impulses, and worthy of his revolutionary lineage. Yell was a warm friend and gallant man, quick to see the right and ready to pursue it. Hardin was one of nature's noblest spirits, a soldier tried and true, a rare union of the best qualities of the head and heart. McKee was wise in council and brave in the field, with a heart moved by the tenderest sympathies and most noble impulses. And what shall I say of Clay—the young, the brave, the chivalrous—foremost in the fight—the soul of every lofty sentiment!—devoted to his friends and generous to his enemies, he fell in the flower of his age and usefulness, and has left no worthier name behind him. If he was not the "noblest Roman of them all," few will deny that in him,

"Were the elements

So mixed, that Nature might stand up and say  
To all the world—THIS WAS A MAN."

## INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE.

Col. Yell, was lanced to death. His horse became restive, his bridle broke, and he carried him into the midst of the enemy, where a lance pierced him through the head.

Col. Hardin, before being killed, captured a flag from the enemy, which, with his horse, he requested should be sent home as a last memento to his wife.

Nothing could contrast more strongly than the humanity of the American soldiers and the cowardly ferocity and roguish propensity of the Mexicans. The Americans shared their biscuit and water with the wounded Mexicans, and were often seen to lay them in a position least painful to them. The Mexicans, on the contrary, cowardly killed our wounded men when they met them, as in the case of Col. Clay; they stripped and robbed several of our officers and many of their own.

Among the prisoners taken, were two who were deserters from our own ranks. They were brought before Gen. Taylor, who ordered the wretches to be drummed out beyond the lines. Such rascals, he said, might do for Santa Anna—they would not suit him—and it would be wasting powder and shot to shoot them. They were



therefore drummed out to the tune of the Rogue's March.

A bullet having passed through the breast of Gen. Taylor's jacket, he remarked that the balls were becoming excited.

The broken nature of the ground divided the forces, so that instead of one general engagement, the regiments were compelled in a great measure to fight on their own hook. Our officers were always in the advance, leading their troops—hence the great mortality among them. In this general *melee*, one of our small regiments, of four hundred men, would be attacked by a whole Mexican brigade of several thousand. Thus the Kentucky infantry was attacked at the foot of a hill, in a deep ravine, by an immense force of the enemy. A large number of the officers were killed here, among them was Col. McKee, who fell badly wounded, and was immediately despatched by the enemy, who pierced him with their bayonets as he lay on the ground. Lieut. Col. Clay was shot through the thigh, and being unable to walk, was taken up and carried some distance by some of his men, but owing to the steepness of the hill, the men finding it very difficult to carry him, and the enemy in great numbers pressing upon them, the gallant Lieut. Col. begged them to leave him and take care of themselves. Forced to leave him on the field, the last that was seen of this noble young officer he was lying on his back, fighting with his sword the enemy who were stabbing him with their bayonets. The veteran Capt. Wm. S. Willis, of the same regiment, at the head of his company, with three stalwart sons who fought at his side, was badly wounded, but still continued the fight, until he was overcome with the loss of blood.

In the meantime, the Indiana brigade, who were drawn out and ordered to charge the enemy, were seized with a panic, and displaying some hesitation, Assistant Adjutant General Lincoln rushed to their front, and whilst upbraiding them for their cowardice, was shot, several balls passing through his body. In justice to this brigade, it should be stated, that they subsequently rallied, and fully redeemed their reputation by the most gallant and effective fighting.

Col. Hardin led the Illinoisians in very handsome style, and they fought like lions. Their intrepid Colonel fell wounded, and experienced the fate of Colonels McKee and Clay, and was killed by the enemy—not, however, before he had killed one of the cowardly miscreants with a pistol, which he fired whilst lying on the ground.

Col. Yell led the foremost man, a charge of his mounted volunteers against a large body of lancers, and was killed by a lance, which entered his mouth and tore off one side of his face.

The Mississippians, the heroes of Monterey, after doing hard duty as skirmishers, were ordered into line to receive a charge of cavalry, which they did with their rifles, delivering at the same time a most destructive fire among the crowded columns of cavalry. The enemy were completely repulsed. The distinguished commander of this gallant regiment, Col. Jefferson Davis, was badly wounded, an escopette ball having entered his foot and passed out of his leg. He was, however, doing well when last heard from. The chivalrous Lieut. Col. McClung was prevented from doing his share of the brave deeds of this brilliant fight, by the grievous wound received at the battle of Monterey.

Col. Humphrey Marshall's splendid regiment of Kentucky cavalry were impatient for an opportunity of showing their mettle, and avenging the capture of their brethren, then in the hands of the enemy. They were soon favoured with the desired opportunity, by the approach of a force of more than two thousand lancers and hussars, who gallantly charged them. The Kentuckians stood their ground with immovable steadiness, and receiving the enemy with a fire from their carbines, charged in the most gallant style through the column on the right, and wheeling fell on their left, dispersing and killing a great many of them. A like charge was made by Col. May, at the head of a squadron of dragoons, and one of Arkansas cavalry, against a large body of the enemy's cavalry with like results.

During the engagement on the right, Santa Anna, seeing that Gen. Taylor's force was not well protected on the left flank, sent a large force of cavalry around that point, and outflanking Taylor, succeeded in throwing two thousand men in his rear; but Gen. Taylor immediately sent Capt. Bragg, with his artillery, against this force, who succeeded in cutting them off from the main body. Lieut. Crittenden was despatched with a flag of truce, to demand the immediate surrender of this force. The Mexican officer, pretending not to understand the character of his mission, insisted that he should be blindfolded, according to the rules of war, and thus had the lieutenant carried into the camp of Santa Anna himself. This was a ruse to get time to extricate the Mexican cavalry from their dangerous position, and pending this truce they were all drawn off by a different road from that by which they had gained this position.

Lieut. Crittenden was conducted blindfolded to the tent of the Mexican General-in-Chief, which he found a long distance from the scene of action, and which he thought the safest place he had been in during the whole day. As he approached Santa Anna's tent he was greeted with a most tremendous flourish of trumpets, which might have been heard a mile off, but produced no great terror in the mind of the Kentuckian. His blind was taken off, and he found himself in the presence of the famous Mexican Chief, surrounded by a brilliant staff of bedizened, gilded and moustached officers. Santa Anna apologized to the Lieutenant for the act of his officers, in having him blindfolded, saying, that so far from having any desire to conceal his situation, he was desirous of exhibiting to Gen. Taylor the utter folly of resisting so powerful an army as he had under his command. To which the Lieutenant replied that his simple message was to demand his (Santa Anna's) immediate surrender to Gen. Taylor. When this extraordinary demand was translated to the Mexican, he raised his hands and eyebrows in utter astonishment at the temerity and presumption of such a message, and replied, that he would expect Gen. Taylor to surrender in an hour, or he would destroy all his forces. Lieut. Crittenden's reply, which we have already given—"Gen. Taylor never surrenders!" terminated the interview, and the battle recommenced, and was continued until night.

All the officers on our side, in this hard fought battle, distinguished themselves. The details of the battle were confided to Gen. Wool, who nobly justified the confidence in his commander and



brother veteran, by the most active, zealous, efficient and gallant conduct. Throughout the whole action he was constantly engaged in the disposition of our forces, and in rallying them to the onset. It was a miracle that he escaped the thick flying balls which thinned the ranks he was marshalling. There was but one complaint made against him, and that was, that he exposed himself too much. Brig. Gen. Lane also showed himself to be a brave and capable officer. Although wounded early in the action, he kept his horse until it closed, and never for a moment left his post.

The old General-in-Chief remained at his original and much exposed position, superintending the battle and narrowly watching its events. An escopette ball passed through his overcoat—that same old brown, so familiar to all the officers and men who have ever been under his command, and which has seen several campaigns in Florida, in Texas, and in Mexico.

On the night of the 22d, both armies drew off from the field of battle. Our men were engaged all night in bringing in the wounded and taking care of them—the Mexicans as well as their own men. There were, however, but few of our men found on the field wounded. They were, to use Santa Anna's significant words, in his despatch, "all dead," the cowardly miscreants having killed every man whom they overtook, wounded and helpless on the field. With like turpitude and treachery, they left their own dead unburied and their own wounded uncared for, on the field where they fell. The latter were carried to Saltillo, in our own wagons, the former were buried by the alcalde, under the orders of Gen. Taylor.

#### INTERESTING DETAILS.

General Wool greatly distinguished himself in the action, and all the officers fought like heroes. After the battle, Gen. Taylor demanded of Santa Anna an unconditional surrender of his whole army, which the latter declined; but in return requested Gen. Taylor to surrender immediately. Immortal be the reply of Old Rough and Ready, as delivered by the gallant Lieut. Crittenden—

"GENERAL TAYLOR NEVER SURRENDERS."

Colonels Yell and Hardin were both talented and honoured members of Congress for several years, the former from Arkansas, the latter from Illinois. Lieut. Col. Henry Clay is the son of the illustrious statesman of Ashland. His son had given proof of the most brilliant qualities, and the promise of his youth filled his aged father's heart with joy and pride. Col. McKee belonged to one of those old families whose gallant deeds form part of the stirring history of the infancy of his gallant Kentucky. Adj. Gen. Lincoln is the heroic descendant of that old Revolutionary stock of patriots who fought at Lexington and Bunker Hill. But we have not time to dwell upon the character and history of all who fell in this bloody strife. History will do them justice.

On the 22d Santa Anna began the battle, by various manœuvres, attempting to outflank and terrify old Rough and Ready. On that day the battle was confined to skirmishing and cannon-ading, without much effect on either side.

In the meantime Santa Anna had sent a large force to Taylor's rear, but our artillery opened

upon them with great effect, and they were soon compelled to withdraw. On the 23d the battle commenced in real earnest, and raged with great violence during the whole day.

The Americans did not wait to be attacked, but with the most daring impunity charged on the enemy with loud huzzas, their officers leading them gallantly. General Taylor was every where in the thickest of the fight. He received a ball through his overcoat, but was not injured.

The result of this battle will shed additional glory upon the American arms, and when it is recollected that it has been an open field fight, by a force almost exclusively composed of raw volunteers, who have only been embodied a few months, and against an army of regular troops, four fold their own number, it has no parallel in the military annals of modern warfare.

The volunteers, whose fame is now resounding through the extent of the land, were instructed in the art and science of warfare by officers capable, in every respect, of teaching them the way in which their bravery and patriotism might avail in the cause in which they had so willingly enlisted. Thanks to the fostering care which our government has bestowed on the West Point Military Academy.

The Matamoras *Flag* of the 13th March, states that the Mexican force engaged in the late battle at Buena Vista, consisted of—

Infantry . . . . .	13,000
Cavalry . . . . .	6,000
Artillery and Sappers . . . . .	2,000
	<hr/>
	21,000

The list of the killed and wounded at Buena Vista is sad evidence of American valour. The Kentucky Regiments suffered awfully, as out of a force of eight hundred men, one hundred and sixty-three, or near one-fourth, fell in armour.

This result has been obtained by volunteers, without material assistance from regulars. And this, while it does not detract from the just fame of the regular army, must afford convincing proof of the efficiency of a volunteer force.

*The ardour of our volunteer officers led them into the hottest part of the fight, and consequently the number of field officers killed and wounded is lamentably great. Every volunteer colonel but one was either killed or wounded.*

A good story is told of Rough and Ready, who accompanied Gen. Worth's Brigade to Saltillo in connection with the march into that place. As they approached within a few miles of it they were met by a courier from the Alcalde, or chief governor of the city, who presented to the General a very formidable looking despatch. A halt was called, and the General's interpreter was ordered to give a translation of the document. It opened with an expostulation of the injustice of the war on the part of the Americans—alleged that it was prosecuted for the purpose of conquest, rapine and plunder—protested against the further advance of the General's forces—threatened him with the retribution that must follow and—but the General stopped the translator in the middle of a sentence with—Are you through sir? No, was the reply, I have not read half of it yet!

O, I'll hear no more of it, said the General—march. He ordered the bugler to sound the advance, and again the column was in motion.

A letter from Washington, says:—"There is no doubt that the great victory of Gen. Taylor at

Buena Vista contributed most powerfully to the easy reduction of Vera Cruz and the castle. The news was received there while the circumvallation was in progress; and the effect of the disastrous overthrow of the invincible Santa Anna in his first demonstration, could but exert a most depressing influence upon the enemy. Had Taylor been annihilated, Scott might have had a bloody task to accomplish; but the battle fought by Old Rough and Ready, and the men it cost to win it, saved a great sacrifice on the part of Gen. Scott."

## VERA CRUZ.

Official Despatches of Gen. Scott and Com. Perry.  
*Giving an account of the fall, surrender, and unconditional capitulation of the City of Vera Cruz, and the Castle of San Juan D'Ulloa.*

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Camp Washington, before Vera Cruz,  
March 23d, 1847.

Sir: Yesterday seven of our ten inch mortars being in battery, and the labours for planting the remainder of our heavy metal being in progress, I addressed at two o'clock, P. M., a summons to the governor of Vera Cruz, and within the two hours limited by the bearer of the flag, received the governor's answer. Copies of the two papers, (marked respectively A. and B.,) are herewith enclosed.

It will be perceived that the governor, who, it turns out, is the commander of both places, chose, against the plain terms of the summons, to suppose me to have demanded the surrender of the castle and of the city—when, in fact, from the non arrival of our heavy metal—principally mortars—I was in no condition to threaten the former.

On the return of the flag, with that reply, I at once ordered the seven mortars, in battery, to open upon the city. In a short time the smaller vessels of Commodore Perry's squadron—two steamers and five schooners—according to previous arrangement with him, approached the city within about a mile and an eighth, whence, being partially covered from the castle, an essential condition to their safety, they also opened a brisk fire upon the city. This has been continued, uninterruptedly, by the mortars, and only with a few intermissions by the vessels, up to nine o'clock this morning, when the commodore very properly called them off from a position too daringly assumed.

Our three remaining mortars are now (twelve o'clock, M.,) in battery, and the whole ten in activity. To-morrow, early, if the city should continue obstinate, batteries Nos. 4 and 5 will be ready to add their fire: No 4 consisting of four 24 pounders and two 8 inch Paixhan guns, and No. 5 (naval battery) of three 32 pounders and three 8 inch Paixhans—the guns, officers, and sailors landed from the squadron—our friends of the navy being unremitting in their zealous co-operation, in every mode and form.

So far, we know that our fire upon the city has been highly effective, particularly from the batteries of ten inch mortars, planted at about eight hundred yards from the city. Including the preparation and defence of the batteries from the beginning, now many days, and notwithstanding the heavy fire of the enemy from city and

castle, we have only had four or five men wounded, and one officer and one man killed, in or near the trenches. That officer was Captain John R. Vinton of the United States 3d artillery, one of the most talented, accomplished and effective members of the army, and who was highly distinguished in the brilliant operations at Monterey. He fell last evening in the trenches, where he was on duty as field and commanding officer, universally regretted. I have just attended his honoured remains to a soldier's grave, in full view of the enemy, and within reach of his guns.

Thirteen of the long-needed mortars—leaving twenty-seven, besides heavy guns, behind—have arrived, and two of them landed. A heavy norther then set in (at meridian) that stopped that operation, and also the landing of shells. Hence the fire of our mortar batteries has been slackened, since two o'clock to day, and cannot be invigorated until we shall again have a smooth sea. In the mean time I shall leave this report open for journalizing events that may occur up to the departure of the steam ship of war, the Princeton, with Commodore Conner, who, I learn, expects to leave the anchorage off Sacrificios, for the United States, the 25th instant.

March 24.—The storm having subsided in the night, we commenced this forenoon, as soon as the sea became a little smooth, to land shot, shells, and mortars.

March 25.—The Princeton being about to start for Philadelphia, I have but a moment to continue this report.

All the batteries, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, are in awful activity this morning. The effect is, no doubt, very great, and I think the city cannot hold out beyond to-day. To-morrow morning many of the new mortars will be in a position to add their fire, when, or after the delay of some twelve hours, if no proposition to surrender shall be received, I shall organize parties for carrying the city by assault. So far the defence has been spirited and obstinate.

I enclose a copy of a memorial received last night, signed by the consuls of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, within Vera Cruz, asking me to grant a truce to enable the neutrals, together with Mexican women and children, to withdraw from the scene of havoc about them. I shall reply the moment that an opportunity may be taken, to say—1. That a truce can only be granted on the application of governor Morales, with a view to a surrender. 2. That in sending safeguards to the different consuls, beginning as far back as the 13th instant, I distinctly admonished them, particularly the French and Spanish consuls, and, of course, through the two, the other consuls, of the dangers that have followed. 3. That, although at that date I had already refused to allow any person whatsoever to pass the line of investment either way, yet the blockade had been left open to the consuls and other neutrals to pass out to their respective ships of war up to the 22d instant; and, 4th, I shall enclose to the memorialists a copy of my summons to the governor, to show that I had fully considered the impending hardships and distresses of the place, including those of women and children, before one gun had been fired in that direction. The intercourse between the neutral ships of war and the city was stopped at the last mentioned date by Commodore Perry,

with my concurrence, which I placed on the ground that that intercourse could not fail to give the enemy *moral aid and comfort*.

It will be seen from the memorial, that our batteries have already had a terrible effect on the city, (also known through other sources,) and hence the inference that a surrender must soon be proposed. In haste.

I have the honour to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. Wm. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.

A.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Camp Washington, before Vera Cruz,

March 22d, 1847.

The undersigned, Major General Scott, general-in-chief of the armies of the United States of America, in addition to the close blockade of the coast and port of Vera Cruz, previously established by the squadron under Commodore Connor of the navy of the said States, having now fully invested the said city with an overwhelming army, so as to render it impossible that its garrison should receive from without succor or reinforcement of any kind; and having caused to be established batteries competent to the speedy reduction of the said city, he, the undersigned, deems it due to the courtesies of war, in like cases, as well as the rights of humanity, to summon his excellency, the governor and commander-in-chief of the city of Vera Cruz to surrender the same to the arms of the United States of America, present before the place.

The undersigned, anxious to spare the beautiful city of Vera Cruz from the imminent hazard of demolition, its gallant defenders from a useless effusion of blood, and its peaceful inhabitants, women and children inclusive, from the inevitable horrors of a triumphant assault, addresses this summons to the intelligence, the gallantry, and patriotism, no less than to the humanity of his excellency the governor and commander-in-chief of Vera Cruz.

The undersigned is not accurately informed whether both the city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa be under the command of his excellency, or whether each place has its own independent commander; but the undersigned, moved by the considerations adverted to above, may be willing to stipulate that, if the city should by capitulation be garrisoned by a part of his troops, no missile shall be fired from within the city or from its bastions or walls upon the castle, unless the castle should previously fire upon the city.

The undersigned has the honour to tender to his distinguished opponent, his excellency the governor and commander-in-chief of Vera Cruz, the assurance of the high respect and consideration of the undersigned.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

B.

[Translation.]

The undersigned, commanding general of the free and sovereign state of Vera Cruz, has informed himself of the contents of the note which Major General Scott, general-in-chief of the forces of the United States has addressed to him under date of to-day, demanding the surrender

of this place, and the castle of Ulloa; and in answer has to say, that the above named fortress, as well as this place depend on his authority; and it being a principal duty, in order to prove worthy of the confidence placed in him by the government of the nation, to defend both points at all cost, to effect which he counts upon the necessary elements, and will make it good to the last; therefore his excellency can commence his operations of war in the manner in which he may consider most advantageous.

The undersigned has the honour to return to the general-in-chief of the forces of the United States the demonstrations of esteem he may be pleased to honour him with.

God and liberty!

VERA CRUZ, March 22d, 1847.

JUAN MORALES.

To Major General Scott, general-in-chief of the forces of the United States, situated in sight of this place.

[Translation.]

VERA CRUZ, March 24th, 1847.

The undersigned, consuls of different foreign powers near the republic of Mexico, moved by the feeling of humanity excited in their hearts by the frightful results of the bombardment of the city of Vera Cruz during yesterday and the day before, have the honour of addressing collectively, General Scott, commander-in-chief of the army of the United States of the north, to pray him to suspend his hostilities, and to grant a reasonable truce, sufficient to enable their respective compatriots to leave the place with their women and children, as well as the Mexican women and children.

The request of the undersigned appears to them too conformable to the existing ideas of civilization, and they have too high an opinion of the principles and sentiments of General Scott, not to be full of confidence in the success of this request. They pray him to have the goodness to send back his answer to the parlementaire, who is the bearer of this, and to accept the assurances of their respectful consideration.

T. GIFFORD,

Consul de sa Majeste Britannique.

A. GLOUX,

Le consul de sa Majeste le Roi des Francais,

FILIPPE G. DE ESCALANTE,

El consul de Espana.

HENRI D'OLEIRE,

Consul de S. M. le Roi de Prusse.

A true translation of the original paper for the Secretary of War.

E. P. SCAMMON, A. A. D. C.

Proposition for the appointment of Commissioners.

I have the honour of transmitting to your excellency the exposition which has this moment been made to me by the Senores Consuls of England, France, Spain, and Prussia, in which they solicit that hostilities may be suspended while the innocent families in this place who are suffering the ravages of war, be enabled to leave the city, which solicitude claims my support; and considering it in accordance with the rights of afflicted humanity, I have not hesitated to invite your excellency to enter into an honourable accommodation with the garrison, in which case you will please name three commissioners



who may meet at some intermediate point to treat with those of this place upon the terms of the accommodation.

With this motive I renew to your excellency my attentive consideration.

God guard your excellency, &c.

On account of the sickness of the commanding general,

JOSE JUAN DE LANDERO.

Major General Scott.

Copy for the Hon. Secretary of War.

E. P. SCAMMON, A. A. D. C.

*Credentials of Commissioners on the part of the United States.*

In consideration of the proposition the undersigned has received from Senor General Landero, the actual commander of the city of Vera Cruz, and its dependencies, that three commissioners be appointed on the part of each belligerent to treat of the surrender of the said city, with its dependencies, to the besieging army before the same—the undersigned, Major General Scott, General-in-chief of the armies of the United States of America, has appointed, and does hereby appoint, Generals W. J. Worth and G. J. Pillow, with Colonel J. G. Totten, chief of Engineers—all of the army of the said States, commissioners on the part of the undersigned to meet an equal number of commissioners who may be duly appointed on the part of the Senor General Landero, to treat of the surrender of the city of Vera Cruz, and its dependencies, to the arms of the said States.

Done at Camp Washington, the Head-Quarters of the Army of the United States of America, this 26th day of March, in the year of our Lord, 1847.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

*Gen. Landero's letter notifying the appointment of Mexican Commissioners.*

In virtue of your excellency's having accepted the proposition of accommodation which I proposed to you in my despatch of to-day, and in accordance with the reply I have just received, I have the honour to inform you that I have named, on my part, the Senores Colonels D. Jose Gutierrez Villanueva, D. Pedro Miguel Herrera, and Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, D. Manuel Robles, to whom I have intrusted the competent power to celebrate said accommodation, having the honour to enclose you a copy of the expressed power.

I reiterate to your excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

God and Liberty. Vera Cruz, March 26th, 1847.

JOSE JUAN DE LANDERO.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Vera Cruz, March 29, 1847.

SIR: The flag of the United States of America floats triumphantly over the walls of the city, and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa.

Our troops have garrisoned both since 10 o'clock. It is now noon. Brigadier General Worth is in command of the city.

Articles of capitulation were signed and exchanged at a late hour, night before last. I enclose a copy of the document.

I have heretofore reported the principal incidents of the siege up to the 25th inst. Nothing of striking interest occurred till early in the

morning of the next day, when I received overtures from Gen. Landero, on whom General Morales had devolved the principal command. A terrible storm of wind and sand made it difficult to communicate with the city, and impossible to refer to Commodore Perry. I was obliged to entertain the proposition alone, or to continue the fire upon a place that had shown a disposition to surrender; for the loss of a day, or perhaps several, could not be permitted. The accompanying papers will show the proceedings and the results.

Yesterday, after the norther had abated, and the commissioners appointed by me early the morning before, had again met those appointed by General Landero, Commodore Perry sent ashore his second in command, Captain Aulick, as a commissioner on the part of the Navy. Although not included in my specific arrangement made with the Mexican commander, I did not hesitate, with proper courtesy, to desire that Captain Aulick might be duly introduced and allowed to participate in the discussions and acts of the commissioners who had been reciprocally accredited. Hence the preamble to his signature. The original American commissioners were Brevet Brigadier General Worth, Brigadier General Pillow, and Colonel Totten. Four more able or judicious officers could not have been desired.

I have time to add but little more. The remaining details of the siege: the able co-operation of the United States Squadron, successively under the command of Commodores Connor and Perry; the admirable conduct of the whole army—regulars and volunteers—I should be happy to dwell upon as they deserve; but the steamer Princeton, with Commodore Connor on board, is under way, and I have commenced organizing an advance into the interior. This may be delayed a few days, waiting the arrival of additional means of transportation. In the meantime, a joint operation, by land and water, will be made upon Alvarado. No lateral expedition, however, shall interfere with the grand movement towards the capital.

In consideration of the great services of Colonel Totten, in the siege that has just terminated most successfully, and the importance of his presence at Washington, as the head of the Engineer bureau, I intrust this despatch to his personal care, and beg to commend him to the very favourable consideration of the department.

I have the honour to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.

FLAG-SHIP MISSISSIPPI,

Off Vera Cruz, March 25th, 1847.

SIR: The sailing of the Princeton this day for the United States, offers me an opportunity of informing the department that Gen. Scott had, on the 23d instant, the day after I assumed the command of the squadron, so far completed the erection of his batteries in the rear of Vera Cruz as to authorize the summoning of the city, and on the refusal of the governor to surrender, of opening his fire at three o'clock of that day.

In conformity with the arrangements made in the morning with General Scott, I directed a flotilla of small steamers and gun-boats of the squadron, led by Commander J. Tatnall, in the Spitfire, to take a position and commence a si-

multaneous fire upon the city. The order was promptly and gallantly executed, and the fire was kept up with great animation until late in the evening.

On visiting them at their position, I found that the two steamers had nearly exhausted their ammunition, but having received a fresh supply during the night from this ship, they at sunrise moved to a more favourable and advanced point, and resumed and continued their fire until recalled by signal.

At the earnest desire of myself and officers, General Scott generously assigned a position in the trenches, to be mounted with guns from the squadron, and worked by seamen. Three eight-inch Paixhans, and three long thirty-two-pounders, (all that were required,) were consequently landed, and after immense labour in transporting them through the sand, in which parties from the divisions of Generals Patterson, Worth, and Pillow, respectively detached by those officers, cheerfully participated, the pieces were placed in position, and opened upon the city about ten o'clock yesterday, immediately drawing upon them a sharp fire from the enemy, which in a short time killed and wounded ten of the detachment from the squadron.

In order to give all a chance to serve in the trenches, for the honour of which there is a great though generous strife, I have arranged that detachments from each ship in charge respectively of lieutenants, and the whole commanded by a captain or commander, shall be relieved every twenty-four hours. Captain Aulick, assisted by Commander Mackenzie, and several lieutenants, had the direction of mounting the guns and opening the fire, and well and bravely was the duty performed. Captain Mayo is now in charge and will be relieved in turn.

The Ohio arrived on the 22d instant, but in consequence of a norther, did not reach her proper anchorage until yesterday afternoon. Detachments of boats from all the vessels are employed night and day in landing from the transports the stores and munitions of the army.

Enclosed is a list of the killed and wounded ascertained up to this hour, (12 meridian,) with the report of Captain Aulick; also a list of the small vessels, comprising the flotilla of the squadron, all of which were engaged on the 22d instant.

I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant.

M. C. PERRY,

Commanding Home Squadron.

Hon. JOHN Y. MASON, Secretary of the Navy,  
Washington city, D. C.

U. S. FLAG-SHIP, MISSISSIPPI,

At anchor near Vera Cruz, March 29, 1847.

SIR: It is with infinite satisfaction I announce to you that the city of Vera Cruz, and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, were this day occupied by garrisons of United States troops. Detachments from the army and navy, with the flotilla, were in motion early in the morning, and the American colours were hoisted on the forts of the city and castle, at twelve o'clock, under a simultaneous salute from all the large vessels of the squadron.

Enclosed is a copy of the articles of capitulation.

I have the honour to be, most respectfully,  
your obedient servant,

M. C. PERRY,

Hon. JOHN Y. MASON, Secretary of  
the Navy, Washington, D. C.

—  
ONE, P. M., March 29.

Within the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa.

I write this within the castle. The batteries in the city are now saluting. The American flags are already hoisted on two forts of the city. The American colours will next be displayed on the Castle.

M. C. PERRY.

—  
*Memoranda furnished by Col. Totten.*

March 9, 1847.—The disembarkation commenced.

March 13, 1847.—The investment is complete—two mortars landed.

March 17, 1847.—Ten or twelve mortars were on shore to-day.

March 18, 1847.—Trenches opened at night.

March 22, 1847.—City summoned at two P. M., to surrender; and, on refusal, the fire was begun from seven mortars—afterwards increased to nine mortars.

March 24, 1847.—The naval battery of three thirty-two-pounders, and three eight-inch Paixhan guns begun its fire this morning.

March 25, 1847.—A battery of four twenty-four-pounders, and two eight-inch howitzers opened to-day.

March 26, 1847.—The enemy, early this morning, commenced the negotiation for a surrender.

March 29, 1847.—Possession taken of both city and castle—the garrison marching out and laying down their arms.

At eight o'clock, the castle saluted the Mexican flag, and crossed to the city. At ten, the whole Mexican army marched out and stacked their arms on the road near the cemetery. Our army then marched on each side of the Mexican lines into the town. Colonel Belton took possession of the castle, saluted the American flag, and then fired a salute to Commodore Connor, as the Princeton left. General Scott, from the government house, reviewed the troops as they marched through the public square. He is now quartered in it. All the best part of the inhabitants had left the city before the attack. On our entry it looked like a deserted city. The city is very much injured by the shot and shell. Nine thousand Mexican troops were within twelve or fifteen miles of the city on the night of the 28th, and were driven back by Colonel Harney, of the dragoons.


The trenches were open seven days.

The fire from our batteries was continued three and a half days.

During the sixteen days that intervened between the disembarkation of the troops, and the opening of negotiations, there were five days of violent "northers," in which all landing of stores, &c., was interrupted. And during the seven days of open trenches, there were two days and two nights, in which it was impossible to undertake any new works; or even, by clearing the trenches and batteries of large quantities of drifting sand, to arrest the accumulating damage.

# The Map of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Uloa.

## THE POSITIONS OF OUR FORCES.



## THE REFERENCES.

*A & C.*—The position of the steamers Spitfire and Vixen. *B, D, E, and F.*—The positions of the gunboats. *G.*—American line of entrenchments, established March 13th—extending from Pt. de la Catita to a point opposite *B*. *H.*—A Mexican redoubt, captured by our forces. The sloop of war John Adams was anchored on the south side of Sacrificios, opposite *F*.

*Articles of capitulation of the city of Vera Cruz, and the castle of San Juan de Uloa.*

PUENTE DE HORNOS,  
Without the walls of Vera Cruz,  
Saturday, March 27, 1847.

Terms of capitulation agreed upon by the commissioners, viz:

Generals W. J. Worth and G. J. Pillow, and Col. J. G. Totten, Chief Engineer, on the part of Major General Scott, General-in-chief of the armies of the United States; and Colonel Jose Gutierrez de Villanueva, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers Manuel Robles, and Colonel Pedro de Herrera, commissioners appointed by General of Brigade Don Jose Juan Landero, commanding in chief, Vera Cruz, the castle of San Juan de Uloa, and their dependencies—for the surrender to the arms of the United States, of the said forts, with their armaments, munitions of war, garrisons, and arms.

1. The whole garrison, or garrisons to be surrendered to the arms of the United States, as prisoners of war, the 29th instant, at ten o'clock, A. M.; the garrison to be permitted to march out with all the honours of war, and to lay down

their arms to such officers as may be appointed by the General-in-chief of the United States armies, and at a point to be agreed upon by the commissioners.


2. Mexican officers shall preserve their arms and private effects, including horses and horse furniture, and to be allowed, regular and irregular officers, as also the rank and file, five days to retire to their respective homes, on parole, as hereinafter prescribed.

3. Coincident with the surrender, as stipulated in article 1, the Mexican flags of the various forts and stations shall be struck, saluted by their own batteries; and, immediately thereafter, Forts Santiago and Conception, and the castle of San Juan de Uloa, occupied by the forces of the United States.

4. The rank and file of the regular portion of the prisoners to be disposed of, after surrender and parole, as their General-in-chief may desire, and the irregular to be permitted to return to their homes. The officers, in respect to all arms and descriptions of force, giving the usual parole that the said rank and file, as well as themselves, shall not serve again until duly exchanged.



## CASTLE OF SAN JUAN DE ULLOA.



WALL IN FRONT OF THE CITY OF VERA CRUZ.

*A. A.* Open courts. *B.* Light house. *C.* Observatory and magazine. *D. D.* Piers  
*E. E. E.* Outposts. *F.* New wall with traverses (bomb proof.) *G. G.* Wall

5. All the *material* of war, and all public property of every description found in the city, the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, and their dependencies, to belong to the United States; but the armament of the same (not injured or destroyed in the further prosecution of the actual war) may be considered as liable to be restored to Mexico, by a definitive treaty of peace.

6. The sick and wounded Mexicans to be allowed to remain in the city, with such medical officers and attendants and officers of the army

as may be necessary to their care and treatment.

7. Absolute protection is solemnly guarantied to persons in the city, and property, and it is clearly understood that no private building or property is to be taken or used by the forces of the United States, without previous arrangement with the owners, and for a fair equivalent.

8. Absolute freedom of religious worship and ceremonies is solemnly guarantied.

(Signed in duplicate.)



## MEXICO.

This extensive territory, occupying 915,270 square miles, embracing almost every variety of climate, excepting the extreme cold of our own, was conquered by the Spaniards, under Cortez, about 1521. It had been the most powerful of all the native empires. In 1821 it declared its independence of Spain, since when Mexico has been little else than a scene of successive revolutions, turmoil, bloodshed and anarchy. Even at the moment when the American forces have taken possession of nearly all their principal cities, subjugated their entire seacoast, and threaten, with speedy capture the capitol, instead of the undivided front which such an emergency calls for, the Mexican citizens have been slaughtering each other in a domestic, civil war. The Roman Catholic has always been the supreme religion of the state, to the exclusion, by law, of all other. The people, notwithstanding the luxuriance of the soil and the richness of its mines are poor, ignorant and degraded. Mexico is divided into twenty-one states, containing, with the territories of New Mexico and the Californias, a population of 7,824,771. Of which Mexico has 1,397,000, its capital city\* 218,000. Puebla 667,000, its capital city\* 80,000. Vera Cruz 257,000, its city\* 10,000. San Luis Potosi 323,000, its capital\* 54,000. New Leon 103,000, its capital city Monterey, about 16,500. Tamaulipas 97,000, Victoria, its chief town, 3,400. Yucatan 563,000, its chief city, Merida 27,000. The territory of New Mexico, 67,800, Santa Fe, its capital 4,600. The two Californias about 34,000.

The population of Mexico is composed of whites or Creoles, Indians and the mixed races.

The number of priests, of all orders, exceed 14,000. The standing amusements of the people of Mexico are similar to those of its mother country, Spain, most prominent among which are bull fights and religious processions, many of which are upon an extensive and imposing scale. Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi abound in mines of the precious metals, one of which alone, in less than forty years, has yielded over one hundred and seventy millions of dollars.

**DISTANCES.**—From Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico, is to Jalapa 50, to Perota 43, to La Puebla 72, to Mexico 90, total 225 miles. From Point Isabel to Matamoras 25, to Monterey 150, thence to Saltillo 42, to San Luis Potosi 315, thence to San Felipe 62, to Guanajuato 30, to Salamanca 25, to Queretaro 52, to Mexico 120, total from Point Isabel, 931 miles.†

The churches in Mexico are upon the most costly and magnificent scale. The great cathedral in the city of Mexico occupies the site of the great temple, which was dedicated to the Sun, and destroyed by Cortez in 1521. This was an immense structure, a place for worship and human sacrifice, upwards of seventy thousand persons having been offered upon its bloody altars. The interior of this stupendous temple was large enough to contain four hundred houses, and was enclosed by a massive wall, crowned with battlements, having four gates, over each of which was a military arsenal. This structure was erected by the father of the celebrated MONTEZUMA, King of Mexico, dethroned by Cortez, and died in 1521.

\* Of the same name.

† These distances are according to recent Geographers. Other accounts make them still greater.





## **SANTA ANNA.**

**PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF MEXICO ;**

The son of an exiled Spanish Nobleman. Born in Mexico, 1803.  
Made Dictator in 1835. Banished in 1845. Recalled in 1846.

He is five feet eleven inches in height.



# OFFICIAL DESPATCHES,

*As published pursuant to the call of the House of Representatives of  
February 1, 1847.*

## CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN **GEN. TAYLOR** AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT, PRECEDING  
AND AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL TAYLOR, FROM MAY 28, 1845, TO MARCH 2, 1846.

[*Confidential.*]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
May 28, 1845.

SIR: I am directed by the President to cause the forces now under your command, and those which may be assigned to it, to be put into a position where they may most promptly and efficiently act in defence of Texas, in the event it shall become necessary or proper to employ them for that purpose. The information received by the Executive of the United States warrants the belief that Texas will shortly accede to the terms of annexation. As soon as the Texan Congress shall have given its consent to annexation, and a convention shall assemble and accept the terms offered in the resolutions of Congress, Texas will then be regarded by the executive government here so far a part of the United States as to be entitled from this government to defence and protection from foreign invasion and Indian incursions. The troops under your command will be placed and kept in readiness to perform this duty.

In the letter addressed to you from the Adjutant General's office, of the 21st of March, you were instructed to hold a portion of the troops under your immediate command in readiness to move into Texas under certain contingencies, and upon further orders from this department. In the treaty between the United States and Mexico, the two governments mutually stipulated to use all the means in their power to maintain peace and harmony among the Indian nations inhabiting the lands on their borders, and to restrain by force any hostilities and incursions by these nations within their respective boundaries, so that the one would not suffer the Indians within its limits to attack, in any manner whatever, the citizens of the other, or the Indians residing upon the territories of the other. (See the 33d article, a copy of which is herewith transmitted.) The obligations which in this respect are due to Mexico by this treaty, are due also to Texas. Should the Indians residing within the limits of the United States, either by themselves, or associated with others, attempt any hostile movement in regard to Texas, it will be your duty to employ the troops under your command to repel and chastise them; and for this purpose you will give the necessary instructions to the military posts on the upper Red river, (although not under your immediate command,) and, with the approbation of the Texan authorities, make such movements, and take such

position, within the limits of Texas, as in your judgment may be necessary. You are also directed to open immediate correspondence with the authorities of Texas, and with any diplomatic agent of the United States, (if one should be residing therein,) with a view to information and advice in respect to the common Indian enemy, as well as to any foreign power. This communication and consultation with the Texan authorities, &c., are directed with a view to enable you to avail yourself of the superior local knowledge they may possess, but not for the purpose of placing you, or any portion of the forces of the United States, under the orders of any functionary not in the regular line of command above you.

Should the territories of Texas be invaded by a foreign power, and you shall receive certain intelligence through her functionaries of that fact, after her convention shall have acceded to the terms of annexation contained in the resolutions of the Congress of the United States, you will at once employ, in the most effective manner your judgment may dictate, the forces under your command, for the defence of these territories, and to expel the invaders.

It is supposed here that, for the mere purpose of repelling a common Indian enemy, as above provided for, it may not be necessary that you should march across the Sabine or upper Red river (at least in the first instance) with more than the particular troops which you were desired in the instructions before referred to, of the 21st March, to hold in immediate readiness for the field, but it is not intended to restrict you positively to that particular amount of force. On the contrary, according to the emergency, you may add any other corps, or any number of companies within your department deemed necessary, beginning with those nearest at hand; and in the contingency of a foreign invasion of Texas, as above specified, other regiments from a distance may be ordered to report to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
WM. L. MARCY,  
General Z. TAYLOR, Secretary of War.  
Fort Jesup, Louisiana.

[*Confidential.*] WAR DEPARTMENT, July 15, 1845.

SIR: On the 4th day of July next, or very soon thereafter, the convention of the people of Texas will probably accept the proposition of annexation, under the joint resolutions of the late Congress of the United States. That acceptance will constitute Texas an integral portion of our country.



In anticipation of that event, you will forthwith make a forward movement with the troops under your command, and advance to the mouth of the Sabine, or to such other point on the gulf of Mexico, or its navigable waters, as in your judgment may be most convenient for an embarkation at the proper time for the western frontier of Texas.

In leaving to your judgment to decide the route, it is intended that you choose the most expeditious, having due regard to the health and efficiency of the troops on reaching the point of destination.

The force under your immediate command at and near Fort Jesup to be put in motion on the receipt of these instructions, will be the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry, and seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons. The two absent companies of the 4th infantry have been ordered to join their regiments. Artillery will be ordered from New Orleans.

It is understood that suitable forage for cavalry cannot be obtained in the region which the troops are to occupy; if this be so, the dragoons must leave their horses and serve as riflemen. But it is possible that horses of the country accustomed to subsist on meager forage may be procured if it be found necessary. You will therefore take the precaution to order a portion of the cavalry equipments to accompany the regiment, with a view to mounted service.

The point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of Texas, where you will select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del Norte, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western border. You will limit yourself to the defence of the territory of Texas, unless Mexico should declare war against the United States.

Your movement to the gulf of Mexico, and your preparations to embark for the western frontier of Texas, are to be made without any delay; but you will not effect a landing on that frontier until you have yourself ascertained the due acceptance of Texas of the proffered terms of annexation, or until you receive directions from Mr. Donelson.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
GEORGE BANCROFT.

To Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR,  
U. S. Army, Com'g 1st Dept., Fort Jesup, La.  
P. S.—The revenue cutters Spencer and Woodbury have been placed by the Treasury Department at the disposition of Mr. Donelson.

WAR DEPARTMENT, JULY 8, 1845.  
SIR: This department is informed that Mexico has some military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, which are, and for some time have been, in the actual occupancy of her troops. In carrying out the instructions heretofore received, you will be careful to avoid any acts of aggression unless an actual state of war should exist. The Mexican forces at the posts in their possession, and which have been so, will not be disturbed as long as the relations of peace between the United States and Mexico continue.

WM. L. MARCY.

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR.

WAR DEPARTMENT.  
Washington, July 30, 1845.

SIR: Your letter, from New Orleans, of the

20th instant, addressed to the Adjutant General, has been received and laid before the President, and he desires me to express to you his approval of your movements.

He has not the requisite information in regard to the country to enable him to give any positive directions as to the position you ought to take, or the movements which it may be expedient to make. These must be governed by circumstances. While avoiding, as you have been instructed to do, all aggressive measures towards Mexico, as long as the relations of peace exist between that republic and the United States, you are expected to occupy, protect, and defend the territory of Texas to the extent that it has been occupied by the people of Texas. The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof, which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in selecting the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the boundary line—the Rio Grande—as prudence will dictate. With this view, the President desires that your position, for a part of your forces at least, should be west of the river Nueces.

You are directed to ascertain and communicate to this department the number of Mexican troops now at Matamoras, and the other Mexican posts along the border, their position, the condition of them, and particularly the measures taken or contemplated to increase or strengthen them. If you should have any reason to believe that the government of Mexico is concentrating forces on the boundaries of the two countries, you will not only act with reference to such a state of things, but give the earliest information to this department.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WM. L. MARCY,  
Secretary of War.

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR,  
Commanding the army of occupation in Texas.

WAR DEPARTMENT.  
Washington, August 23, 1845.

SIR: The information hitherto received as to the intentions of Mexico and the measures she may adopt, does not enable the administration here to give you more explicit instructions in regard to your movements than those which have been already forwarded to you. There is reason to believe that Mexico is making efforts to assemble a large army on the frontier of Texas, for the purpose of entering its territory and holding forcible possession of it. Of their movements you are doubtless advised, and we trust have taken, or early will take, prompt and efficient steps to meet and repel any such hostile incursion. Should Mexico assemble a large body of troops on the Rio Grande, and cross it with a considerable force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement of hostilities. You will, of course, use all the authority which has been or may be given you, to meet such a state of things. Texas must be protected from hostile invasion, and for that purpose you will of course employ to the utmost extent all the means you possess or can command.



An order has been this day issued for sending one thousand more men into Texas to join those under your command. When the existing orders are carried into effect, you will have with you a force of four thousand men of the regular army. We are not enabled to judge what auxiliary force can, upon an emergency, be brought together from Texas, and as a precautionary measure you are authorized to accept volunteers from the States of Louisiana and Alabama, and even from Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Should Mexico declare war, or commence hostilities by crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, you are instructed to lose no time in giving information to the authorities of each or any of the abovementioned States as to the number of volunteers you may want from them respectively. Should you require troops from any of these States, it would be important to have them with the least possible delay. It is not doubted that at least two regiments from New Orleans and one from Mobile could be obtained and expeditiously brought into the field. You will cause it to be known at these places what number and description of troops you desire to receive from them in the contemplated emergency. The authorities of these States will be apprized that you are authorized to receive volunteers from them, and you may calculate that they will promptly join you when it is made known that their services are required. Arms, ammunition, and camp equipage for the auxiliary troops that you may require, will be sent forward subject to your orders. You will so dispose of them as to be most available in case they should be needed, at the same time with a due regard to their safety and preservation. Orders have been issued to the naval force on the gulf of Mexico to co-operate with you. You will, as far as practicable, hold communication with the commanders of our national vessels in your vicinity, and avail yourself of any assistance that can be derived from their co-operation. The *Lexington* is ordered into service as a transport ship, and will sail in a few days from New York with a detachment of United States troops for Corpus Christi. She will be employed as the exigency of the public service may require. In order to keep up a proper communication between the army in Texas and the United States, the *On-ka-hy-e*, the *Harney*, and the *Dolphin* will be put into service as soon as they can be made ready as despatch vessels to convey intelligence, supplies, &c. You will avail yourself of these vessels and all other proper means to keep the government here advised of your operations, and of the state of things in Texas and Mexico.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, yours,  
WM. L. MARCY.

*Secretary of War.*

General Z. TAYLOR.

[Sent to the quartermaster at New Orleans.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, August 25, 1845.

SIR: General Taylor, to whom has been committed the command of the army of occupation in Texas, is authorized to draw any auxiliary force he may need from Texas. If such aid should be wanted, it is not doubted that the patriotic citizens of that State will rally to his assistance with alacrity, in sufficient numbers to enable him, in conjunction with United States troops, to repel the invasion of Texas by Mexico, should it

be attempted. Though our information as to the force Mexico may bring into the field for such a purpose is not very accurate, yet there is reason to apprehend that it is more numerous than that under the command of General Taylor; and may, perhaps, exceed his effective force when augmented with the auxiliary aid he may derive from Texas. Besides, he may need additional troops to a greater number, and sooner than they can be furnished him from that State. Should he need assistance from your State, he is directed to signify to you the number and description of troops he may deem necessary to receive as volunteers into service. Relying upon the zeal and public spirit of the gallant militia of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the government here do not doubt that he will be promptly furnished with such and so many as he may express a desire to have mustered into the service of the United States; and it has the most perfect reliance upon your countenance and co-operation in organizing and sending into Texas such a volunteer force from your State as he may desire. It is necessarily left to his judgment to designate the number. It is proper to observe, that the emergency rendering such assistance from the militia of your State necessary, does not appear to have been foreseen by Congress, and consequently no appropriation was made for paying them: but it is not to be doubted that such a provision will be promptly made when Congress shall again assemble. In order to be paid, the State troops must be mustered into service. In organizing companies and regiments for that purpose, the number of officers must be proportioned to that of the privates. Enclosed I send you, from the Adjutant General, a statement of the number and rank of officers for each company of men, as well as the regimental and staff officers, should a regiment of volunteers be called for. From the known patriotism and military ardor of the militia of your State, it is presumed that volunteers to the number that may be required will readily tender their services to their country in the contemplated emergency. Should aid from your State be required by the commanding general in Texas, it will be of the utmost importance that the troops should be sent into that State without delay. This consideration will render it proper that they should come from such part of the State as can most promptly furnish them.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

His Excellency BENJAMIN FITZPATRICK,  
*Governor of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.*  
His Excellency A. G. BROWN,  
*Governor of Mississippi, Jackson, Mississippi.*  
His Excellency ALEXANDER MOUTON,  
*Governor of Louisiana, New Orleans, Louisiana.*

Letters were also addressed on the 28th of the same month, to the governors of Tennessee and Kentucky, on the same subject, and in the same words as the above.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, August 30, 1845.

SIR: Only one letter has been received from you since you entered Texas, and that was written the day after you arrived at Aransas Bay. Permit me to urge upon you the im-

portance of availing yourself of every opportunity of communicating with this department. It is desirable to have early and correct information from you, to enable the government to form a true judgment of the designs and movements of Mexico, founded on ascertained facts. It is presumed that, in pursuance of previous instructions from this department, you have taken special pains to become acquainted with the proceedings of Mexico, particularly in regard to the number and kind of Mexican troops at Matamoras, Monterey, and other places, as well as those which are on the march towards them, and may be brought to act against your forces or pushed across the Rio Grande, either in the vicinity of Matamoras or at distant points on that river. You will not, I trust, underrate the importance of such information, or fail to use the proper and necessary means for acquiring it. You are directed, should you deem it expedient, to employ competent and trustworthy persons to obtain such intelligence.

The instructions heretofore issued, enjoin upon you to defend Texas from invasion and Indian hostilities; and, should Mexico invade it, you will employ all your forces to repulse the invaders, and drive all Mexican troops beyond the Rio Grande. Should you judge the forces under your command inadequate, you will not fail to draw sufficient auxiliary aid from Texas, and, if there be need, from the States, pursuant to your previous instructions. It is not to be doubted, that on your notification, volunteer troops, to the number you may require, will rally with alacrity to your standard. You have been advised that the assembling a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the Executive here as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross that river with such a force will also be considered in the same light. There may be other acts on the part of Mexico which would put an end to the relations of peace between that republic and the United States. Should depredations be committed on our commerce by her public armed vessels, or privateers acting under her authority, this will constitute a state of war.

Orders have been issued to the vessels of the United States in the gulf, to furnish you with information of any hostile proceedings of Mexico, and the state of things in that republic. You will embrace every occasion that may present, to forward to the commanders of these vessels such intelligence as you may possess concerning the movements of the military forces and the state of things in Mexico and Texas, and to suggest to them such assistance and co-operation as you may desire to receive.

In case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts, your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas. Mexico having thus commenced hostilities, you may, in your discretion, should you have sufficient force and be in a condition to do so, cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling to invade Texas, defeat the junction of troops uniting for that purpose, drive them from their positions on either side of that river, and, if deemed practicable and expedient, take and hold possession of Matamoras and other places in the country. I scarcely need to say that enterprises of this kind are only to be

ventured on under circumstances presenting a fair prospect of success.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WM. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR,  
*Commanding the U. S. army in Texas.*

P. S.—Herewith you will find a copy of the order of the Navy Department to Commodore Connor.

#### WAR DEPARTMENT.

Washington, October 16, 1845.

SIR: The information which we have here, renders it probable that no serious attempts will at present be made by Mexico to invade Texas, although she continues to threaten incursions. Previous instructions will have put you in possession of the views of the government of the United States, not only as to the extent of its territorial claims, but of its determination to assert them. In carrying out these instructions you will be left very much to your own judgment, by reason of your superior knowledge of localities, and the earlier notice you may receive of the probable views of Mexico, and the movements of her troops.

On the supposition that no active operations on your part will be required during the approaching winter, an important question to be decided is the position or positions to be occupied by your forces. This must be determined mainly with reference to the objects for which the army under your command was sent into Texas. You will approach as near the western boundary of Texas (the Rio Grande) as circumstances will permit; having reference to reasonable security; to accommodations for putting your troops into winter huts, if deemed necessary; to the facility and certainty of procuring or receiving supplies; and to checking any attempted incursions by the Mexican forces or the Indian tribes. Ought your present position to be changed? the forces which are, or soon will be, assembled under your command, be kept together or divided? and, if divided, what positions are to be taken, and how are they to be divided? These are questions which must be in a measure left to your judgment, or, at least, the decision upon them here, if there be time, will be influenced in no inconsiderable degree by the information and views which you may furnish the department. You need not, therefore, wait for directions from Washington, to carry out what you may deem proper to be done. Upon all the points above enumerated, and others not suggested, your reports and views in full are desired, not only with reference to the continuance of the present aspect of affairs between the United States and Mexico, but in the contingency of your selecting, or being directed to take, a position on the banks of the Rio Grande near its mouth, or places above, or even in the event of open hostilities. It is expected that the officers of the Engineer and Topographical Corps, who have been sent into Texas, will examine, as far as practicable, under your direction, the country, with a view to selecting eligible positions for permanent or temporary occupation, for depots of supplies, arms, and munitions of war. It is extremely desirable that the seacoast, or at least that part of it which will be likely to be visited by our vessels in aid of any contemplated military operations, should be better known here than it now is; as well as the character of the several rivers which may present obstacles to the movements of our forces, or fur-

lish facilities for transporting supplies. You are requested to avail yourself of all proper occasions, and employ the means you possess, to collect information in regard to all these matters, and forward it to this department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
WM. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR.  
*Commanding army of occupation in Texas.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, January 13, 1846.

SIR: I am directed by the President to instruct you to advance and occupy, with the troops under your command, positions on or near the east bank of the Rio del Norte, as soon as it can be conveniently done with reference to the season and the routes by which your movements must be made. From the views heretofore presented to this department, it is presumed Point Isabel will be considered by you an eligible position. This point, or some one near it, and points opposite Matamoras and Mier, and in the vicinity of Laredo, are suggested for your consideration; but you are left to your better knowledge to determine the post or posts which you are to occupy, as well as the question of dividing your forces with a view to occupying two or more positions.

In the positions you may take in carrying out these instructions and other movements that may be made, the use of the Rio del Norte may be very convenient, if not necessary. Should you attempt to exercise the right which the United States have in common with Mexico to the free navigation of this river, it is probable that Mexico would interpose resistance. You will not attempt to enforce this right without further instructions.

You are requested to report to this department, without delay, what means you may require, if any, beyond those you now possess, to enforce and maintain our common right to navigate this river, as well as your views of the importance of this right in the defence and protection of the State of Texas.

It is not designed, in our present relations with Mexico, that you should treat her as an enemy; but, should she assume that character by a declaration of war, or any open act of hostility towards us, you will not act merely on the defensive, if your relative means enable you to do otherwise.

Since instructions were given you to draw aid from Texas, in case you should deem it necessary, the relations between that State and the United States have undergone some modification. Texas is now fully incorporated into our union of States, and you are hereby authorized by the President to make a requisition upon the executive of that State for such of its militia force as may be needed to repel invasion or to secure the country against apprehended invasion.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. L. MARCY.  
*Secretary of War.*

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, January 20, 1846.

SIR: You will perceive by a letter which has been addressed to General Taylor, commanding the United States troops in your State, a copy of which I send to you herewith, that the President

has authorized him, in case of hostilities between the United States and Mexico, and an invasion or threatened invasion of your State, to make a requisition for such militia force as in a possible state of things may be required from Texas.

By the request of the President I hereby apprise you of the directions which have been given to General Taylor, and express to you the confidence here entertained, that, should he make a requisition, it will be promptly responded to.

WM. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

His Excellency JAMES HENDERSON,  
*Governor of the State of Texas.*

# DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL TAYLOR TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS 1ST MILITARY DEPARTMENT,  
New Orleans, La., July 20, 1845.

SIR: I respectfully acknowledge your communication of July 8, covering the instructions of the Secretary of War of the same date, relative to the Mexican settlements on this side of the Rio Grande. Those instructions will be closely obeyed; and the department may rest assured that I will take no step to interrupt the friendly relations between the United States and Mexico. I am gratified at receiving these instructions, as they confirm my views, previously communicated, in regard to the proper line to be occupied at present by our troops.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,  
Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Steamship Alabama, Aransas Pass,  
Texas, July 28, 1845.

SIR: I respectfully report my arrival at this place on the 25th instant, with eight companies of the 3d infantry, it having been found necessary to leave two companies of that regiment, to be brought over in other transports.

The troops are temporarily established on St. Joseph's island. I am waiting the report of a boat expedition sent to Corpus Christi bay before I determine on the site of an encampment. I hope to receive the necessary information in the course of the day, when I shall immediately commence the removal of the 3d infantry to the point selected. The position will probably be "Live Oak Point," in Aransas bay, some ten miles from our present position. I am very anxious to establish myself at the mouth of the Nueces, but the extreme shoalness of the water will, I fear, present an insuperable obstacle, unless we can procure lighters of much lighter draught than those we have at present.

The difficulties of effecting a debarkation on this coast, and of establishing depots for supplying the army, are much greater than I anticipated, and will render our operations at once embarrassing and expensive. Between Pass Cavallo and Brazos Santiago, there is no entrance for vessels drawing more than seven or eight feet; and the prevailing winds render the operation of lightening extremely uncertain and hazardous. We have been favored with fine weather, and, should it continue, the other transports, which may now be expected, will be enabled to discharge without difficulty.



We had a very favorable run from New Orleans; and I am happy to state that the health of the command was greatly improved by the voyage. The eight companies have scarcely any sickness at this time.

The day before leaving New Orleans, I received from Major Donelson a communication dated at Austin, on the 7th of July, informing me that the convention had unanimously accepted the proposition of annexation, and suggested that two companies should be posted at Austin. I still deem it best to concentrate my force until our relations with Mexico shall become settled, and until the country can be examined, and the best mode of supply ascertained.

I hear nothing important from the Mexican frontier. Some Indian depredations are committed from time to time near Corpus Christi, and will claim my first attention after I can get established.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, August 15, 1845.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, by New Orleans papers of the 7th instant, I have received intelligence of the preparatory steps taken by Mexico towards a declaration of war against the United States. I shall spare no exertions to meet suitably this probable change in the relations between the two countries; and the additional force ordered to join me, as announced in your communication of July 30, will, I trust, enable me to do something more than maintain a merely defensive attitude on the Nueces. This will depend upon the demonstrations made by Mexico along the Rio Grande, in regard to which the Secretary of War has solicited a report. I am enabled to say, upon information which is regarded as authentic, that General Arista was to leave Monterey on the 4th of this month for Matamoras with 1,500 men—500 being cavalry. I learn, from the same source, that there are 500 regular troops at Matamoras. In regard to the force at other points on the Rio Grande, except the militia of the country, I have no information; nor do I hear that the reported concentration at Matamoras is for any purpose of invasion. I have but just arrived at this place, and hope in a few days to be able to obtain more full and precise intelligence concerning the movements of the Mexicans. I shall not fail to communicate promptly to the department all such intelligence upon which I think reliance can be placed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I enclose a sketch prepared by Lieut. Eaton, of Aransas and Corpus Christi bays, showing our intended depot, and also our present position—Fort Marcy.

Z. T.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, August 19, 1845.

SIR: I respectfully enclose for the information of the department, a copy of a letter addressed by me to the President of Texas, and forwarded to him by special express on the 17th instant. I have deemed it proper to make this communication to President Jones, in consequence of the desire manifested by the authorities of Texas to have a garrison established at once at Austin. As I cannot consent to detach any portion of my command while a superior Mexican force is probably concentrating in my front, and as I still feel bound to extend every assistance compatible with a successful prosecution of the main object of the expedition, towards putting the frontier in a suitable state of defence, I have judged it prudent to make the suggestions and recommendations which you will find in the enclosed letter. Trusting that they will meet the approbation of the War Department,

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, August 30, 1845.

SIR: I respectfully report the arrival at this point of seven companies of the 7th infantry under Major Brown, and two companies of volunteer artillery under Major Gally. Major Seawell's company, I am informed, was ordered back to Baton Rouge by General Gaines, and some small detachments of that regiment were also left at several posts. I have retained one company as a guard for the depot at St. Joseph's island.

The battalion of volunteer artillery has a fine battery of eight pieces—two twelves and six sixes, completely equipped in every respect. The officers are zealous, and the men seem to be quite well instructed in their duties. In case of need, I look for valuable service from this battalion.

I have just received a communication from President Jones, under date of the 23d instant, notifying me that he had taken preparatory steps towards organizing a volunteer force of 1,000 men to assist me if necessary. This matter will form the subject of a special communication to your office in a few days.

Apprehending that the erroneous impressions current in New Orleans in regard to our situation, might induce General Gaines to order the muster of a battalion or brigade of infantry, I addressed a communication to his staff officer by the steamship Alabama, expressing my thanks for the reinforcement of the volunteer battalion of artillery, but with the hope that no more volunteers would be sent without a requisition from me. That communication will reach New Orleans to night or to-morrow, in time, I trust, to stop the employment of any more volunteers.

We have no news from the Rio Grande. Idle stories are brought in from that quarter, but with the means of accurate information which we now possess, I do not deem it necessary to repeat them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, October 4, 1845.

SIR: I beg leave to suggest some considerations in relation to the present position of our force, and the dispositions which may become necessary for the more effectual prosecution of the objects for which it has been concentrated. It will be recollected that the instructions of June 15, issued by Mr. Bancroft, then acting Secretary of War, directed me to "select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion," &c. Brazos Santiago is the nearest entrance to the mouth of the Rio Grande; and Point Isabel, within that entrance, and twenty-one miles from Matamoras, would have fulfilled more completely than any other position the conditions imposed by the Secretary. But we had no artillery, no engineer force or appliances, and but a moderate amount of infantry; and the occupation of Point Isabel, under these circumstances, and with at least the possibility of resistance from the Mexicans, might have compromised the safety of the command. I therefore determined to take up the next accessible position in the rear, which is the mouth of the Nueces river. All the information which I could obtain before leaving New Orleans, seemed to point to Corpus Christi as the most suitable point for concentration; and, although before the President's instructions of July 30 reached me, I would have preferred a position on the left bank of the river, yet a careful examination of the country had already convinced me that none could be found combining so many advantages as this. Every day's experience has confirmed these impressions. Corpus Christi is healthy, easily supplied, and well situated to hold in observation the course of the Rio Grande from Matamoras to Laredo—being about 150 miles from several points on the river. I have reason to believe, moreover, that a salutary moral effect has been exercised upon the Mexicans. Their traders are continually carrying home the news of our position and increasing numbers, and are confessedly struck by the spectacle of a large camp of well-appointed and disciplined troops, accompanied by perfect security to their persons and property, instead of the impressment and pillage to which they are subject in their own country. For these reasons, our position thus far has, I think, been the best possible; but, now that the entire force will soon be concentrated, it may well be a question whether the views of government will be best carried out by our remaining at this point. It is with great deference that I make any suggestions on topics which may become matter of delicate negotiation; but if our government, in settling the question of boundary, makes the line of the Rio Grande an ultimatum, I cannot doubt that the settlement will be greatly facilitated and hastened by our taking possession at once of one or two suitable points on or quite near that river. Our strength and state of preparation should be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken. However salutary may be the effect produced upon the border people by our presence here, we are too far from the frontier to impress the government of Mexico with our readiness to vindicate, by force of arms, if necessary, our title to the country as far as the Rio Grande. The "army of occupation" will, in a few days, be concentrated at this point, in condition for vigorous and efficient service. Mexico having as yet made no positive declaration of

war, or committed any overt act of hostilities, I do not feel at liberty, under my instructions, particularly those of July 8, to make a forward movement to the Rio Grande without authority from the War Department.

In case a forward movement should be ordered or authorized, I would recommend the occupation of Point Isabel and Laredo, as best adapted to the purposes of observing the course of the river, and covering the frontier settlements of Texas. Point Isabel is accessible by water, and can be safely occupied by two brigades of infantry, with a suitable force of field artillery. On the arrival of the steamer Harney, I shall order a careful reconnaissance of Brazos Santiago, as a necessary preliminary measure to the occupation of Point Isabel. To occupy Laredo will require a land march from this point. Supplies may probably be transported by water as high as San Paricio, and possibly to the junction of the Rio Frio with the Nueces. I propose to establish a depot on the Nueces river, probably at the crossing of the San Antonio and Laredo road, from which to operate towards the Rio Grande. You will perceive from my "special orders" No. 24 that a reconnaissance has been ordered in that direction. A brigade of infantry, with the cavalry, and a battery or two of field artillery, will be sufficient for the occupation of Laredo. That town is on the left bank of the Rio Grande, and possesses the military advantage of holding in observation the main route from the interior of Mexico through Monterey to Matamoras.

In case it should be found impracticable to establish a suitable depot on the Nueces, the entire force, after strengthening San Antonio, might be thrown forward to Point Isabel, where it could be readily supplied, and held in readiness for any further service.

I have deemed it my duty to make the above suggestions. Should they be favorably considered, and instructions based upon them, I will thank you to send the latter in duplicate to Lieut. Colonel Hunt—one copy to be despatched *direct*, without delay; the other to be sent via Galveston, should a steamer be running to that port from New Orleans.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding,  
Z. TAYLOR,

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

P. S.—It is proper to add, that should any auxiliary force be required, I propose to draw it wholly from Texas. I do not conceive that it will become necessary, under any circumstances, to call for volunteers from the United States.

Z. T.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, November 7, 1845.

SIR: I respectfully enclose a copy of a letter from Commodore Conner, commanding the home squadron, which I received by the "Saratoga," sloop of war, on the 5th instant. The intelligence communicated by the commodore will, doubtless, reach the seat of government long before the receipt of this letter.

The communication from the Secretary of War, dated October 16, was received and acknowledged on the 1st and 2d instant. I purposely deferred a detailed reply to the various points embraced in that communication until I could receive an answer to mine of October 4, which covered (at least in part) the same ground. The intelligence from

Mexico, however, tends to modify, in some degree, the views expressed in that communication. The position now occupied by the troops may, perhaps, be the best while negotiations are pending, or at any rate until a disposition shall be manifested by Mexico to protract them unreasonably. Under the supposition that such may be the view of the department, I shall make no movement from this point, except for the purpose of examining the country, until further instructions are received. You will perceive, from my orders, that reconnoissances are almost constantly in the field, the officers of engineers and topographical engineers rendering valuable service on those duties. I refer you to the reports made by those officers to the chiefs of their own bureaux for the information which is thus procured in relation to the country. An examination of the harbor of Brazos Santiago will be ordered in a few days—as soon as a proper vessel shall become disposable for that service.

In case no movement is made this season towards the Rio Grande, I may find it necessary to detach a portion of the army a short distance into the interior, where wood can be more readily procured than here. But in no case do I deem it necessary to hut the troops. Sheds, with platforms, on which to pitch the tents, were extensively used in camps of position in Florida, and will, I cannot doubt, form a sufficient protection here.

On the hypothesis of an early adjustment of the boundary, and the consequent establishment of permanent frontier posts, I cannot urge too strongly upon the department the necessity of occupying those posts before the warm weather shall set in. A large amount of sickness is, I fear, to be apprehended, with every precaution that can be taken; but the information which I obtain leads me to believe that a summer movement would be attended with great expense of health and life. As in Florida, the winter is the best season for operations in Texas.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

#### HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Corpus Christi, Texas, February 4, 1846.

SIR: I respectfully acknowledge the communication of the Secretary of War, dated January 13th, and containing the instructions of the President to move forward with my force to the Rio Grande. I shall lose no time in making the necessary preparations for carrying out those instructions.

The occupation of Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago as a depot will be indispensable. That point and a position on or near the river opposite Matamoras will I think answer all present purposes. At any rate, I shall not separate my force further until the position of affairs shall render it entirely safe to do so.

I propose to abandon this position entirely, as soon after our march as the stores, hospital, &c., can be transferred to St. Joseph's island. It will be necessary to keep up an establishment at that point for the present, although our supplies will come to Point Isabel direct from New Orleans.

In reply to the call of the Secretary for information as to what means, if any, will be required

"to enforce and maintain our common right to navigate" the Rio Grande, I would respectfully state that, until I reach the river and ascertain the condition of things in the frontier States of Mexico, temper of the people, &c., I cannot give any satisfactory answer to the question. I have every reason to believe that the people residing on the river are well disposed towards our government. Our advance to the Rio Grande will itself produce a powerful effect, and it may be that the common navigation of the river will not be disputed. It is very important to us, and will be indispensable when posts are established higher up, as must ultimately be the case.

I shall not call for any militia force in addition to what I already have, unless unforeseen circumstances shall render its employment necessary.

I beg leave again to call the attention of the department to the necessity of having our movement and position at Brasos Santiago covered by a small armed vessel. I deem this vitally important, and hope it will meet with favorable consideration.

We have no news from the interior of Mexico more recent than that derived from the New Orleans papers of the 26th January.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR.

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

#### HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Corpus Christi, Texas, February 26, 1846.

SIR: I have to report that the preparations for a forward movement of this command are now nearly completed. The examinations spoken of in my report of the 16th instant have shown the practicability of both routes—by the main land and by Padre island. The reconnoissance of Padre island extended to its southern extremity, and included the harbor of Brazos Santiago and Point Isabel; that of the main route reached to a point near the Little Colorado. A depot, with four days' forage, and subsistence for the army, will be thrown forward some forty miles, to the Santa Gertrudes. A detachment of two companies, to establish and cover this depot, will march, on the 28th, under Brevet Major Graham. In about a week thereafter, say the 7th of March, the cavalry will march, to be followed, at intervals of one day, by the brigades of infantry. By the 25th of March, at latest, I hope to be in position on the Rio Grande.

I have taken occasion to represent to some citizens of Matamoras, who were here with a large number of mules for sale, and who are represented to have considerable influence at home, that the United States government, in occupying the Rio Grande, has no motive of hostility towards Mexico, and that the army will, in no case, go beyond the river, unless hostilities should be commenced by the Mexicans themselves; that the Mexicans, living on this side, will not be disturbed in any way by the troops; that they will be protected in all their usages; and that everything which the army may need will be purchased from them at fair prices. I also stated that, until the matter should be finally adjusted between the two governments, the harbor of Brazos Santiago would be open to the free use of the Mexicans as heretofore. The same views were impressed upon the Mexican custom-house officer at Brazos Santiago by Captain Hardee, who



commanded the escort which covered the reconnaissance of Padre island.

We are entirely without news of interest from the frontier, or the interior of Mexico, our latest date from the capital being the 21st of January, and the same from Vera Cruz.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Corpus Christi, Texas, March 8, 1846.

SIR: I respectfully report that the advance of the army, composed of the cavalry and Major Ringgold's light artillery, the whole under the command of Colonel Twiggs, took up the line of march this morning in the direction of Matamoras, its strength being 23 officers and 378 men. The advance will be followed in succession by the brigades of infantry, the last brigade marching on the 11th instant. The roads are in good order, the weather fine, and the troops in excellent condition for service.

Major Munroe will embark for Brazos Santiago in season to reach that harbor about the time the army will be in the vicinity of Point Isabel. He takes with him a siege train and a field battery. Captain Sanders, of the engineers, the officers of ordnance, and the pay department, accompany Major Munroe.

The movement by water, to Brazos Santiago, will be covered by the revenue cutter "Woodbury," Captain Foster, whose commander has kindly placed her at my disposal for this service.

All proper arrangements have been made by the staff departments for supplying the army on the route, as well as establishing a depot for its further wants at Point Isabel.

I have deemed it proper to cause my "orders" No. 30, to be translated into Spanish, and circulated on the Rio Grande. Sixty copies have already been sent in advance of the army to Matamoras, Camargo, and Mier. This form of giving publicity to the spirit which actuates our movement in occupying the country, I thought preferable to a proclamation. I trust the order itself will meet the approval of the department. A few copies of the translation are herewith enclosed.

I shall again communicate with general headquarters before I march, and I expect to do so at least once on the route.

My headquarters will march with the rear brigade, but will soon pass to the advance of the army.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., comdg.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Order No. 30. Corpus Christi, March 8, 1846.

The army of occupation of Texas being now about to take a position upon the left bank of the Rio Grande, under the orders of the Executive of the United States, the general-in-chief desires to express the hope that the movement will be ad-

vantageous to all concerned; and with the object of attaining this laudable end, he has ordered all under his command to observe, with the most scrupulous respect, the rights of all the inhabitants who may be found in peaceful prosecution of their respective occupations, as well on the left as on the right side of the Rio Grande. Under no pretext, nor in any way, will any interference be allowed with the civil rights or religious privileges of the inhabitants; but the utmost respect for them will be maintained.

Whatsoever may be needed for the use of the army will be bought by the proper purveyor, and paid for at the highest prices. The general-in-chief has the satisfaction to say that he confides in the patriotism and discipline of the army under his command, and that he feels sure that his orders will be obeyed with the utmost exactness.

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Camp at "El Sauce," 119 miles from Corpus Christi, March 18, 1846.

SIR: I avail myself of a chance opportunity to Corpus Christi to report that I have advanced to this point with the cavalry and 1st brigade of infantry. The 2d brigade encamps to-night about 7 miles in my rear; the 3d brigade about 19. I shall concentrate all my force on reaching the Little Colorado, 13 miles in my front, so as to be prepared for any contingency. I am happy to say that all the corps of the army are in fine condition and spirits, equal to any service that may be before them.

Within the last two days, our advance has met with small armed parties of Mexicans, who seemed disposed to avoid us. They were, doubtless, thrown out to get information of our advance.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Point Isabel, March 25, 1846.

SIR: I respectfully report that I marched on the morning of the 23d instant with the entire army from the camp, near the Colorado, in the order prescribed in my order No. 35, herewith enclosed. After a march of fifteen miles, we reached, on the morning of the 24th, a point on the route from Matamoras to Point Isabel, eighteen miles from the former and ten from the latter place. I here left the infantry brigades under Brigadier General Worth, with instructions to proceed in the direction of Matamoras until he came to a suitable position for encampment, where he would halt, holding the route in observation, while I proceed with the cavalry to this point to communicate with our transports, supposed to have arrived in the harbor, and make the necessary arrangements for the establishment and defence of a depot.

While on my way hither, our column was approached by a party on its right flank, bearing a white flag. It proved to be a civil deputation from Matamoras, desiring an interview with me. I informed them that I would halt at the first suitable place on the road and afford them the desired interview. It was, however, found

necessary, from the want of water, to continue the route to this place. The deputation halted while yet some miles from Point Isabel, declining to come further, and sent me a formal protest of the prefect of the northern district of Tamaulipas against our occupation of the country, which I enclose herewith. At this moment, it was discovered that the buildings at Point Isabel were in flames. I then informed the bearer of the protest that I would answer it when opposite Matamoras, and dismissed the deputation. I considered the conflagration before my eyes as a decided evidence of hostility, and was not willing to be trifled with any longer, particularly as I had reason to believe that the prefect, in making this protest, was but a tool of the military authorities at Matamoras.

The advance of the cavalry fortunately arrived here in season to arrest the fire, which consumed but three or four houses. The port captain, who committed the act under the orders, it is said, of General Mejia, had made his escape before its arrival. We found two or three inoffensive Mexicans here, the rest having left for Matamoras.

I was gratified to find that the water expedition had exactly answered to our land movement—the steamers arriving in the harbor only two or three hours before we reached Point Isabel, with the other transports close in their rear. The “Porpoise” and “Lawrence,” brigs of war, and cutter “Woodbury,” are lying outside. I have thought it necessary to order Captain Porter’s company to this place to reinforce Major Munroe. Our great depot must be here, and it is very important to secure it against any enterprise of the enemy. The engineer officers are now examining the ground with a view to tracing lines of defence and strengthening the position.

As soon as a sufficient amount of supplies can be thrown forward toward Matamoras, I shall march in the direction of that town and occupy a position as near it as circumstances will permit.

I enclose a sketch prepared by my aid de camp, Lieutenant Eaton, exhibiting the route of march since leaving the Colorado, and the bearings of important points.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

OFFICE OF THE PREFECT OF THE NORTHERN  
DISTRICT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TAMAULIPAS.

GOD AND LIBERTY!

Santa Rita, March 23, 1846.

SIR: Although the pending question respecting the annexation of the department of Texas to the United States is subject to the decision of the supreme government of Mexico, the fact of the advance of the army under your excellency’s orders, over the line occupied by you at Corpus Christi, places me under the necessity, as the chief political authority of the northern district of Tamaulipas, to address you, as I have now the honor to do, through the commissioners, who will place this in your hands, and to inform you that the people, under this prefecture, being justly

alarmed at the invasion of an army, which, without any previous declaration of war, and without announcing explicitly the object proposed by it, comes to occupy a territory which never belonged to the insurgent province, cannot regard with indifference a proceeding so contrary to the conduct observed towards each other by civilized nations, and to the clearest principles of the law of nations; that, directed by honor and patriotism, and certain that nothing has been said officially by the cabinet of the Union to the Mexican government, respecting the extension of the limits of Texas to the left bank of the Rio Bravo, trusting in the well-known justice of their cause, and using their natural right of defence, they (the citizens of this district) protest, in the most solemn manner, that neither now nor at any time do they, or will they, consent to separate themselves from the Mexican republic, and to unite themselves with the United States, and that they are resolved to carry this firm determination into effect, resisting, so far as their strength will enable them, at all times and places, until the army under your excellency’s orders shall recede and occupy its former positions; because, so long as it remains within the territory of Tamaulipas, the inhabitants must consider that whatsoever protestations of peace may be made, hostilities have been openly commenced by your excellency, the lamentable consequences of which will rest before the world exclusively on the heads of the invaders.

I have the honor to say this to your excellency, with the object indicated, and to assure you of my consideration and esteem.

JENES CARDENAS.

JUAN JOSE PINEDA.

To General Z. TAYLOR, &c.

[Extract.]

CAMP ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE RIO GRANDE,  
Opposite Matamoras, March 29, 1846.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived at this camp yesterday with the forces under my command, no resistance having been offered to my advance to the banks of the river, nor any act of hostility committed by the Mexicans, except the capture of two of our dragoons, sent forward from the advanced guard. I deem it possible that these two men may have deserted to the enemy, as one of them, at least, bears a bad character. Our approach seems to have created much excitement in Matamoras, and a great deal of activity has been displayed since our arrival in the preparation of batteries. The left bank is now under reconnoissance of our engineer officers, and I shall lose no time in strengthening our position by such defensive works as may be necessary, employing for that purpose a portion of the heavy guns brought round by sea.

The attitude of the Mexicans is so far decidedly hostile. An interview has been held, by my direction, with the military authorities in Matamoras, but with no satisfactory result.

Under this state of things, I must again and urgently call your attention to the necessity of speedily sending recruits to this army.

The militia of Texas are so remote from the border \* \* \* that we cannot depend upon their aid.

The strength gained by filling up the regiments

here, even to the present feeble establishment, would be of very great importance.

I respectfully enclose a field report of the force now in this camp.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
Z. TAYLOR,

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

HEADQUARTERS AT MATAMORAS, 2 o'clock P. M.,  
GOD AND LIBERTY!

April 12, 1846.

FOURTH MILITARY DIVISION, }  
General-in-Chief. }

To explain to you the many grounds for the just grievances felt by the Mexican nation, caused by the United States government, would be a loss of time, and an insult to your good sense; I therefore pass at once to such explanations as I consider of absolute necessity.

Your government, in an incredible manner—you will even permit me to say an extravagant one, if the usage or general rules established and received among all civilized nations are regarded—has not only insulted, but has exasperated the Mexican nation, bearing its conquering banner to the left bank of the Rio Bravo del Norte; and in this case, by explicit and definitive orders of my government, which neither can, will, nor should receive new outrages, I require you in all form, and at latest in the peremptory term of twenty-four hours, to break up your camp and retire to the other bank of the Nueces river, while our governments are regulating the pending question in relation to Texas. If you insist in remaining upon the soil of the department of Tamaulipas, it will clearly result that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question; and in that case I advise you that we accept the war to which, with so much injustice on your part you provoke us, and that, on our part, this war shall be conducted conformably to the principles established by the most civilized nations; that is to say, that the law of nations and of war shall be the guide of my operations; trusting that on your part the same will be observed.

With this view, I tender you the considerations due to your person and respectable office.

PEDRO DE AMPUDIA.

Senor General-in-Chief of the U. S. Army,  
Don Z. TAYLOR.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Camp near Matamoras, Texas, April 12, 1846.

SEÑOR: I have had the honor to receive your note of this date, in which you summon me to withdraw the forces under my command from their present position, and beyond the river Nueces, until the pending question between our governments, relative to the limits of Texas, shall be settled.

I need hardly advise you that, charged as I am, in only a military capacity, with the performance of specific duties, I cannot enter into a discussion of the international question involved in the advance of the American army. You will, however, permit me to say that the government of the United States has constantly sought a settlement, by negotiation, of the question of boundary; that an envoy was despatched to Mexico for that purpose, and that up to the most recent dates said envoy had not been received by the actual Mexican government, if indeed he has not received his passports and left the republic. In the mean time, I have been ordered to occupy the country up to the left bank of the Rio Grande, until the boundary shall be definitely settled. In carrying out these instructions I have carefully abstained from all acts of hostility, obeying, in this regard, not only the letter of my instructions, but the plain dictates of justice and humanity.

The instructions under which I am acting will not permit me to retrograde from the position I now occupy. In view of the relations between our respective governments, and the individual suffering which may result, I regret the alternative which you offer; but, at the same time, wish it understood that I shall by no means avoid such alternative, leaving the responsibility with those who rashly commence hostilities. In conclusion, you will permit me to give the assurance that on my part the laws and customs of war among civilized nations shall be carefully observed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your  
obedient servant.  
Z. TAYLOR.

Senor General D. PEDRO DE AMPUDIA.

In the preceding pages, we have given the Despatches and correspondence which will enable our citizens to form their own estimate of the nature and origin of the present hostilities. From a mass of voluminous documents, we have presented the orders of the Administration, and the Despatches of Gen. Taylor from the period immediately preceding the commencement of the war against Mexico.

It is not our purpose to offer any comments upon these. They are before the reader, and our duty is discharged in furnishing the authentic evidence by which correct conclusions can be made upon points of the utmost importance, to the Administration, and to Gen. Taylor, involving momentous consequences, upon which the public mind has been much divided. The letters, for the most part, clear and perspicuous, leave no room for doubt or misapprehension. Their import is plain. While we leave to partizan presses the conflicting opinions and harsh *animated versions*, on the grave questions which this war has presented to the country, the facts, which this documentary evidence furnishes, will be not the less acceptable to the serious and sober enquirers after truth. In connection with the other matters, which these pages furnish, we trust our brief, but comprehensive work will be considered as furnishing a popular and correct record of the most startling events of the age; events which have cast a lustre upon the history of the country.



# OFFICIAL DESPATCHES,

(Continued.)

On the 1st of February the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on the PRESIDENT for copies of "all the correspondence with General TAYLOR since the commencement of hostilities with Mexico," not heretofore published; also, the correspondence of the Quartermaster General's Department in relation to transportation for General Taylor's army, and the reports of Brigadier Generals Hamer and Quitman of the operations of their brigades in the attack on Monterey.

The President answered this call on the 27th of February, and the papers thus communicated are now presented in pamphlet form.

The Message from the President, accompanying the Documents, merely says that it has not been thought necessary to withhold any of this correspondence on the ground that its publication would be "detrimental to the public service," because he is satisfied that the operations to which it alludes "are now so far advanced, and that the enemy has already received so much information from other sources in relation to the intended movements of our army, as to render this precaution unnecessary."

The following is the essential portion of the note from the Secretary of War, covering the correspondence:

"The documents are numerous, and an attempt has been made so to arrange them as to bring together letters relating to the same subjects; but it has been found impracticable to carry this out to the fullest extent. In regard to the correspondence with General Taylor, from one to two months usually intervened between the letters written by and to him, and the receipt of the answers; and within that period several other letters, upon different subjects, were sent and received. Had a strictly chronological order of the correspondence been observed in the arrangement, many different subjects would have been introduced between the letters and the replies to them. An attempt has been made to bring together the letters and the replies, and it has been done to a considerable extent in regard to those which have reference to the campaign and to military movements. Those which relate to transportation have also been brought together as far as practicable.

"Among the letters embraced in the call, several, merely formal, such, for instance, as enclosed returns, proceedings of courts-martial, &c., have

not been copied; but the dates are given, and their contents briefly stated in the accompanying synopsis."

The first letter is from the President to General Taylor, dated

WASHINGTON CITY, May 30, 1846.

SIR: I transmit to you herewith a commission as major general by brevet in the army of the United States, conferred upon you for gallant conduct and distinguished services in the successive victories over superior Mexican forces at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, on the 8th and 9th days of May, 1846.

It gave me sincere pleasure, immediately upon the receipt of official intelligence from the scene of your achievements, to confer upon you, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, this testimonial of the estimate which your government places upon your skill and gallantry. To yourself and the brave officers and soldiers under your command the gratitude of the country is justly due. Our army have fully sustained their deservedly high reputation and added another bright page to the history of American valor and patriotism. They have won new laurels for themselves and for their country. My confidence in them never faltered. The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma rank among our most brilliant victories, and will long be remembered by the American people. When all the details of these battles and of the noble defence of the camp opposite to Matamoras shall have been received, it will be my pleasure, as it will be my grateful duty, to render to the officers and men under your command suitable testimonials for their conduct in the brilliant victories which a superintending Providence has enabled them to achieve for their country.

In transmitting to you this commission, and in communicating to the officers and soldiers under your command my profound sense of their meritorious services, I but respond to the patriotic enthusiasm manifested by the people in behalf of their brave defenders. Whilst my warmest thanks are tendered to the survivors, the nation mourns the loss of the brave officers and soldiers who fell in defence of their country upon the field of victory. Their names also shall be remembered and appropriate honors be paid to their memory by a grateful country.

You will cause this communication to be made known to the army under your command.

JAMES K. POLK.

To Brevet Major Gen. Z. TAYLOR, commanding U. S. army on the Rio Grande.

The first letter from General Taylor is dated May 20, 1846, at Matamoras, mentioning that he had called on the Governors of Louisiana and Texas for eight regiments, (5,000 men,) and requested General Gaines to assist in organizing this force; that General Gaines had called for many more volunteers than he (Gen. Taylor) deemed necessary, &c.; also asking for 1,000 tents, to be sent immediately to Brasos Santiago.

On the 21st of May, General Taylor wrote again soliciting further instructions. He says:

"Our future movements must depend, in a great degree, on the extent to which the Rio Grande is navigable for steamboats, and I fear that my expectations in this particular will not be realized. Though at times navigable as high as Camargo or even Mier, it is doubtful whether a boat can now be pushed higher than Reynosa. Indeed, the 'Neva,' which is in the river and accompanied the expedition under General Smith, has not yet reached this place, though hourly expected. Could we establish and keep up by water a depot at Camargo, operations might be carried on in the valley of the San Juan toward Monterey, the first city of importance in that direction. A direct movement from this point to Monterey would require vast transportation, chiefly by pack mules, and would moreover be hazardous in summer on account of the scarcity of water, part of the route being supplied by wells only. The country between this and Monterey, by whatever route, cannot support an army.

"I shall lose no time in ascertaining the practicability of the river for steamboats, and shall occupy Reynosa and such other points as a boat may be able to reach."

#### HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Matamoras, June 3d, 1846.

SIR: I respectfully enclose herewith a field return of the forces in and near Matamoras, both regular and volunteer. The corps known to have arrived at Point Isabel, of which no returns have yet been received, will carry the entire force under my orders to nearly eight thousand men.

I am necessarily detained at this point for want of suitable transportation to carry on offensive operations. There is not a steamboat at my command proper for the navigation of the Rio Grande; and without water transportation, I consider it useless to attempt any extensive movement. Measures have been taken to procure boats of suitable draught and description, and one or two may be now expected. In the mean time, I propose to push a battalion of infantry as far as Reynosa, and occupy that town. For any operations in the direction of Monterey, it

will be necessary to establish a large depot at Camargo, which I shall lose no time in doing as soon as proper transports arrive, unless I receive counter instructions from the department.

I trust the department will see that I could not possibly have anticipated the arrival of such heavy reinforcements from Louisiana as are now here, and on their way higher. Without large means of transportation, this force will embarrass, rather than facilitate our operations. I cannot doubt that the department has already given instructions, based upon the change in our position since my first call for volunteers.

Our last accounts of Arista represent his force to be halted at Coma, an extensive hacienda on the Monterey road, about one hundred miles from this point. He has pickets covering the roads leading to Matamoras, with a view to cut off all communication with the interior. The departmental authorities have issued a decree denouncing as traitors all who hold intercourse with us, or with those who do so. I am nevertheless disposed to believe that in some quarters, at least, our presence is not unfavorably viewed. We have no intelligence from the city of Mexico.

Ordnance stores, and other munitions of war are continually discovered in the town. Five pieces of cannon, and a very large amount of balls, shells, and ammunition generally, have been brought to light.

I am, sir, very respectfully,  
your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Br. Br. Gen. U. S. A., comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

On the 8th of June, the War Secretary wrote to Gen. Taylor at length. He says:

"In my letter of the 28th ultimo you were left to your own discretion and judgment as to the measures to be pursued before the end of the unfavorable season shall be passed, and it is not now intended to control that discretion. You best know what amount of force you will have under your command, and what can be best accomplished with that force.

"It is presumed you will hold both banks of the Rio Grande to a considerable distance from its mouth, and secure the uninterrupted use of that river for the transportation of supplies. I hope you will be able to take and hold in possession all places on it as high up as Laredo.

"It is proper that I should advise you that a considerable force, which will be also under your command, will soon assemble at San Antonio de Bexar. The ultimate destination of this force is Chihuahua, if it should be determined that such an expedition would have a favorable operation in the conduct of the war; but it might be at once used to take and secure the several places on the

Rio Grande. Though we have no despatch from you since those giving an account of the battles on the 8th and 9th of May, we have such information as induces the belief that you are in possession of Matamoras, and that you are not now threatened with any considerable Mexican force. It is desirable that you should find yourself in sufficient strength to capture and hold Monterey with your present force. You are apprized that large reinforcements are preparing to join you. Besides the regular forces now under "our command, and which will be speedily augmented, you will soon have nearly twenty thousand volunteers, (including those to rendezvous at San Antonio de Bexar,) who are to serve for one year. Your determination as to immediate movements will therefore be somewhat influenced by the consideration of the additional force which will soon join you.

"The President is desirous of receiving and hopes soon to be favored with your views and suggestions in relation to the fall campaign. His determination is to have the war prosecuted with vigor, and to embrace in the objects to be compassed in that campaign, such as will dispose the enemy to desire an end of the war. Shall the campaign be conducted with the view of striking at the city of Mexico, or confined so far as regards the forces under your immediate command to the Northern provinces of Mexico? Your views on this point will doubtless have an important influence upon the determination of the Government here. Should our army penetrate far into the interior of Mexico, how are supplies to be obtained? Can they be, to any considerable extent, drawn from the enemy's country, or must they be obtained from the United States? If the latter, what are the facilities and difficulties of transportation? These are very important questions, and the answers to them will have an essential bearing in settling the plan and objects of the campaign; and it is desired that you should express your views fully in regard to them.

"Again: it is important to know your opinion of the description of troops best adapted to operations in the interior of Mexico; what proportion should be infantry, artillery, and cavalry, &c.? A peace must be conquered in the shortest space of time practicable. Your views of the manner of doing it are requested. It is not doubted that you will push your advantages to the utmost extent, it can be done with the means at your command."

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Matamoras, June 10, 1846.

SIR: I beg leave earnestly to invite the attention of the department to the following points:

1st. The great influx of volunteers at Point Isabel. Five regiments certainly from Louisiana, numbering, say 3,600 men; two regiments or battalions from Louisville and St. Louis, numbering, say 1,200 more; several companies from Alabama, and I know not how many from Texas, the latter now beginning to arrive. The volunteer troops now under my orders amount to nearly 6,000 men. How far they may be increased without previous notification to me, it is impossible to tell.

2dly. The entire want of the proper kind

of transportation to push my operations up the river. The boats on which I depended for this service were found to be nearly destroyed by worms, and entirely unfit for the navigation of the river. At my instance, Major Thomas, on the 18th of May, required from Lieut. Col. Hunt a boat of the proper description, and followed it up in a few days by a requisition for another. At the last dates from New Orleans, no boat had been procured. Capt. Sanders, of the engineers, was despatched by me to New Orleans, to assist in procuring suitable boats, but I have yet received no report from him.

As I have previously reported, my operations are completely paralyzed by the want of suitable steamboats to navigate the Rio Grande. Since the 18th of May, the army has lain in camp near this place continually receiving heavy reinforcements of men, but no facility for water transport, without which, additional numbers are but an embarrassment.

I desire to place myself right in this matter, and to let the department see that the inactivity of the army, results from no neglect of mine. I must express my astonishment that such large reinforcements have been sent forward to join the army, without being accompanied by the means of transportation, both by land and water, to render them efficient. As matters now stand, whatever may be the expectations of the department, I cannot move from this place; and unless Capt. Sanders shall succeed in procuring boats of the proper kind, I can give no assurance in regard to future operations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Br. Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

*Endorsement by the Adjutant General.*

[REMARK.—"How far the volunteer force will be increased without previous notification to me, it is impossible to tell." With regard to the force called out by Gen. Gaines, and pushed forward by him, Gen. Taylor, no doubt, was not informed, as he could not be from this office, because the amount was unknown. Of the *twelve-month's men* authorized by the Executive, the General was timely and specially notified. See the general-in-chief's instructions of June 12, and adjutant general's of June 16.] R. J.

*Endorsement by Major General Scott.*

Respectfully laid before the Secretary of War, who is requested to look at my circular (memoranda) sent round to chiefs of staff, including quartermaster general, dated May 15, 1846.

JUNE 27, 1846.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

On the 12th of June General Scott wrote to General Taylor as follows:



"Recruits to fill up the ranks of the regular companies which are with you, or ordered to join you, to (say) about seventy men each, shall be sent forward as fast as practicable, so as to give you, we hope, in a short time a total force of about 23,070 men.

"Without waiting for the arrival of that amount of force, but before, and as soon as you shall deem it safe in respect to the relative numbers and positions of the enemy, your knowledge of the country, your supplies and means of transportation, it is the wish and expectation of the President that, with your accustomed energy, you take up lines of march beyond the Rio Grande, and press your operations toward the heart of the enemy's country; that is, upon such important points as you may deem necessary to conquer and to hold.

—  
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Matamoras, May 28, 1846.

SIR: With a view to expedite the procuring of small steamboats for the navigation of the Rio Grande, which is indispensable to future operations, the commanding general directs that you proceed without delay to New Orleans, and there assist Lieut. Col. Hunt in procuring boats of the proper draft and description.

Four boats will be required, and you may give assurances that they will receive employment at good prices, in transporting military stores on the river. Should any change in the condition of affairs render it necessary to discharge them at an earlier period than is now contemplated, you will assure the proprietors that they shall be remunerated for the time so lost.

In executing this service, you will please communicate with Lieut. Col. Hunt, to whom you will show this letter of instructions, and also with Col. Winthrop, who has promised his aid in this matter.

The proper draught of the boats, and the description best adapted to the purpose, you have already learned from the commanding general.

After the completion of this service, you will please return to headquarters.

If the requisite number, or indeed none of the proper kind of boats can be procured at once in New Orleans, you will proceed up the Mississippi and Ohio rivers until you fully accomplish the object of your mission.

The commanding general deems it preferable to make arrangements for compensating the boats, by giving the owners assurances of their receiving liberal prices for freight; but the boats must be procured if they have either to be bought or chartered.

As expedition is essential to this business, arrangements must be made to have at least the first boats you engage or procure, towed round the coast by some good sea boat of sufficient power, to prevent any unnecessary detention or delays.

I am sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,  
W. W. S. BLISS,  
Assistant Adjutant General.  
Capt. JNO. SANDERS, Corps of Engineers,  
Matamoras.

—  
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Matamoras, June 17, 1846.

SIR: I deem it proper to report that no advices have been received from general

headquarters since the 10th instant—"general orders" No 13, and "special orders" No 45, both of May 26th, being received on that day. Our dates from the north through the newspapers are some days later.

No steamboats have been sent out from New Orleans for the navigation of the Rio Grande, and in the absence of all information on that point, or respecting the views of the government, I am altogether in the dark as to our future operations. I must think that orders have been given by superior authority, to suspend the forwarding of means of transportation from New Orleans. I cannot otherwise account for the extraordinary delay shown by the Quartermaster's Department in that city. Even the mails containing probably important despatches from the government, are not expedited.

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson has occupied Reynosa, without opposition. What remains of the Mexican army is understood to be still at Linares, and has suffered from disease. General Torrejon has died, and Col. Carasco, at last advices, was very ill. I learn that Generals Arista and Ampudia have gone to Mexico, probably for the trial of the former or both.

Volunteer regiments have arrived from Louisville and St. Louis, making with those from Louisiana, eight strong and organized battalions—mustering over 5,000 men.

In addition, we have seven companies of Alabama volunteers, and twelve or fifteen companies from Texas—others from Texas are continually arriving. A portion of these volunteers has been lying in camp at this place for nearly a month, completely paralyzed by the want of transportation. Exposed as they are in this climate to diseases of the camp, and without any prospect, so far as I can see, of being usefully employed, I must recommend that they be allowed to return to their homes.

I have despatched Captain McCulloch, a good partisan officer, in the direction of Linares, with his company, to gain information, touching the numbers and position of the enemy, and the resources of the country.

I enclose herewith the descriptive roll of the detachment of recruits, brought out by Lieutenant McPhail.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
Z. TAYLOR,

Bt. Br. Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

—  
WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, July 1, 1846.

SIR: It gives me sincere pleasure to transmit herewith a commission, issued to you by the

President, of major general in the army of the United States, pursuant to the first section of the act of Congress passed 18th June last, a copy of which is also herewith enclosed.

On receiving your despatch No. 51, stating your want of means for transporting troops, supplies, &c., on the Rio Grande, I desired the quartermaster general to inform me what measures had been taken on that subject. I herewith send you his reply. I trust that the steps taken by your orders, and those of the quartermaster general here, will have furnished the means to enable you to prosecute active operations, as suggested in my letters of the 28th of May and 8th of June.

I anticipated the embarrassments of which you complain, by the accumulation of troops before accommodations could be possibly provided, and arrangements made for the employment of them. The only relief which can be applied to the case, is that contained in my previous communications to you on the subject, and in that from the adjutant general on the 25th of May.

The atrocious murder of Col. Cross has created a general anxiety that the guilty perpetrator of it should be brought to punishment. It is generally understood here that he is Romano Falcon, and that the crime can be proved against him. If this be so, allow me to express a hope that you may be able to get him into your custody, to the end that he may be dealt with as he deserves. Any fair and proper means you may deem fit to effect this, will be approved and sanctioned by this department.

Very respectfully, your  
obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.  
Maj. Gen. Z. TAYLOR, comdg Army of Occupation  
on the Rio Grande.

*General Taylor to the Secretary of War.*  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Matamoras, July 2, 1846.

SIR: In reply to the communications of the Secretary of War, dated May 28th, and June 8th, and to that of the general-in-chief, dated June 12th, I have the honor to submit the following views in regard to the operations against Mexico from this quarter. I will remark that my constant efforts to procure information in relation to the nature of the country, amount of supplies, &c., have not been as satisfactory as I could wish, the various accounts often differing even in important particulars. Either from the ignorance or interested motives of those who profess to give information, it is extremely difficult to obtain any upon which we can implicitly rely.

In calling upon the States of Louisiana and Texas for an auxiliary force of about 5,000 men, it was my expectation with that force to be able to clear the course of the Rio Grande as high as Laredo, and to occupy or control the country to the foot of the mountains, capturing and holding Monterey, if circumstances permitted. With the proper river transportation this could have been easily done, a depot would now have been

established at Camargo, and our operations pushed up the valley of the San Juan. The difficulties and embarrassments that I have experienced for want of such transportation have already been sufficiently made known. These difficulties have been increased by the great excess of volunteers that have been sent out—say 3,000 men beyond my original call. I nevertheless propose, upon the arrival of the steamers now hourly expected, to throw forward this force, with the regular troops, to Camargo, and established there a depot and base from which to operate towards the mountains. My reasons for retaining these six-months' volunteers in service have been set forth in another communication; and I desire, from motives of health and other considerations, to keep them employed as actively as possible. The twelve-months' volunteers can, in the meantime, form camps at healthy points in my rear; and, while receiving instruction, await the season for more extensive operations. The above dispositions can be made in the rainy season perhaps better than at any other time, as the river is then in a good navigable state. For operating with a heavy force—say 6,000 men from this point—towards Monterey and Saltillo, through which passes the only artillery route across the mountains, it is indispensable to employ the river as a channel of supply, and the valley of the San Juan, on one of the heads of which Monterey is situated, as a line of operations. The direct land route from this point to Monterey is much longer than the line from Camargo; in wet weather impassable for artillery or heavy wagons, and in dry scantily supplied with water. Assuming, then, Camargo as the depot, and the valley of the San Juan as the line of operations, the question arises, what amount of supplies can be obtained, and how can a column be subsisted on this route? It is pretty well determined that we cannot depend upon any considerable supply of breadstuffs short of Monterey, or perhaps Saltillo, seventy-five miles further south. Beef in abundance, it is believed, may be procured, and on this, with perhaps occasional issues of mutton, we must mainly depend for the meat part of the ration. From Camargo to Saltillo, then, we must expect to depend upon our depot for bread; and I am of opinion, from all I can learn of the resources of the country in pack mules and means of transportation generally, that a column exceeding 6,000 men cannot be maintained in bread alone as far as Saltillo. Saltillo itself is at no great distance from two or three fertile grain-growing districts, but how far the production in those districts may

exceed the supply I cannot with any certainty determine.

The above calculations, in regard to subsistence, are made on the suppositions that we shall find the people of the country, if not friends, at least passive and willing to part with their produce to the best advantages. I believe we shall find such to be their temper on this side of the mountains; whether this neutrality or indifference extends beyond, may well be a question. Should they prove hostile, destroy their crops, and drive away their stock, it will be an extremely difficult matter to sustain a column at Saltillo—still more so to pass beyond that city.

Supposing a column of the above strength—say 6,000 men—able to maintain itself at Saltillo, it will become a question, depending for its solution upon the elements above indicated, how far that force may be increased, or what amount of the twelve-months' volunteers may be safely and profitably thrown forward from the rear, with a view to future operations.

From Camargo to the city of Mexico is a line little if any short of 1,000 miles in length. The resources of the country are, to say the best, not superabundant; and, over long spaces of the route, are known to be deficient. Although the road, as we advance south, approaches both seas, yet the topography of the country, and the consequent character of the communications, forbids the taking up a new line of supply, either from Tampico or the Pacific coast. Except in the case (deemed improbable) of entire acquiescence, if not support, on the part of the Mexican people, I consider it impracticable to keep open so long a line of communication. It is therefore my opinion that our operations from this frontier should not look to the city of Mexico, but should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces—an undertaking of comparative facility and assurance of success.

With the view of cutting off the northern provinces, the projected expedition from San Antonio to Chihuahua may be of great importance. From the best information, however, which I now possess, I would suggest mounted troops alone for that expedition. I am satisfied that the route from that point to Chihuahua is not practicable for artillery or wagons, and infantry would rather embarrass the movement of a mounted expedition. Mountain howitzers, to be packed with their carriages on mules, might be advantageously employed on that service, and indeed with the column designed to penetrate to Saltillo. There may be great difficulty in supplying any considerable force

between San Antonio and Chihuahua, although the line is not very long, probably not exceeding 300 miles. I hope to procure better information than any I now possess in regard to this route.

It will be perceived that my remarks on the line of operations from the Rio Grande, southward, have been confined to the question of subsistence, which is certainly the most important one to be considered. There are military obstacles on the route, particularly in the space between Monterey and Saltillo, where the defile of "La Rinconada" is represented to be of great strength. This point, and perhaps others, if fortified, may give us some trouble; but if they can be turned by light troops, and such I believe to be the case, they will not long impede our march.

In regard to the "description of troops best adapted to operations in the interior of Mexico," I am scarcely prepared at this time to give a definite reply. The facility or difficulty of obtaining forage must necessarily control to some extent the amount of cavalry employed. At the Estate of the Conde de Jarral, some forty leagues from Saltillo, there will, I understand, be no difficulty in obtaining a remount when necessary and forage for the cavalry. The field artillery under my orders (four batteries, including Washington's) will, particularly if filled up to the complement of guns, be quite sufficient for any operations in this quarter. We may have occasion for heavier guns, and I have directed two 12 pounders field guns to be procured, which, with the 24-pounder howitzers now in depot at Point Isabel, will constitute an efficient battery. We shall have two, perhaps three regiments of horse from Texas under my original call. They are now organizing under the Governor's directions at Point Isabel. These are six-months' men. Should I find it necessary to increase the cavalry force, I can draw certainly one regiment from San Antonio, and still leave quite enough for the expedition to Chihuahua.

I have given my views on most of the points connected with the operations from this frontier, purposely abstaining from any reference to movements against Tampico or Vera Cruz. The former place, I am induced to believe, could have been easily taken a month since, and could be so even now; but the yellow fever would not have permitted us to hold it, and I deemed it best to undertake no movement in that direction at this season of the year. Should we advance as far as San Luis Potosi, which has a communication (though not for wheels)



with Tampico, the possession of the latter place would be important.

I am awaiting with utmost impatience the arrival of steamboats suited to the navigation of this river, to establish a depot at Camargo, and throw the troops gradually forward to that point. The rainy season has commenced, and the river is now in the best possible condition for navigation. Several small boats were to leave New Orleans about the 20th of June. If not wrecked in the recent severe gales, they may be hourly expected here.

I have the honor to be, respectfully,  
general, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Bt. Mag. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington. D. C.

*Secretary of War to General Taylor.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

[Confidential.] WASHINGTON, JULY, 9, 1846.

SIR: The proclamation which you were directed to spread among the Mexican people will have put you in possession of the views of the Government in relation to the mode of carrying on the war, and also in relation to the manner of treating the inhabitants. The war is only carried on to obtain justice; and the sooner that can be obtained, and with the least expenditure of blood and money, the better. One of the evils of war is the interruption of diplomatic communications between the respective authorities, and the consequent ignorance under which each party may lie in relation to the views of the other. The natural substitute of these interrupted diplomatic communications is the military intercourse which the usages of war allow between contending armies in the field, and in which commanding generals can do much towards reopening negotiations, and smoothing the way to a return of peace.

The President has seen with much approbation the civility and kindness with which you have treated your prisoners, and all the inhabitants with whom you have come in contact. He wishes that course of conduct continued, and all opportunities taken to conciliate the inhabitants, and let them see that peace is within their reach the moment their rulers will consent to do us justice. The inhabitants should be encouraged to remain in their towns and villages, and these sentiments be carefully made known to them. The same things may be said to officers made prisoners, or who may visit your headquarters according to the usages of war; and it is the wish of the President that such visits be encouraged, and also that you take occasions to send officers to the headquarters of the enemy for the military purposes, real or ostensible, which are of ordinary occurrence between armies, and in which opportunity may be taken to speak of the war itself as only carried on to obtain justice, and that we had much rather procure that by negotiation than by fighting. Of course, authority to speak for your Government will be disavowed, but a knowledge of its wishes will be availed, and a readiness will be expressed to communicate to your Government the wishes of the Mexican Government to negotiate for honorable peace, whenever such shall be their wish,

and with the assurance that such overtures will be met in a corresponding spirit by your Government. A discreet officer, who understands Spanish, and who can be employed in the intercourse so usual between armies, can be your confidential agent on such occasions, and can mask his real, under his ostensible, object of a military interview.

You will also readily comprehend that, in a country so divided into races, classes, and parties as Mexico is, and with so many local divisions among departments, and personal divisions among individuals, there must be great room for operating on the minds and feelings of large portions of the inhabitants, and inducing them to wish success to an invasion which has no desire to injure their country, and which, in overthrowing their oppressors, may benefit themselves. Between the Spaniards, who monopolize the wealth and power of the country, and the mixed Indian race who bear its burdens, there must be jealousy and animosity. The same feelings must exist between the lower and the higher orders of the clergy, the latter of whom have the dignities and the revenues, while the former have poverty and labor. In fact the curates were the chief authors of the revolution which separated Mexico from Spain, and their relative condition to their superiors is not much benefited by it.

If, from all the information which you may communicate to the Department, as well as that derived from other sources, it should appear that the difficulties and obstacles to the conducting of a campaign from the Rio Grande, the present base of your operations, for any considerable distance into the interior of Mexico, will be very great, the Department will consider whether the main invasion should not ultimately take place from some other point on the coast—say *Tampico*—or some other point in the vicinity of *Vera Cruz*. This suggestion is made with a view to call your attention to it, and to obtain from you such information as you may be able to impart. Should it be determined that the main army should invade Mexico at some other point than the Rio Grande—say the vicinity of *Vera Cruz*—a large and sufficient number of transport vessels could be placed at the mouth of the Rio Grande by the time the healthy season sets in—say early in November. The main army, with all its munitions, could be transported, leaving a sufficient force behind to hold and occupy the Rio Grande and all the towns and provinces which you may have conquered before that time. In the event of such being the plan of operations, your opinion is desired: what increased force, if any, will be required to carry it out with success? We learn that the army could be disembarked a few miles distant from *Vera Cruz*, and readily invest the town in its rear, without coming within the range of the guns of the fortress of San Juan d'Uloa. The town could be readily taken by land, while the fortress, being invested by land and sea and all communication cut off, must soon fall. The distance from *Vera Cruz* to the city of Mexico is not more than one-third of that from the Rio Grande to the city of Mexico. Upon these important points, in addition to those mentioned in my letter of the 8th of June, your opinion and views are desired at the earliest period your duties will permit you to give them. In the meantime, the Department confidently relies on you to press forward your operations vigorously to the extent

of your means, so as to occupy the important points within your reach on the Rio Grande and in the interior. It is presumed that Monterey, Chihuahua, and other places in your direction will be taken and held. If in your power to give the information, the Department desires to be informed of the distance from *Chihuahua* to *Guaymas* on the Gulf of California. Whether there be a road over which ordnance and baggage wagons could be taken, and whether it be practicable for an army to march from the former to the latter place, and what time would probably be required for mounted men, and what time for infantry or artillery to do so? This information is desired before the Department can be prepared to decide upon the propriety of sending forward such an expedition.

Your answer to this communication you will please to address directly to the *President of the United States*.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY.

Major Gen. Z. TAYLOR, Comd'g, &c.

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Matamoras, July 22, 1846.

SIR: I have respectfully to report that the city of Camargo, was occupied without opposition on the 14th inst., by a detachment of two companies of the 7th infantry, under command of Captain Miles. The captain was joined the next day by the remainder of the regiment, two pieces of artillery, and a company of irregular cavalry. He has since been reinforced by the 5th infantry, and the 1st brigade of infantry under General Worth is now in route to Camargo, except a guard of two companies, left to escort the train by land—the main body proceeding by water. The 3d brigade will immediately follow, and in a few days all the active regular force will be at Camargo, or in motion thither. I am unavoidably compelled, much to my regret, to leave several companies of the artillery regiments to guard the different depots in my rear.

We have now several steamboats in the river, and the business of sending up troops and supplies is urged as much as possible. I find the difficulty of throwing supplies up the river to be very great, in consequence of the rapidity of the current and the entire absence of dry steamboat fuel. But every effort will be employed to overcome these difficulties, and I have no doubt that we shall be able to keep up a depot at Camargo, quite sufficient for any operations from that point.

As yet the land route to Camargo is impassable for wagons, owing to the recent rains and freshets. As soon as it shall become practicable, the field artillery and train of the army, will move forward to Camargo.

As soon as I can complete the necessary arrangements for throwing forward the volunteer troops to Camargo, I propose to es-

tablish my headquarters at that point, and organize, without delay, a marching column to move on Monterey.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR,

Major Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

#### *General Taylor to the President.*

#### HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Matamoras, August 1, 1846.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the confidential communication of the Secretary of War, dated July 9th, and to present the following remarks in relation to the several points embraced in it. Agreeably to the injunction of the Secretary, this communication is addressed directly to the President of the United States.

1st. As to the intercourse with the enemy and means of obtaining information with regard to his movements, &c., I fear that no very satisfactory results will be obtained in the way proposed. The Mexican generals and other officers have exhibited, since the commencement of hostilities, a determination to hold with us as little intercourse as possible. A most rigid non-intercourse has been observed throughout; and, since the 17th of June, no communication whatever has passed between the headquarters of the two armies. I shall not fail to improve such occasions when they present themselves, in the manner pointed out by the Secretary. Since crossing the Rio Grande, it has been my constant aim to conciliate the people of the country, and I have the satisfaction of believing that much has been done towards that object not only here, but at Reynosa, Camargo, and other towns higher up the river. The only obstacle I encounter in carrying out this desirable policy arises from the employment of volunteer troops. Some excesses have been committed by them upon the people and their property, and more, I fear, are to be apprehended. With every exertion, it is impossible effectually to control these troops, unaccustomed as they are to the discipline of camps, and losing, in bodies, the restraining sense of individual responsibility. With increased length of service, these evils, it is hoped, will diminish.

2d. In regard to availing ourselves of internal divisions and discord among the Mexicans, it is hardly time yet to say how far this may be relied upon as an element of success. I have good reason to believe that the country lying between the Rio Grande and Sierra Madre is disposed to throw off the yoke of the central Government, and will perhaps do so as soon as it finds a

strong American force between it and the capital. I shall do all in my power to encourage this movement, of which I received indications from many quarters, and shall comply fully with the instructions of the Secretary on that point.

3d. As to the military operations best calculated to secure an early and honorable peace, my report of July 2d. will have put the Department in possession of my views touching operations in this quarter, and I have now little to add to that report. Whether a large force can be subsisted beyond Monterey, must be determined by actual experiment, and will depend much upon the disposition of the inhabitants towards us. If a column (say 10,000 men) can be sustained in provisions at Saltillo, it may advance thence upon San Luis Potosi; and, I doubt not, would speedily bring proposals for peace. If, on the other hand, a column cannot be sustained beyond Monterey, it will be for the Government to determine, from considerations of state, whether a simple occupation of the frontier departments, (including Chihuahua and New Mexico,) or in addition to such occupation an expedition against the capital [by way of Vera Cruz] be most expedient. I cannot give a positive opinion as to the practicability of an expedition against Vera Cruz, or the amount of force that would probably be required for it. The Department of War must be much better informed than I am on that point. From the impracticable character of the routes from Tampico, particularly that leading to Mexico, I should judge an expedition against the capital from that point to be out of the question. The simultaneous embarkation of a large body of troops at Brasos Santiago, as proposed in the Secretary's communication, would be attended with great difficulty, if we may judge from the delay and danger which accompany the unloading of single transports, owing to the almost perpetual roughness of the bar, and boisterous character of the anchorage. It may also well be questioned whether a force of volunteers, without much instruction more than those now here can receive in season for such an expedition, can prudently be allowed to form the bulk of an army destined for so delicate an operation as a descent upon a foreign coast, where it can have no proper base of operations or supplies.

I have already had occasion to represent to the Department that the volunteer force ordered to report to me here is much greater than I can possibly employ, at any rate in the first instance; the influx of twelve-months' volunteers has even impeded my forward movement, by engrossing all the re-

sources of the Quartermaster's Department to land them and transport them to healthy positions. This circumstance, in connection with the possibility of an expedition against ———, leads me to regret that one division of the volunteers had not been encamped—say at Pass Christian—where it could have been instructed until its services were required in the field.

These embarrassments, however, are now mostly overcome; the regular force is nearly all at Camargo; and all the arrangements are made to throw forward the volunteers to the same point. The President may be assured that no one laments more than I do the inevitable difficulties and delays that have attended our operations here, and that no exertion of mine has been or will be wanting to press forward the campaign with all possible vigor. But I deem it indispensable to take such amount of force and observe such precautions as not to leave success a matter of doubt.

In answer to the inquiry relative to the route from Chihuahua to Guaymas, I have the honor to submit a memorandum derived from———, an American gentleman residing in this place, who has lived in Chihuahua, and travelled over the routes. The distances on the mule route are probably overrated, as it is a direct route across the mountains. The wagon road, by the city of Arispe, is the only one practicable for artillery.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. Army, commanding.

To his Excellency the Hon. JAMES K. POLK,  
President of the United States, Washington.

[The "memorandum" referred to gives the distances from point to point, by the wagon route and the mule route—the aggregate by the former being 795 miles, and by the latter 810.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camargo, September 1, 1846.

SIR: Before marching for the interior, I beg leave to place on record some remarks touching an important branch of the public service, the proper administration of which is indispensable to the efficiency of a campaign. I refer to the Quartermaster's Department. There is at this moment, when the army is about to take up a long line of march, a great deficiency of proper means of transport, and of many important supplies.

On the 26th April, when first apprizing you of the increased force called out by me, I wrote that I trusted the War Department



would "give the necessary orders to the staff department, for the supply of this large additional force;" and when first advised of the heavy force of twelve-months' volunteers ordered hither, I could not doubt that such masses of troops would be accompanied, or preferably preceded by ample means of transportation, and all other supplies necessary to render them efficient. But such has not been the case. Suitable steamboats for the Rio Grande, were not procured without repeated efforts directed from this quarter, and many weeks elapsed before a lodgement could be made at this place, the river being perfectly navigable.

After infinite delays and embarrassments, I have succeeded in bringing forward a portion of the army to this point, and now the steamers procured in Pittsburg are just arriving. I hazard nothing in saying, that if proper foresight and energy had been displayed in sending out suitable steamers to navigate the Rio Grande, our army would long since have been in possession of Monterey.

Again, as to land transport. At this moment our wagon train is considerably *less* than when we left Corpus Christi, our force being increased *five-fold*. Had we depended upon means from without, the army would not have been able to move from this place. But fortunately the means of land transport existed to some extent in the country, in the shape of pack mules, and we have formed a train which will enable a small army to advance perhaps to Monterey. I wish it distinctly understood that our ability to move, is due wholly to means created here, and which could not have been reckoned upon with safety in Washington.

I have adverted to the grand points of water and land transportation. Of the want of minor supplies, the army has suffered more than enough. The crying deficiency of camp equipage has been partially relieved by the issue of cotton tents, of indifferent quality. Our cavalry has been paralyzed by the want of horse shoes, horse shoe nails, and even common blacksmith's tools, while many smaller deficiencies are daily brought to my notice.

I respectfully request that the above statement, which I make in justice to myself and the service, may be laid before the general-in-chief and Secretary of War.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major Gen. U. S. A. comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

Following the forgoing portion of the correspondence between General TAYLOR and the WAR DEPARTMENT which we have already published, comes the subjoined despatch, which was intercepted by the enemy :

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, September 2, 1846.

"SIR: It is intended to make a descent on the Gulf coast of Mexico as soon as the season shall have so far advanced as to render it safe in regard to the health of our troops.

"Our attention is turned to Tampico as one of the places for the attack. It may be important to take that place, and hold possession of it and the surrounding country, with reference to your line of operations. Though our information is not so full and accurate as we desire in relation to the interior of the country in the vicinity of Tampico, yet it is such as induces us to believe that this will be an important position to be occupied, to facilitate the future prosecution of the war. The possession of the northern provinces of Mexico as far south as San Luis de Potosi, is undoubtedly an important object with reference to bringing the war to a successful termination. The difficulties you will encounter in pushing your forces thus far, can be much better appreciated by yourself than any other. San Luis de Potosi is stated to be from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and eighty miles from Tampico; and if there be a good road between these two places—as some allege to be the case, while it is questioned by others—it will be highly advantageous to have possession of Tampico, and to penetrate the country from that point in the direction of San Luis de Potosi with a considerable force. This matter is under consideration, and will receive the attention it deserves. It is important, in respect to the plan of operations to be adopted for a movement on this point, that you should furnish the Government here, at the earliest period, with your opinion of the progress you will be able to make on your present line of operations. When you shall have arrived at Monterey, you will be enabled to determine as to the practicability of your further progress. It is important that we should know whether you can reach San Luis de Potosi, and your opinion on this point is particularly desired. The Administration is, to some extent, aware of the obstacles you will have to encounter, of the difficulties of sustaining so long a line of communication, and of the uncertainty as to the force which will oppose you; but your better information on these several points will enable you to form much more accurate opinions.

"Your views also as to the effect of taking possession of Tampico, of penetrating the enemy's country from that point, of the amount and kind of force to be assigned to that service, are desired.

"It is not intended to weaken the force of your advancing column by any movements on the coast. It is supposed that fifteen hundred or two thousand men will be a sufficient number of troops to take and hold possession of Tampico. At least half of this force ought to be of the regular army. These, it is presumed, can be obtained without withdrawing any of that description of force now with you.

"The amount of the volunteer force required for this purpose can be taken from the Rio

Grande, it is presumed, without too much weakening that line.

"As you are in a situation to obtain more full and accurate information in relation to all the matters touched on in this communication, it is desirable—indeed quite important—that the Administration should have your views upon them. It is unnecessary to assure you that they will have an important influence upon its determinations.

"I am, with great respect,  
your obedient servant,  
WM. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }  
West Point, N. Y., Sept. 12, 1846. }

SIR:—In the letter I had the honor to address to you the 27th of May last, I requested that I might be sent to take the immediate command of the principal army against Mexico—either "to-day, or at any better time he (the President) may be pleased to designate."

The horse regiments (twelve months' volunteers) destined for that army, being, I suppose, now within fifteen or twenty marches of the Rio Grande, and the season for consecutive operations at hand, I respectfully ask to remind the President of that standing request. I do this without any hesitation in respect to Major General Taylor, having reason to believe that my presence at the head of the principal army in the field, in accordance with my rank, is neither unexpected nor undesired by that gallant and distinguished commander.

A slight return of chills and fevers may detain me here with my family long enough to receive your reply to this note. Should the President yield to my wishes, a few hours in New York and Philadelphia would enable me to make certain arrangements, and save the necessity of a return to those cities from Washington. I suppose it would be easy for me to reach the Rio Grande by the end of this month.

With high respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. Marcy, Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT.  
Washington, Sept. 14, 1846.

SIR:—I have received your letter of the 12th instant, and submitted it to the President. He requests me to inform you that it is not within the arrangements for conducting the campaign in Mexico, to supersede Gen. Taylor in his present command by assigning you to it.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,  
W. L. MARCY.  
Major Gen. W. Scott.

The next despatch is dated on the 22d September, and is also from the Secretary of War. It informs General Taylor that the Mexican authorities had declined the proposal of this Government to negotiate, and referred the question to their Congress, which would assemble in December. This determination of Mexico, the Secretary says, "has an important bearing on our military movements, and suggests the propriety of a change of policy in regard to our dealings with the people of the country occupied by our troops;" and he then instructs Gen. Taylor as follows:

"Upon the liberal principles of civilized warfare, either of three modes may be pursued in relation to obtaining supplies from the enemy: first, to purchase them on such terms as the inhabitants of the country may choose to exact; second, to pay a fair price without regard to the enhanced value resulting from the presence of a foreign army; and, third, to require them as contributions without paying or engaging to pay therefor.

"The last mode is the ordinary one, and you are instructed to adopt it, if in that way you are satisfied you can get abundant supplies for your forces; but should you apprehend a difficulty in this respect, then you will adopt the policy of paying the ordinary price, without allowing to the owners the advantages of the enhancement of the price resulting from the increased demand. Should you apprehend a deficiency under this last mode of dealing with the inhabitants, you will be obliged to submit to their exactions, provided by this mode you can supply your wants on better terms than by drawing what you may need from the United States."

The Secretary then recurs to the contemplated movement on Tampico, as follows:

"It is proposed to take possession of the Department of Tamaulipas, or some of the principal places in it, at the earliest practicable period. In this enterprise it is believed that a co-operation of our squadron in the Gulf will be important if not necessary. It is presumed that a force of about three or four thousand men will be sufficient for this purpose—one-third of which should be of the regular army.

"We have not now sufficiently accurate knowledge of the country to determine definitively as to the manner of conducting this enterprise."

Next follows a letter from the Secretary of War, giving instructions to Gen. Patterson, from which we make the following extracts:

"With this you will receive a copy of a despatch forwarded to Major General Taylor. In that despatch you will find the views of the Government in relation to an expedition to be fitted out to take possession of the southern part of the department or State of Tamaulipas. Unless Gen. Taylor has made arrangements to employ you otherwise, it is designed that this expedition shall be under your immediate command. We have not the requisite information to enable us to determine whether it shall be conducted by land or by water, or in part by each. It is very important that the Department here should be put in possession of all the information which can be collected on the subject at the earliest period. You are therefore directed to forward to this Department, with the least possible delay, all the facts you can collect on this subject.

"The Rio Grande is regarded the base of operations, and that must be firmly maintained. It is left to General Taylor to determine what force is necessary for that purpose. But the movement of the expedition is not—as you will learn from my letter to Gen. Taylor—to be delayed for further direction from this place as to the mode of advancing into the enemy's country. As soon as you shall learn from General Taylor that a sufficient force for the enterprise can be spared, and receive his directions in regard to it, you will lose no time in putting them in execution. If General Taylor should not give directions as to moving by land or water, the choice will then be left for your determination. As soon as

you have settled this point, you will at once make known to the officers of the several branches of the public service, now on the Rio Grande, what may be required. They will be instructed to comply with your requisitions as expeditiously as practicable. Measures will be adopted, by direction from this Department, to have them prepared to answer the requisitions you may make on them."

On the 25th of September, Gen. Taylor wrote to the Department from Monterey, announcing the capitulation of that place, and enclosing all the documents in relation thereto. These papers have heretofore been published, but we copy the material part of Gen. Taylor's letter covering them :

"It will be seen that the terms granted the Mexican garrison are less rigorous than those first imposed. The gallant defence of the town, and the fact of a recent change of Government in Mexico, believed to be favorable to the interests of peace, induced me to concur with the commission in these terms, which will, I trust, receive the approval of the Government. The latter consideration also prompted the convention for a temporary cessation of hostilities. Though scarcely warranted by my instructions, yet the change of affairs since those instructions were issued seemed to warrant this course. I beg to be advised, as early as practicable, whether I have met the views of the Government in these particulars."

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, October 1, 1846.

SIR : I have the honor to enclose herewith for your information, a copy of an application of the Quartermaster General, for orders to proceed to New Orleans to direct in person the operations of his department in the southwest, and a copy of the communication which has this day been addressed to him, complying with his request upon that subject.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Major General Z. TAYLOR, United States army,  
Camargo, Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Camp near Monterey, Oct. 12, 1846.

SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the communication of the Secretary of War, with enclosures, dated the 22d ultimo : also one from your office of September 21st, relative to the resignations of volunteer officers, and "General Orders" No. 41, all of which were delivered by Lieut Armistead on the 10th instant.

It will be seen at once, that under the terms of the capitulation of Monterey, I cannot detach a force south of a line from Linares to San Fernando, and cannot, therefore, even were there no other obstacles,

comply at present with the instructions of the Secretary. I cannot doubt that on receiving the intelligence of the capture of Monterey, modified instructions were issued by the department.

I shall, with as little delay as possible, reply at length to the Secretary's communication, and present my views in *extenso* on all topics connected with the campaign.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. army, commanding.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army, Washington, D. C.

On the 15th of October, in further response to the same communication, Gen. Taylor writes as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Camp near Monterey, Oct. 15, 1846.

"SIR : In my acknowledgement, dated the 12th instant, of the instructions of the Secretary of War, of September 22d, I briefly stated that the detachment to Tampico could not be made without contravening the convention of Monterey. Other reasons and more detailed views on this point and the general question of the campaign I left to a subsequent communication, which I have now the honor to submit for the information of the General-in-chief and Secretary of War. Such a point has been reached in the conduct of the war and the progress of our arms as to make it proper to place my impressions and convictions very fully before the Government.

"I wish to remark, first of all, that I have considered Brigadier General Wool, though formally under my orders, yet as charged by the Government with a distinct operation, with which I was not at liberty to interfere. Though greatly in doubt as to the practicability of his reaching Chihuahua with artillery, and deeming the importance of the operation at any rate to be not at all commensurate with its difficulty and expense, I have accordingly refrained from controlling his movements in any way. His force, therefore, forms no element in my calculations, particularly as it is now, or soon will be, entirely beyond my reach.

"The Mexican army under General Ampudia has left Saltillo, and fallen back on San Luis Potosi—the last detachment, as I understand, being under orders to march to-day. General Santa Anna reached San Luis on the 8th instant, and is engaged in concentrating and organizing the army at that point. Whether the withdrawal of the forces to San Luis be intended to draw us into the country far from supplies and support, or whether it be a political movement,



connected with Santa Anna's return to power, it is impossible to say; it is sufficient for my present argument to know that a heavy force is assembling in our front. Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, is virtually in our possession, and can be occupied, if necessary, the moment the convention is at an end. The occupation of Saltillo will lengthen our line 75 miles, but, on the other hand, may enable us to draw at least a portion of our breadstuffs from the country. San Luis is about 300 miles from Saltillo, perhaps more.

"San Luis is a city of some 60,000 inhabitants, in a country abundant in resources, and at no great distance from the heart of the Republic, whence munitions of war and reinforcements can readily be drawn. It is at the same time nearly 600 miles from the Rio Grande, which must continue to be the base of our operation, at least until we reach San Luis.

"In view of the above facts, I hazard nothing in saying that a column to move on San Luis from Saltillo, should, to ensure success, be at least 20,000 strong, of which 10,000 should be regular troops. After much reflection, I consider the above as the smallest number of *effective* troops that could be employed on this service without incurring the hazard of disaster and perhaps defeat. There would be required, besides, to keep open our long line, protect the depots, and secure the country already gained, a force of 5,000 men—this, without including the force necessary to send to Tampico to take or hold that place.

"The above estimate may seem large when it is remembered that important results have been gained with a much smaller force. But we have hitherto operated near our own base, and the Mexicans at a great distance from theirs. Saltillo may be considered about equidistant from the Rio Grande and San Luis. Every day's march beyond it lengthens our already long line and curtails theirs—weakens us, and gives them strength. Hence the movement should not be undertaken except with a force so large as to render success certain.

"In the above calculation I have supposed the Mexicans able to concentrate at San Luis a force of 40,000 to 50,000 men. With tolerable stability in the Government, I doubt not their ability to do this, and it is not safe to assume any less number as a basis.

"The force of twelve-months' volunteers has suffered greatly from disease. Many have died, and a great number have been discharged for disability. So much has their effective strength been reduced by this cause and present sickness that, in the absence of

official returns, I am satisfied that 500 men per regiment would be a large average of *effectives* among the volunteers. This would give, including the cavalry, a force a little short of 9,000 men, or, adding 4,000 regulars, (our present strength is not 3,000,) a total force of 13,000. Leaving the very moderate number of 3,000 to secure our rear, I should not be able to march from Saltillo, with present and expected means, at the head of more than 10,000 men—a number which, from considerations above stated, I deem to be entirely inadequate.

"And I now come to the point presented in the Secretary's letters. A simultaneous movement on San Luis and Tampico is there suggested; but it will readily be seen that, with only half the force which I consider necessary to march on one point, it is quite impossible to march on both, and that nothing short of an effective force of 25,000 to 30,000 men would, on military principles, justify the double movement. And it is to be remarked that the possession of Tampico is indispensable in case we advance to San Luis, for the line hence to the latter place is entirely too long to be maintained permanently, and must be abandoned for the shorter one from Tampico, the moment San Luis is taken.

"I have spoken only of the number of troops deemed necessary for the prosecution of the campaign beyond Saltillo. It will be understood that largely increased means and material of every kind will be equally necessary to render the army efficient, such as cavalry and artillery horses, means of transport, ordnance stores, &c.

"The Department may be assured that the above views have not been given without mature reflection, and have been the result of experience and careful inquiry. It will be for the Government to determine whether the war shall be prosecuted by directing an active campaign against San Luis and the capital, or whether the country already gained shall be held, and a defensive attitude assumed. In the latter case, the general line of the Sierra Madre might very well be taken; but even then, with the enemy in force in my front, it might be imprudent to detach to Tampico so large a force as 3,000 or 4,000 men, particularly of the description required for that operation. If the co-operation of the army, therefore, be deemed essential to the success of the expedition against Tampico, I trust that it will be postponed for the present.

"I have not been unmindful of the importance of taking Tampico, and have at least once addressed the Department on the subject. Nothing but the known exposure of

the place to the ravages of the yellow fever prevented me from organizing an expedition against it last summer. I knew that, if taken, it could not with any certainty be held, and that the cause would not be removed before the last of November or the first of December.

"It may be expected that I should give my views as to the policy of occupying a defensive line to which I have above alluded. I am free to confess that, in view of the difficulties and expense attending a movement into the heart of the country, and particularly in view of the unsettled and revolutionary character of the Mexican Government, the occupation of such a line seems to me the best course that can be adopted. The line taken might either be that on which we propose to insist as the boundary between the Republics—say the Rio Grande—or the line to which we have advanced, viz. the Sierra Madre, including Chihuahua and Santa Fe. The former line could be held with a much smaller force than the latter; but even the line of the Sierra Madre could be held with a force greatly less than would be required for an active campaign. Monterey controls the great outlet from the interior; a strong garrison at this point, with an advance at Saltillo, and small corps at Monclava, Linares, Victoria, and Tampico, would effectually cover the line.

"I have limited my remarks to the position of the army on this frontier, and the requirements of a campaign against San Luis Potosi; the suggestions in the Secretary's letter being confined to this general theatre of operations. Should the Government determine to strike a decisive blow at Mexico, it is my opinion that the force should land near Vera Cruz or Alvarado, and, after establishing a secure depot, march thence on the capital. The amount of troops required for this service would not fall short, in my judgment, of 25,000 men, of which at least 10,000 should be regular troops.

"In conclusion, I feel it my duty to make some remarks, which I would gladly have been spared the necessity of submitting. I feel it due to my position, and to the service to record my protest against the manner in which the Department has sought to make an important detachment from my command, specifically indicating not only the general officers, but to a considerable extent the troops that were to compose it. While I remain in command of the army against Mexico, and am therefore justly held responsible by the Government and the country for the conduct of its operations, I must claim the right of organizing all detachments from it, and regulating the time and manner of

their service. Above all do I consider it important that the Department of War should refrain from corresponding directly with my subordinates, and communicating orders and instructions on points which, by all military precept and practice, pertain exclusively to the general-in-chief command. Confusion and disaster alone can result from such a course. The reason alleged, viz. the loss of time in communicating with Gen. Patterson, has no application; for the Secretary's despatch came from that officer to my headquarters in sixty hours, and he could not move, at any rate, without drawing largely upon this column for artillery and regular troops.

"I beg it may be understood that my remarks have no personal application. It is quite probable that, in the event of making such a detachment, I would have placed it under Major General Patterson; but I conceive that this mode of regulating details, and ordering detachments direct from the Department of War, is a violation of the integrity of the chief command in the field, pregnant with the worst evils, and against which I deem it my duty respectfully but earnestly to protest.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

On the 23d of October, the Secretary of War addressed a long communication to General Taylor, the material part of which we copy. The Secretary says:

"It is apprehended here that the recent change in the political affairs of Mexico will have an important bearing upon our military movements, and may render it necessary to modify, in some respects, the plans of operation.

"Santa Anna is at the head of the war party, and appears to have entered with zeal upon his duties as general-in-chief of the Mexican army. It is not improbable that he may succeed in collecting and keeping together a considerable force; but the promise of change in the form of Government is probably a more important consideration in regard to the prosecution of the war. The northern departments of Mexico were opposed to the central and in favor of the federal system. The former was forced upon them and maintained by military power. This undoubtedly produced throughout these provinces considerable disaffection to the Central Government.

"The existence of this disaffection was not overlooked either by yourself or the Government here in the plan of the campaign designed to be principally confined to these provinces, and it was presumed that it would materially affect the extent to which our operations in them could be safely carried.

"The views presented in your communications of the 2d of July, and 1st of August appeared to be sound, and were fully concurred in by the

Government. According to these views, the extent to which you could penetrate the enemy's country in the direction of Monterey would depend mainly upon the facility of obtaining supplies and of keeping open the line of communication with the Rio Grande. In both these respects, it was foreseen that much would depend upon the disposition and feelings of the Mexican people. Though there was, when you wrote your letter of the 1st of August, as you state, good reason to believe that the country lying between the Rio Grande and the Sierra Madre was disposed to throw off the yoke of the Central Government, and there was then a hope that it would do so when there should be a strong American force between it and the city of Mexico, the aspect of things in this particular appears to have since changed. The new rulers of Mexico have declared in favor of the federal system, and thus gratified the wishes of the northern provinces. It is, I apprehend, no longer reasonable to expect from them even neutrality, and our measures must be taken on the assumption that they will co-operate with the enemy in carrying on the war, and do all they can to impede our movements.

"In your communication of the 1st of August, you state that 'whether a large force can be subsisted beyond Monterey must be determined by actual experience, and will depend much upon the disposition of the inhabitants towards us.' We are led to believe, from all the information we have received, that the inhabitants are not only hostile, but will be active in obstructing our march into the interior; and that it will not be safe to proceed beyond Monterey, with a view of taking and holding a permanent position. The risk of extending your line beyond that point, or such positions as you may occupy for its defence and security, would probably counterbalance the advantages of proceeding further into the interior, unless you have an adequate force, and could command ample means to reach San Luis Potosi with a view to its secure occupation. It is believed you are not in a condition to do this, if the disposition of the Mexican people is such as has been indicated. Indeed, serious doubts are entertained here whether you ought to extend your line beyond the place you have reached and its necessary dependencies. Should you concur in this view, as it is presumed you will from the tenor of your despatches, you will then turn your attention to securing your position at Monterey, keeping open your line of communication with the Rio Grande. I refer you to what was said on this subject in my letter of the 13th instant. It is not intended by what is here said that you should be restrained from making excursions beyond Monterey and the department of New Leon, if you should see occasion to do so. The enemy should be impressed with the belief that you intend to move forward, to the end that they may not withdraw their forces and employ them on other points. Should the force assembled to resist you be withdrawn, or ascertained not to be in sufficient number to oppose serious obstacles to your further advance, you will exercise your own discretion, under all the circumstances, in regard to any forward movement; but it is not thought here that this can be done with a view to take a permanent position much beyond that you now occupy, unless you should deem it proper, for your own security at Monterey, to advance so far as to occupy the difficult passes between that city and Saltillo.

This, however, is left altogether to your own judgment.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Secretary then enjoins the utmost caution and secrecy in the organization of the expedition against Vera Cruz, and advises the encouragement of the belief, at the time prevalent, that it was to be directed against Tampico. This despatch concludes as follows:

"As it was suggested in former communications that Major General Patterson should be placed in command of the expedition against Tamaulipas, it is deemed proper that he should still occupy that position in the expedition fitted out against Vera Cruz. I have no further suggestions to make as to a Brigadier General to command of volunteers. In regard to the commanding officer of the regular force, it would meet the views of the Government if you should select Brevet Brigadier General Worth. In that event you are directed by the President to assign him to that command by virtue of his brevet rank.

"It is proposed that Col. Totten, the chief engineer, Major Baker, of the ordnance corps, and some officer of rank and experience of the topographical corps, shall accompany the expedition, with others of inferior rank in these respective branches of the public service. Such of these officers as are not now with the army will be ordered to proceed to the Rio Grande, and report to the commander of the expedition."

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camp near Monterey, Oct 26, 1816.

SIR: In reply to so much of the communication of the Secretary of War, dated September 22d, as relates to the mode of supplying the army, I beg leave to submit the following remarks:

It would have been impossible hitherto, and is so now, to sustain the army to any extent by forced contributions of money or supplies. The country between the Rio Grande and Sierra Madre is poor, furnishing only corn and beef. These articles we obtain at moderate rates; but if a different system had been adopted, it is certain that they would not have been procured at all in sufficient quantities. The prompt payment in cash for the few articles of supply we have drawn from the country has neutralized much of the unfriendly feeling with which we were regarded, and has contributed greatly to facilitate our operations. The people have it in their power, at any time, to destroy their crops, and would undoubtedly do so, rather than see them taken forcibly. Add to which they would have no inducements to plant again. The prices that have been paid are reasonable, being in almost all cases the prices of the country.

Should the army, in its future operations, reach a portion of the country which may be made to supply the troops with advantage, I shall not fail to conform to the wishes



and instructions of the department in this particular.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. army, commanding.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army, Washington, D. C.

In a letter dated on the 8th of November, Gen. Taylor thus replied to the Secretary's last recited despatch to him :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

"Camp near Monterey, Nov. 8, 1846.

"SIR: In reply to so much of the communication of the Secretary of War, dated October 13, as relates to the reasons which induced the convention resulting in the capitulation of Monterey, I have the honor to submit the following remarks :

"The convention presents two distinct points. *First*, the permission granted the Mexican army to retire with their arms, &c. *Secondly*, the temporary cessation of hostilities for the term of eight weeks. I shall remark on these in order.

"The force with which I marched on Monterey was limited by causes beyond my control to about 6,000 men. With this force, as every military man must admit, who has seen the ground, it was entirely impossible to invest Monterey so closely as to prevent the escape of the garrison. Although the main communication with the interior was in our possession, yet one route was open to the Mexicans throughout the operations, and could not be closed, as were also other minor tracks and passes through the mountains. Had we, therefore, insisted on more rigorous terms than those granted, the result would have been the escape of the body of the Mexican force, with the destruction of its artillery and magazines, our only advantage being the capture of a few prisoners of war, at the expense of valuable lives and much damage to the city. The consideration of humanity was present to my mind during the conference which led to the convention, and outweighed in my judgment the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack upon the town. This conclusion has been fully confirmed by an inspection of the enemy's position and means since the surrender. It was discovered that his principal magazine, containing an immense amount of powder, was in the cathedral, completely exposed to our shells from two directions. The explosion of this mass of powder, which must have ultimately resulted from a continuance of the bombardment, would have been infinitely disastrous, involving the destruction not only of Mexican troops, but of non-combatants,

and even our own people, had we pressed the attack.

"In regard to the temporary cessation of hostilities, the fact that we are not at this moment, within eleven days of the termination of the period fixed by the convention, prepared to move forward in force, is a sufficient explanation of the military reasons which dictated this suspension of arms. It paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, we could not possibly move. I desire distinctly to state, and to call the attention of the authorities to the fact, that, with all diligence in breaking mules and setting up wagons, the first wagons in addition to our original train from Corpus Christi, (and but one hundred and twenty-five in number,) reached my headquarters on the same day with the Secretary's communication of October 13, viz. the 2d instant. At the date of the surrender of Monterey, our force had not more than ten day's rations, and even now, with all our endeavors, we have not more than twenty-five. THE TASK OF FIGHTING AND BEATING THE ENEMY IS AMONG THE LEAST DIFFICULT THAT WE ENCOUNTER—the great question of supplies necessarily controls all the operations in a country like this. At the date of the convention, I could not of course have foreseen that the Department would direct an important detachment from my command without consulting me, or without waiting the result of the main operation under my orders.

"I have touched the prominent military points involved in the convention of Monterey. There were other considerations which weighed with the commissioners in framing and with myself in approving the articles of the convention. In the conference with General Ampudia, I was distinctly told by him that he had invited it to spare the further effusion of blood, and because Gen. Santa Anna had declared himself favorable to peace. I know that our Government had made propositions to that of Mexico to negotiate, and I deemed that the change of Government in that country since my last instructions, fully warranted me in entertaining considerations of policy. My grand motive in moving forward with very limited supplies had been to increase the inducements of the Mexican Government to negotiate for peace. Whatever may be the actual views or disposition of the Mexican rulers or of Gen. Santa Anna, it is not unknown to the Government that I had the very best reason for believing the statement of Gen. Ampudia to be true. It was my opinion at the time of the convention, and it has not been changed, that the liberal treat-

ment of the Mexican army and the suspension of arms would exert none but a favorable influence in our behalf.

"The result of the entire operation has been to throw the Mexican army back more than three hundred miles to the city of San Luis Potosi, and to open the country to us as far as we choose to penetrate it up to the same point.

"It has been my purpose in this communication not so much to defend the convention from the censure which I deeply regret to find implied in the Secretary's letter, as to show that it was not adopted without cogent reasons, most of which occur of themselves to the minds of all who are acquainted with the condition of things here. To that end I beg that it may be laid before the General-in-Chief and Secretary of War.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Z. TAYLOR,  
"Maj. Gen. U. S. A., comdg."

In reference to the concluding sentence of the foregoing letter, it is proper to remark that the correspondence of General Taylor is addressed to the "Adjutant General of the Army," at headquarters, in Washington.

On the day after the date of the above letter (that is, on the 9th of November,) Gen. Taylor again wrote to the Department, saying—

"I have formally notified the Mexican general-in-chief that the temporary suspension of arms agreed upon in the convention of Monterey will cease on the 13th instant, the date at which the notice will probably reach San Luis de Potosi. This notification was sent by Major Graham, topographical engineer, who left on the 6th instant.

"You will perceive from my 'orders' No. 139, what arrangements have been made for the occupation of Saltillo at the earliest moment by our troops. Whether our operations are pushed forward towards San Luis or not, the occupation of Saltillo is important—politically, as the capital of Coahuila, and, in a military view, as covering an important region from which we may draw supplies.

"Brigadier General Wool, with a portion of his force, arrived at Monclova on the 29th of October, and is now joined by the rear division. He reports no practicable route to Chihuahua, except the one by Parras, which will bring him within a few leagues of Saltillo. He inquires what is to be gained by going to Chihuahua? And I am free to answer, nothing at all commensurate with the excessive length of his line of operations. Chihuahua, moreover, is virtually conquered, and can be occupied at any moment, while we hold Saltillo and Santa Fé. I shall in-

struct General Wool to remain at Monclova, where there are supplies, until I can determine what disposition to make of his column, which cannot be done until I visit Saltillo.

"I have taken the first steps towards organizing the expedition on Tampico, and propose to accompany it, for the purpose at least of commanding a covering force. There will be some delay for the want of means of land transport.

"The information received since my communication of October 15th, relative to the route hence to San Luis, renders it more than probable that from the want of permanent water, it will be impossible to march a large force from Saltillo to that city. I hope to acquire certain information on this point in a few days."

Gen. Taylor replied from his camp near Monterey, on the 12th of November, as follows:

"The communication of the Secretary of War of October 22, with its enclosures, by the hands of Major McLane, was received this morning. You will have seen by my orders and my despatch of the 9th, what measures have been taken to conclude the armistice and to occupy Saltillo. Being advised by special express from Matamoras of Major McLane's approach, I had postponed my intended departure this day for Saltillo, until his arrival. As I deem it still important to occupy that position, for reasons to be explained below, I shall march thither to-morrow, according to my first intention. On my return—say by the 20th instant—I shall probably be able to inform the Department more fully on certain important points connected with our operations; but I now avail myself of the return of Major McLane to Washington, to state briefly my views on some of the topics embraced in the Secretary's communication.

"Without active operations towards San Luis Potosi from this quarter, I still deem the occupation of Saltillo important for three reasons: *First*, as a necessary outpost of the main force at Monterey, covering as it does the important defile which leads from the low country to the table land, and also the route to Monclova; *secondly*, as controlling a region from which we may expect considerable supplies of breadstuffs and cattle, viz. the fertile country around Parras; and, *thirdly*, as the capital of Coahuila, which renders it very important in a political point of view.

"I have already represented to the Department the difficulties to be encountered in a forward movement upon San Luis, and

the amount of force which would be necessary to ensure success. Those reasons only apply to the country beyond Saltillo. I consider the occupation of that point as a necessary complement to our operations, and to the policy of holding a defensive line, as the Sierra Madre, and trust the Department will concur with me in this view.

"As already reported, Brigadier General Wool is now at Monclova, having found no practicable route to Chihuahua, save the well-known but very circuitous one by Parras. I fully agree with the Department that no commensurate benefit is likely to result from the march on Chihuahua of General Wool's column, and shall accordingly direct him to suspend his movement in that direction. The occupation of Saltillo in force renders it still less necessary that Chihuahua should be occupied. I cannot yet determine specifically what disposition to make of Gen. Wool's column. Meanwhile I have directed him to remain in his present position until further orders.

"In regard to the expedition against Vera Cruz, after a good deal of reflection upon the subject, I feel bound to express my conviction that 4,000 men will be a force quite too small for the purpose contemplated. In my despatch of October 15th, I stated 25,000 troops, of which 10,000 to be regulars, as the least force that should make a descent in that quarter, with the view of marching on the capital. I now consider that, simply to invest and take Vera Cruz, and of course hold the position, we should have 10,000 troops, of which 4,000, if possible, should be regulars. It is quite probable that a smaller force, even 4,000, might effect a landing and carry the town; but could they sustain themselves until the castle of San Juan de Uloa should be reduced by famine? The country lying between Vera Cruz and the city of Mexico is populous, and at least one portion (Puebla) understood to be very loyal. Would not a force be brought against us, before the castle could be reduced, sufficiently strong to endanger our safety, cut off as we should be from succor? When to these considerations we add the uncertainty of weather during the winter season, rendering our communications with the fleet liable to interruption, I think it will be seen that the force should be large enough not only to land and invest the town, but also to hold itself secure against any attack from the interior, and for such purpose I consider 10,000 men quite as small a force as should be ventured.

"A force of 10,000 men cannot be spared from the occupation of the line of the Sierra Madre; 4,000 may be diverted from that ob-

ject; and if to these 6,000 fresh troops from the United States were added at the proper time, the expedition might be undertaken with a promise of success. I propose, therefore, to proceed with the preparation for a movement on Tampico, and, after accomplishing every thing that is to be done in that quarter, I will, if the Department approve, hold 4,000 men, of which perhaps 3,000 regulars, ready to embark at some point on the coast, and effect a junction with the additional force from the States. The movement towards Tampico will not produce any delay if my views are adopted; and I consider it quite important to occupy Victoria and the lower portion of Tamaulipas, after securing properly the line to be held in this quarter.

"I conceive it all important, having in view the Mexican character, that as little should be left to accident as possible, and that we should be careful, as far as human foresight can provide, to avoid the smallest liability to disaster. A descent upon a hostile coast, notoriously dangerous, and in an inclement season of the year, is an operation requiring the most careful preparations and exact management, and possessing, under the most favorable circumstances, more or less elements of failure. It seems the part of prudence, therefore, to take a sufficient force to meet any contingency that may arise.

"Being pressed for time I have given my views briefly, and perhaps somewhat crudely, on the most important points presented in the despatch of the Secretary. There are other topics which will probably claim my attention, but which must be now passed over. I would only suggest that in the event of an expedition to Vera Cruz, the heavy ordnance, engineers, stores, &c., should be shipped direct from the North."

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, Nov. 23, 1846.

SIR: The President, several days since, communicated in person to you his orders to repair to Mexico, to take command of the forces there assembled, and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition to operate on the Gulf coast, if, on arriving at the theatre of action, you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided for accomplishing it, is committed to you, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage.

The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them.

Of this you must be the judge when prepara-



tions are made, and the time for action has arrived.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. L. MARCY,

*Secretary of War.*

Major Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT, com'ding the army,  
Washington, D. C.

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Camp near Monterey, Nov. 24, 1846.

SIR: I reported briefly from Saltillo, on the 16th inst., the occupation of that city by our troops. A duplicate of that report is transmitted herewith. I seize the first opportunity, after my return from that place, to report more in detail the circumstances of its occupation, and also to refer to the position of Brig. Gen. Wool, and the orders which I have given to that officer.

While in route to Saltillo on the 4th inst., I was met by a white flag, conveying a despatch from Gen. Santa Anna in reply to the notice given him of the cessation of the armistice. Copies of these letters, and of my final reply, are forwarded by this mail.

On approaching the city of Saltillo, a messenger placed in my hands a document, herewith enclosed, protesting, in the name of the State of Coahuila, against the occupation of the city. The individual signing the protest had been elected governor the day previous, and left the city the morning of the day on which we took possession. The troops of Gen. Worth's division were immediately quartered in the town, and arrangements were made before I left for procuring a supply of breadstuffs and forage at reasonable rates.

A reconnoissance was also made of the country some twenty-five miles in front, and one projected, to be executed after my departure, of the Parras route as far as Patos—a rich hacienda about thirty-five miles from Saltillo. I left a squadron of the 2d dragoons, to serve under Gen. Worth's orders until relieved by other cavalry, proposing to assign Lieut. Kearney's company 1st dragoons and a squadron or two of the Kentucky horse to his division as soon as they can be brought forward. I shall also reinforce him by a volunteer force, probably a brigade.

The division at Saltillo covers the direct route from San Luis Potosi. The other route would be covered by a force at Parras, which would at the same time control the abundant supplies to be drawn from the neighboring country—the richest of the north of Mexico. Brig. Gen. Wool being in position at Monclova, and it being now fully ascertained that he cannot march thence on Chihuahua, even were it desired, I have ordered him to move on Parras. The State

of Coahuila will then be completely occupied and covered, and in case active operations towards the interior should hereafter be determined on, we shall be in position to march on San Luis, Zacatecas, or Durango. Brig. Gen. Wool will at once abandon his communications by San Antonio and Lavaca, and adopt that by the Rio Grande and Monterey.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

[TRANSLATION.]

The movement you are making with the forces under your command leaves no doubt that your object is to invade this city, as have been the greater part of the towns of Coahuila by the troops which have advanced to Monclova. The want of arms in this State leaves me no means to oppose force to force, and will enable you to occupy this capital without opposition, and compel me to retire from it; but in doing so, I ought, and I desire to place upon record, in the most authentic manner, this protest, which I solemnly make, in the name of the State of Coahuila, against the government of the United States of the North, for the usurpation of the territory occupied by their arms—for the outrages and damages which may accrue to the persons and property of the inhabitants of these defenceless towns—for the injuries the public interests may suffer—and for all the evils consequent upon the most unjustifiable invasion ever known to the world.

God and liberty. Saltillo, Nov. 16, 1846.

JOSE MARIE DE AGUIRRE.

Major General TAYLOR, General-in-chief of the army of the United States.

[Private and confidential.]

New York, Nov. 25, 1846.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I left Washington late in the day yesterday, and expect to embark for New Orleans the 30th instant. By the 12th of December I may be in that city, at Point Isabel the 17th, and Camargo say the 23d—in order to be within easy corresponding distance from you. It is not probable that I may be able to visit Monterey, and circumstances may prevent your coming to me. I shall much regret not having an early opportunity of felicitating you in person upon your many brilliant achievements; but we may meet somewhere in the interior of Mexico.

I am not coming, my dear general, to supersede you in the immediate command on the line of operations rendered illustrious by you and your gallant army. My proposed theatre is different. You may imagine it, and I wish very much that it were prudent, at this distance, to tell you all that I expect to attempt or hope to execute. I have

been admonished that despatches have been lost, and I have no special messenger at hand. Your imagination will be aided by the letters of the Secretary of War, conveyed by Mr. Armistead, Major Graham, and Mr. McLane.

But, my dear general, I shall be obliged to take from you most of the gallant officers and men (regulars and volunteers) whom you have so long and so nobly commanded. I am afraid that I shall, by imperious necessity—the approach of yellow fever on the Gulf coast reduce you, for a time, to stand on the defensive. This will be infinitely painful to you, and for that reason distressing to me. But I rely upon your patriotism to submit to the temporary sacrifice with cheerfulness. No man can better afford to do so. Recent victories place you on that high eminence, and I even flatter myself that any benefit that may result to me, personally, from the unequal division of troops alluded to, will lessen the pain of your consequent inactivity.

You will be aware of the recent call for nine regiments of new volunteers—including one of Texas horse. The President may soon ask for many more, and we are not without hope that Congress may add ten or twelve to the regular establishment. These by the spring, say April, may, by the aid of large bounties, be in the field—should Mexico not earlier propose terms of accommodation; and long before the spring (March) it is probable you will be again in force to resume offensive operations.

I am writing at a late hour of the night, and more than half sick of a cold. I may despatch another note before I embark; but from New Orleans, Point Isabel, &c., you shall hear from me officially and fully.

It was not possible for me to find time to write from Washington, as I much desired. I only received an information to hold myself in preparation for Mexico, on the 18th inst. Much has been done towards that end, and more remains to be executed.

Your detailed report of the operations at Monterey and reply to the Secretary's despatch, by Lieutenant Armistead, were both received two days after I was instructed to proceed South.

In haste I remain, my dear general,

Yours faithfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major Gen. Z. TAYLOR, United States Army,  
Commanding, &c. &c. &c.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, Nov. 25, 1846.

SIR: You will have perceived by my despatch of the 13th ultimo, that the government apprehended at that time that you would be likely to encounter many and serious difficulties in extending your line of operations as far as San Luis Potosi. These apprehensions are confirmed by your despatch of the 15th ultimo, which was received on the 20th instant. In the belief that it might not be advisable, unless circumstances favored, to push forward in that direction, it became more important that operations should be undertaken upon the gulf coast. In case that it should be decided not to attempt at present to take any place beyond Monterey or Saltillo with a view of holding permanent possession, it was believed that a sufficient force would be detached from the troops now in the field (with such additions as can be soon made) for a successful attack upon

the most important points on the coast, still leaving enough to hold the positions you have gained and menace the enemy with a forward movement.

By intercepting my despatch of the 2d of September (a copy of which I herewith transmit) and probably through other means, the enemy has already become aware of our intention to operate in that quarter, and undoubtedly will be prepared to make a vigorous resistance. It has become quite evident that a larger force than that indicated in my communication of the 13th ultimo, will be required for that expedition. The President having decided to send Major General Scott to the seat of war, communicated this determination to him on the 18th instant. Since that time the general has been engaged in making preparations here, principally with a view to military operations on the shores of the gulf, and left yesterday for the Rio Grande.

The competence of a military tribunal to take cognizance of such a case as you have presented in your communication of the 11th ultimo, viz: the murder of a Mexican soldier, and other offences not embraced in the express provision of the articles of war, was deemed so questionable that an application was made to Congress at the last session to bring them expressly within the jurisdiction of such a tribunal, but it was not acted on. I am not prepared to say that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and particularly by the non-existence of any civil authority to which the offender could be turned over, a military court could not rightfully act thereon; yet very serious doubts are entertained upon that point, and the government do not advise that course. It seriously regrets that such a flagrant offender cannot be dealt with in the manner he deserves. I see no other course for you to pursue than to release him from confinement and send him away from the army, and this is recommended. It is intended to invite the attention of Congress again to this subject in order to have provision made for such cases, but it cannot be so done as to operate *ex post facto*, and of course will not embrace the case in question.

I refer, with reluctance, to your remarks upon that part of my despatch of the 22d of September, which relates to the Tampico expedition. As you have misconceived the views of the government and made the course pursued here the ground of a formal protest, it seems to be proper that I should notice your animadversions upon it. I think you have erred in regarding what was put forth as suggestions, in the light of peremptory commands. It was intended to leave the whole subject, as well the organizing and sending forth the expedition, as the designation of the officers to command it, to your approval and final judgment. Such I think the fair import of the language used to manifest this intention. Considering the large number of troops on the Rio Grande and on the way there, it was presumed here, that a part of them could be spared for the Tampico expedition, but you were expressly informed that none would be withdrawn from that line, if, in your opinion, it "would interfere with your operations;" and it was not then suggested that any should be taken from your advancing column. So in relation to the general officers, proposed for the command of the force, they were not to be taken, if "it should interfere with your previous arrangement in regard to these officers." They were presented to your consideration for that service, because they were not employed with the

column advancing into the enemy's country, but were with the troops on the Rio Grande, from which most of the force for the expedition, it was presumed, would be detached.

Certainly no disrespect was intended towards you, as commanding general; nothing was proposed which could deprive you of the means of securing success to your own plans of operation. After a respectful consideration of your remarks, and a re-examination of that part of my despatch which you deem exceptionable, I cannot regard it as an incroachment upon your just rights, or "a violation of the integrity of the chief command in the field."

You must be aware that in my official communications, I am only the medium of presenting the views of the President, and you will not question his right, as commander-in-chief, to make suggestions as to the movements of the forces under your command, or as to the officers to be employed in these movements. Having, in this instance, carefully qualified his suggestions so as to prevent them from being regarded as positive directions or commands, and expressly disclaimed the intention of employing any part of the troops which, in your opinion, "would interfere with your operations," he is entirely unconscious of having given any just cause for protest or complaint.

The reason offered for communicating directly with General Patterson, and instructing him "to make preparations for the movement, (the Tampico expedition,) so far as it can be done without disturbing your present arrangements on the Rio Grande," &c., was, "to prevent delay." This you declare to be inapplicable. Your language is: "The reason alleged, viz: the loss of time in communicating with General Patterson, has no application, for the Secretary's despatch came from that officer to my headquarters in sixty hours, and he could not move without drawing largely upon this column for artillery and regular troops." To vindicate the good faith with which this reason was assigned, I deem it proper to apprise you that it was not known here that General Patterson was at Camargo; but as he was in command on the Rio Grande, it was reasonable to conclude that my communication would reach him at Matamoras, or in that vicinity; neither was it known at what place in the enemy's country my despatch would reach you. The casualties of sending communications to and from you, after you had penetrated far into it, was not overlooked. The fact that the one from this department of the 2d of September, having relation to the Tampico expedition, was intercepted by the enemy, shows that it was not unreasonable to apprehend delay from this cause.

There were causes for delay in the contemplated expedition other than that suggested in your remarks, viz: the concentration of troops. By my letter to General Patterson, it will be perceived that it was here considered important that he should be at once engaged in acquiring accurate information as to the routes, whether by land or sea, and in forwarding it with the least possible delay to the department. The early receipt of this information was deemed important for the seasonable preparation of transports, and collecting needful supplies," &c.

With the disposition which, I am sure you possess, to judge fairly on the subject, I allow myself to hope that, on reflection, you will perceive that

the reason alleged for a direct communication with General Patterson was not an idle one; and perhaps you may regard it as it was, and still is, here regarded, as of sufficient importance to justify the course adopted.

In conclusion, I assure you that nothing could be further from the views of the department than any intention to interfere with, or derogate from, the authority belonging to you by right or usage as commanding general; and allow me to add, that after full consideration of the part of the despatch deemed by you exceptionable, I am unable to convince myself that either in the manner or matter, all circumstances considered, it furnishes just grounds for your animadversions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. L. MARCY.

*Secretary of War.*

Maj. Gen. Z. TAYLOR, &c. &c. &c.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camp near Monterey, Nov. 26, 1846.

SIR: I have to report that I received official information last evening of the occupation of Tampico on the 14th instant, by the naval forces under Commodore Perry. I had before learned from the Mexican newspapers that the garrison had been withdrawn on the 27th of October.

On the requisition of Commodore Perry, who brought the first intelligence of the occupation to Brazos Santiago, Major General Patterson promptly gave orders for Lieut. Col. Belton's battalion (six companies) to proceed to and garrison Tampico; and also took measures to ship thither a sufficient supply of heavy ordnance and provisions. These orders have been fully approved by me, and I have directed a regiment of volunteers to be added to the garrison, the whole to be under the command of a brigadier general, probably Brigadier General Shields, who is now here, and will soon report to Major General Patterson.

I propose still to throw forward a force as far as Victoria, with the view of examining the country, and particularly the passes which lead from Linares and other points towards the interior.

I shall take the earliest occasion to reply to the communication of the Secretary of War, dated October 29, but am obliged to postpone it for a day or two.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camp near Monterey, Dec 8, 1846.

SIR: As I expect to march in a few days for Victoria, I consider the present a proper occasion to explain somewhat in detail the dispositions which have been made, and which are contemplated, for the occupation



and defence of this frontier. With this view I enclose a sketch, exhibiting the line from Parras to Tampico, and showing how a portion of that line is naturally marked by the chain of the "Sierra Madre."

It will be seen at once, that San Luis Potosi is a position almost equally distant from the points of this line. This would give a force at San Luis a great advantage over us, were it not for the nature of the country and the communications; the region between San Luis and the mountains being scantily supplied with water and subsistence, and the road by Saltillo and Monterey being the only practicable route for artillery across the mountains. Without artillery the Mexican troops are not at all formidable, and I think have but little confidence in themselves. I consider the positions of Saltillo and Parras as of prime importance. With an intermediate post at Patos, and the means by a good road of rapidly uniting if necessary, I deem the columns of Brigadier Generals Wool and Worth quite equal to hold that flank of the line. I shall, however, reinforce the latter General, particularly in cavalry, and shall reserve at this place to support the advanced positions, should the movements of the enemy require it.

Brigadier General Wool is understood to be now at Parras with his column—say 2400 strong, with six guns. Brigadier General Worth has his head quarters at Saltillo—his command consisting of 1200 regular troops, with eight guns. I propose to reinforce him by two regiments of volunteer foot, and a portion of the Kentucky cavalry. Lieut. Kearney's company is all the regular cavalry force I can assign to him at present.

At Monterey will be the head quarters of Major General Butler, commanding the reserve. Two companies of artillery, and one of the weak infantry battalions (4th) will compose the garrison of the place. The troops of General Butler's proper division (Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky) will be at this point, and in echelon on the route hence to Canargo and the mouth of the Rio Grande, except those which may be ordered to reinforce General Worth, as above indicated.

Tampico is now garrisoned by eight strong companies of artillery, and the Alabama regiment of volunteers, say 1000 effectives. I consider this force quite sufficient to hold the place, controlling, as we do, the harbor. Between Tampico and this place, Victoria offers itself at once as an important position to be held by us. It is the capital of the State of Tamaulipas; it is situated at the debouche of a pass through the mountains, and it has a port, Soto la Ma-

rina, where we shall probably be able to establish a convenient depot. It also threatens the flank of the Mexican army, should it advance from San Luis. These considerations attracted my attention to Victoria, before the surrender of Tampico; but I now deem it more than ever important; for I have reason to believe that a corps of observation is in that quarter under the orders of Gen. Urrea, having its head quarters perhaps at Tula, and sending forward advanced parties as far as Victoria. I have therefore changed nothing in my original purpose of moving on Victoria, believing it important to occupy that point, and knowing that any surplus force would then be in position for the ulterior views of the government, should any further operations on the gulf coast be ordered. Major General Patterson has accordingly been instructed to march from Matamoros on Victoria, with three regiments of volunteers from his division, one being the Tennessee horse. I propose to move from this point, say by the 12th inst., with the regular troops now here under Brigadier General Twiggs (except those to be left in garrison as above,) and the regiments of General Patterson's division under Brigadier General Quitman. At Montemelos, 68 miles from this, I shall effect a junction with Riley, who is now there, and incorporate with the column the 2d Tennessee regiment, under orders for that place. With this augmented force, I expect to effect a junction with Major General Patterson before Victoria.

After establishing a depot, if it be found practicable, at Soto la Marina, examining the passes of the mountains, and making such dispositions as may be found necessary for the security of the position, it is my intention, unless otherwise instructed, to return with a portion of the regular force, and establish my headquarters in advance of Saltillo, which after all I consider to be our most important point.

You will perceive that one effect of the arrangements above indicated will be to throw Major General Patterson with the troops of his appropriate division (Tennessee, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia) on the left, and near the coast, while Major General Butler, with his division, occupies the line of communication from the Rio Grande to Saltillo.

Intelligence received this moment from Saltillo represents all quiet in front. We have reports of a revolution in Mexico, embracing two or three States, and directed against General Santa Anna, but the information does not come in an authentic form.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major Gen. U. S. A. comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

In Gen. Taylor's letter of the 14th December, he mentions the inconveniences resulting to him from the orders of the Department above referred to. Writing from his camp near Monterey, under the above date, he says :

"In my communication of the 8th instant, I alluded to the occupation of Tampico, and the force which I considered sufficient to hold that place. I fully approved of the first measures taken by Maj. Gen. Patterson to garrison Tampico, and after giving him instructions to despatch thither a regiment of volunteers in addition to the battalion of artillery, was not a little surprised to hear from him that he had beside ordered the Illinois brigade by water, and proposed going there himself to assume the command. The proceeding I considered not only wholly unnecessary, but as a direct and unwarrantable interference with the plan which I had already communicated to Gen. Patterson for a combined movement upon Victoria; for while the Illinois regiments were to proceed by water to a place where their services were not needed, the Tennessee regiment of horse was to be compromised by marching, unsupported by infantry, from Matamoros to Victoria. By special express I succeeded in arresting this fatal misdirection, and I have now hopes of concentrating a respectable force at Victoria, as first intended.

"I wish my report of interferences could stop here; but another of the gravest character has been brought to my notice, to which I beg leave to invite the earnest attention of the General-in-Chief and the Department of War. In an official letter, addressed under date of November 26th, to the commanding officer at Point Isabel, Com. Perry of the navy, writes thus :

"Since I wrote you by Lieut. Anderson, I have visited New Orleans, conferred with Gov. Johnson and Generals Jesup and Brooke, all of whom unite with me in placing great importance upon the immediate possession, by a military garrison, of Tampico.

"I have on board this ship eight pieces of artillery with all the requisite appurtenances and munitions, borrowed from the State arsenal of Louisiana, by Gen. Brooke. Also, Lieut. Crittenden, with forty-five infantry (recruits.) Gen. Brooke assures me that four hundred mounted riflemen, hourly expected at New Orleans, will be immediately despatched in the steamer 'Massachusetts,' so soon as they arrive, but I fear there will be difficulty in landing the horses on

'account of the roughness of the sea at the bar of Tampico.'

"It is hardly necessary to make any comment upon the above. It will be seen at once, that by the advice of officers at a distance, totally ignorant of my views, and incurring no responsibility for the failure of operations, a large and efficient corps of cavalry upon which I had reckoned for important service in the interior has been intercepted without authority, and sent where it is not needed, and where it may lose many of its horses. Had the mounted riflemen been sent back to Jefferson Barracks, they could not have been more completely lost to the present operations.

"I have now no assurance that any reinforcements or supplies will reach me through New Orleans. The advice of Gen. Brooke or 'Governor Johnson' may divert recruits and the most important objects of supply to Tampico, under the new principle of war, that the enemy, after destroying his heavy guns, will attack a place which he dared not defend.

"With such proceedings on the Rio Grande and in New Orleans, I cannot be held responsible for the efficient prosecution of the objects of the Government here. The departure of Gen. Patterson from the full and precise instructions I had given him is, in my opinion, a legitimate result of the position of quasi independence given to that officer by the Department of War, against which I have protested and again protest. As for the interference of Gen. Brooke, the War Department, I cannot doubt, will give that officer the most stringent orders in no case to stop or divert the troops or supplies that may be destined for the army under my command.

"While I am considered competent to exercise the chief command in the field, it is no more than reasonable that subordinates, and, above all, officers not serving with the army against Mexico, should be compelled to keep in their proper places, and not to expose to hazard, by mischievous meddlings, the success of military operations involving the reputation of the army and the country."

And, as immediately connected with the preceding, we give the following letter from Gen. Patterson, addressed directly to the Secretary of War. It is dated at Matamoros on the 8th of December

"SIR : On the 22d of November I had the honor to inform you that I had been apprized of the capture of Tampico, and of the measures adopted by me for occupying and holding that place, and that I intended to go there by sea and assume my command. I regret to say that the general commanding the army in Mexico has disapproved of my proceedings. Herewith I send copies of the

letter of disapproval and of my answer. I am ordered to move by land from this point, and am using every exertion to obtain means of transportation, and will leave here as soon as those means can be obtained. I hope to march in eight or ten days, but as transportation has not been provided for me, or officers of the quartermaster's department assigned to me, in time to procure a sufficient amount, I do not consider myself responsible in any degree for delay caused by want of it."

The enclosures consist, first, of a letter from Assistant Adjutant General Bliss, dated at Headquarters the 28th November, as follows:

"SIR: Your communication of the 24th instant has just been received and laid before the commanding general, who directs me to express his entire disapproval of your orders respecting the Illinois regiment of foot and the Tennessee horse. He now directs that the movement of those corps towards Tampico in the manner suggested be at once suspended, and then carried out only in the mode prescribed by him in previous instructions. It is considered by the General that one thousand men, of which say one-half regular troops, are more than sufficient to defend Tampico, and it is not his purpose to devote a larger force to that object. The battalion under Col. Gates, or Lient. Col. Belton, together with one regiment of volunteer infantry, as directed in the instructions by Major McCall, are intended to compose the garrison of that place, and may even be reduced if circumstances require. The Alabama regiment having already started will not be recalled, although a different arrangement was proposed. The Tennessee horse and the Illinois brigade will now march from Matamoras, the former regiment being immediately recalled to that point until it can march, supported by a column of infantry. This march will be under your own orders, and the general desires to be informed when it will commence that he may regulate his own march accordingly.

"I am directed further to say that the general disapproves of your order directing Captain Hunter to proceed to New Orleans. No officer in the field, except the General himself, has any right to order an officer out of the country, and the General sees nothing in the case to justify a departure from regulations and usage.

The next enclosure is a copy of a letter from Gen. Patterson to Major Bliss, in reply to the above, in the following terms:

"MAJOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of November. In accordance with the orders of the commanding general, I have suspended the embarkation of the Illinois foot until I have received the instructions which you say were sent by Major McCall, who I hope will soon join me. I desire to say that I have given no orders to the Tennessee regiment of horse except for its improvement in police and discipline. In my letter of the 24th of November I informed you that I should order the regiment of Tennessee horse to proceed as directed in your letter of the 5th of the same month. I am therefore somewhat at a loss to understand why the commanding general should, in this case, direct you to express to me 'his entire disapproval' of my proposing to do precisely what I had been ordered by him to do.

Although I think I had a clear right to order 'Captain Hunter, 2d dragoons, to proceed to New Orleans and bring out the horses and equipments for companies H and K of that regiment, so that the men may be at once mounted and prepared for the field,' and that there has been no departure from the regulations of the army; yet as the commanding general disapproves of this step, and as Captain Hunter is now on the boat with me, I will order him back to Camargo. As I have been very anxious that all my proceedings in Mexico should merit and receive the approbation of the general commanding, I cannot but regret that any act of mine should meet with his disapprobation.

"I have also to acknowledge the receipt of extract from special orders No. 179, the original of which was sent direct to Col. Baker. Although he was under my immediate command, and stationed at the same place, I have to remark that I neither sent up nor approved any application of Col. Baker's to go to Washington; that his correspondence with headquarters was direct, and did not pass through the usual channel. Col. Baker's regiment will now march with only one field officer, (the major.) I venture to request that hereafter all correspondence with officers under my command be passed through the usual channel. This is a courtesy due me, and I shall expect it.

"On my arrival at Matamoras I will ascertain the means of transportation, and inform you when the column under my command will move.

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Camp near Monterey, Dec. 22, 1846.

SIR: Agreeably to the plan announced in my despatch No. 122, I left this place on the 15th instant for Victoria, having previously put in motion the troops destined for that point. At Montemorelos a junction was effected on the 17th with the 2d infantry, and 2d regiment of Tennessee foot from Camargo, and it was intended with the whole force (say 3,500 men) to march on the 19th for Victoria. But the very evening of my arrival at Montemorelos a despatch arrived from General Worth, commanding at Saltillo, with the intelligence that Santa Anna designed to take advantage of the diversion of force towards Victoria, and by a rapid movement to strike a heavy blow at Saltillo, and if successful, then at General Wool's force at Parras. Under these circumstances, and with no means of judging how far this information might be well founded, I deemed it proper to return to this point, with the regular force, and thus be in a position to reinforce Saltillo if necessary. The volunteers under Brig. Gen. Quitman, reinforced by a field battery, were ordered to continue their march, and effect a junction with Gen. Patterson at Victoria, while I returned hither with General Twigg's division, now increased by the 2d infantry.

In the meantime, Major General Butler



and Brig. Gen. Wool being advised by Gen. Worth of a probable attack upon his position, moved rapidly to join him with all available force at Parras and Monterey, while orders were despatched by Maj. Gen. Butler to hasten up troops from the rear. The latter general proceeded in person to Saltillo, and assumed the command, agreeably to instructions which I had given before my departure to meet a case like the present.

I had proceeded beyond this point on my way to Saltillo, when I was met on the 20th by a despatch from the front, announcing the early arrival of General Wool's column, and also that the expected concentration and movement of the Mexican troops upon that position had not taken place; indeed, that their advance posts had rather been withdrawn. Deeming the force now and soon to be at Saltillo quite sufficient to repel any demonstration at this season from San Luis Potosi, I have not thought it worth while to throw forward Gen. Twigg's division to that place, and after resting it to-day, I shall, to-morrow, put it again in march for Victoria, moving forward myself to that point.

Major General Patterson is supposed to be now well on his march from Matamoras to Victoria, where his division, except the Alabama regiment, (in garrison at Tampico,) will be brought together. With a force holding in observation the passes from Tula, the garrison at Tampico may be much reduced with advantage to the service. I shall withdraw from that place at once the mounted riflemen and recruits that had been sent there.

I respectfully enclose a letter received yesterday from General Santa Anna in reply to my communication of December 4, a copy of which has been forwarded.

My last official date from Washington, is Nov. 10th.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major Gen. U. S. A. Comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army,  
Washington, D. C.

[TRANSLATION.]

General—The communication of your excellency of the 4th inst. and the enclosed printed sheet, inform me the government of the United States have ordered the release of Gen. Dias de la Vega, and of the Mexican officers who accompanied him, thus carrying into effect an exchange for the prisoners of the brig Truxton, as agreed upon between the commanding general of Vera Cruz and Commodore Conner. I shall give notice of this event to my government.

I shall also make known to it the mea-

sures your excellency has taken for the liberation of the Mexicans who were detained near Matamoras, and in the name of the republic, I give you most sincere thanks for this trait of humanity and generosity which, to a certain extent, alleviate the distresses consequent on a state of war.

I have the honor to offer to your excellency my esteem and high consideration.

Headquarters San Luis Potosi, Dec. 17, 1846.

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

Gen. Z. TAYLOR, Major General commanding the army of the United States.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Montemorelos, Dec. 26, 1846.

Sir:—Your communication of November 30th, with enclosures relative to the occupation of Tampico, has been received.

The prompt, and, in my opinion, sufficient measures taken to garrison Tampico, the moment that Commodore Perry arrived at the Brazos, were duly reported to the department; and I regret that it should have been considered necessary to give orders from Washington to garrison a place voluntarily abandoned by the enemy, and within the theatre of my operations; but, above all, that the diversion of a large body of regular troops to that point by the orders of Brigadier General Brooke should be approved, as seems to be the case. Those troops are not required at Tampico, but are much wanted at other points.

In regard to the direct correspondence with Major General Patterson, I have nothing to add to what has been said in former letters, except that confusion and embarrassment have resulted from this unusual course; and I must again insist, while invested with the chief command, upon being left perfectly free to employ the officers and the troops under my orders as may, in my own judgment, seem most expedient for the public service.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. army, commanding.  
The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the army, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Camp near Victoria, Mexico, Jan'y 7, 1847.

Sir:—I have the honor to advise you that on the 29th ultimo, Brigadier Gen. Quitman occupied, without resistance, the city of Victoria, capital of the State of Tamaulipas. The enemy had a body of some 1,500 cavalry in the town, with its advanced picket at Santa Engracia, but it fell back as General Quitman approached,

and is understood to be now at Jaumave, in the direction of Tula. At Tula there is a strong division of observation, under the command of Gen. Valencia.

An examination of the mountain pass leading to Tula shows that it is entirely impracticable for artillery or wagons. Such is also believed to be the character of the Santa Barbara pass, which opens in the direction of Tampico.

I arrived here with the division of Brig. Gen. Twiggs on the 4th instant, and was joined on the same day by the force which Major Gen. Patterson conducted from Matamoros. The force now collected here is over 5,000 strong, and, I am happy to add, in excellent health, and in good condition for service.

I am unofficially advised that Major General Scott is now in the country, under orders from the government. I propose to remain at this point until I can hear from him, and determine what disposition to make of the troops now here. I am constantly expecting despatches from his headquarters.

The reconnoissance of the mountain passes leading to Labradores, alluded to in my communication of December 26, was completely successful, so far as to determine the character of the routes, &c.; but regret to report that on the return of the party to Linares, the escort was attacked in a difficult pass of the mountain, and the baggage and ten men of the rear guard cut off. It is hoped that the rear guard may have effected their escape, and will yet join us. The officer and non-commissioned officer of the rear guard are in arrest, and the former under charges. I am happy to say that no blame can attach to Lieut. Col. May, who commanded the escort, for this unfortunate occurrence. His detailed report will be forwarded hereafter.

We have newspapers from the city of Mexico to the 19th of December, at which date the Congress had taken no action in regard to the war or the election of President. The country seems to be in a very distracted condition, and the tone of the public press more desponding than heretofore.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. Army, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
Saltillo, Feb. 25, 1847.

SIR:—I have respectfully to report that the main Mexican force is yet at Agua Nueva. Our troops hold the positions which they have so well defended, and are

prepared to receive the enemy, should he venture another attack.

An arrangement has been made with Gen. Santa Anna for an exchange of prisoners, by which we shall receive all, or nearly all, of those captured from us at different times, besides the few taken in the action of the 23d. Our wounded, as well as those of the Mexicans which have fallen into our hands, have been removed to this place, and are rendered comfortable.

Our loss in the recent actions, so far as ascertained, amounts to 264 killed, 450 wounded, and 26 missing. One company of the Kentucky cavalry is not included in this statement, its casualties not being yet reported. I respectfully enclose a list of the commissioned officers killed and wounded, embracing many names of the highest merit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Major General U. S. A., comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington. D. C.

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Agua Nueva, March 1, 1847.

SIR:—I have the honor to report that the troops of my command occupied their original camp at this place on the 27th of February, the last of the Mexican army leaving the morning of that day in the direction of San Luis. It is ascertained that the enemy is in full retreat, and in a very disorganized condition; the men deserting and dying of starvation in great numbers. I despatch a command this day as far as Encarnacion to harass his rear, and secure whatever military supplies may be found there.

From the statement of Mexican officers, particularly of the medical staff left to succor the wounded there seems no doubt, that their loss in the recent action is moderately estimated at 1,500, and may reach 2000 men, killed and wounded; besides 2000 or 3000 deserters. Many officers of rank were lost. I enclose a list of the names of our own killed and wounded, made as complete as practicable at this time. One regiment (Kentucky cavalry) is not included, its return not being rendered.

The enemy had fully reckoned upon our total rout, and had made arrangements to intercept our retreat, and cut off the army, stationing for that purpose corps of cavalry, not only immediately in our rear, but even below Monterey. I regret to report that they succeeded near the village of Marin in destroying a train of supplies, and killing a considerable number of the escort and teamsters. Col. Morgan, 2d Ohio regiment on his march from Cerralvo to Monterey,

was infested by the Mexican cavalry, with which he had several rencontres, but finally dispersed them with small loss on his own part. Capt. Graham, A Q M., volunteer service, was mortally wounded in one of these affairs. I have no doubt that the defeat of the main army at Buena Vista will secure our line of communication from further interruption, but I still propose in a few days to change my headquarters to Monterey, with a view to make such further arrangements as may be necessary in that quarter.

The dispositions made to harrass our rear, vindicate the policy and necessity of defending a position in front of Saltillo, where a defeat has thrown the enemy far back into the interior. No result so decisive could have been obtained by holding Monterey, and our communications would have been constantly in jeopardy.


I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,

Maj. Gen. U. S. A., comdg.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army,  
Washington, D. C.

IN FULL PURSUIT.



RINGGOLD'S FLYING ARTILLERY.







# SANTA ANNA.

PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF MEXICO;

**The son of an exiled Spanish Nobleman. Born in Mexico, 1803.**

**Made Dictator in 1835. Banished in 1845. Recalled in 1846.**

He is five feet eleven inches in height





































































































































































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